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
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Edited by LT.-GEN. SIR FRANCIS TUKER, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.

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The manuscript has been brought to light by Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Toker who contributes a preface recounting the story of the discovery of the manuscript and an introduction giving the background of the mutiny and of Private Metcalfe himself. General Toker served with the Indian Army for some thirty-four years and was the last G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Command, India.

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
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
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
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SECRETARY'S NOTES

May, 1953

HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN MARY

The death of Queen Mary on 24th March, 1953, ended a long and active association with the Institution, which began in 1893 when Her Majesty, as Princess "May," attended the laying of the memorial foundation stone.

The following letters were sent by the Chairman on 25th March in the name of the Institution :—

The Private Secretary to
Her Majesty The Queen,
Buckingham Palace,
S.W.1.

Sir,

The Council and Members of the Royal United Service Institution, with humble duty to Her Majesty, beg to state their profound regret at the death of Her Majesty Queen Mary, and to express their deep sympathy with Her Majesty The Queen and with all Members of the Royal Family in the loss they have sustained.

The Council and Members recall with very great pride the many visits which Her Majesty Queen Mary made to the Institution and Museum, where they treasure a large number of Her gracious gifts.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(signed) James Robb,
*Air Chief Marshal,
Chairman of the Council.*

The Private Secretary to
H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester,
St. James's Palace,
S.W.1.

Sir,

The Council and Members of the Royal United Service Institution beg to state their profound regret at the death of Her Majesty Queen Mary, and to express their deep sympathy with the President of the Institution, His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester, in the loss he has sustained.

The Council and Members recall with very great pride the many visits which Her Majesty Queen Mary made to the Institution and Museum, where they treasure a large number of Her gracious gifts.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(signed) James Robb,
*Air Chief Marshal,
Chairman of the Council.*

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Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., has been elected Chairman of the Council for 1953.

Vice-Chairman of the Council

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1953.

Ex Officio Member

Captain J. D. Luce, D.S.O., O.B.E., R.N., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Director of the Royal Naval Staff College.

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ARMY

Major E. MacL. Mackay, M.B.E., Royal Engineers.
 Captain L. G. Shaw, Royal Army Pay Corps.
 Brigadier A. D. M. Teacher, O.B.E.
 Major D. W. B. Williams, Royal Engineers.
 Captain D. G. Miles-Marsh, Coldstream Guards.
 Brigadier R. B. P. Wood, D.S.O.
 Major S. H. Ward, T.D., The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
 Lieutenant D. W. Beaver, R.A.S.C., T.A.
 Captain J. R. M. Ffrench, M.C., The Royal Ulster Rifles.
 Major R. H. Taylor, 19th Middx. H.G. Bn.
 Lieut.-Colonel Gurdev Singh, The Sikh Regiment, I.A.
 Brigadier A. G. Wilson, Australian Staff Corps.
 Major R. G. Maslen-Jones, The King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
 Lieutenant R. J. T. Blockberger, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians).
 Captain L. R. Smith, Coldstream Guards.
 Lieut.-Colonel M. N. Cox, M.C., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Major W. A. Fraser-Harris, Royal Artillery.
 Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Miller, R.A.O.C.
 Lieut.-Colonel G. B. Aris, O.B.E., M.C., T.D., R.A., T.A.
 Captain H. Lomax, R.E.M.E.
 Major R. Bromley Gardner, M.C., The Highland Light Infantry.
 Captain H. J. Orpen-Smellie, The Essex Regiment.
 Lieut.-Colonel H. B. Williams, Royal Army Educational Corps.
 Major P. Leslie, M.C., Royal Engineers.

Major-General E. L. Sheehan, C.B.E., Australian Military Forces.
 2nd Lieutenant P. R. Burleigh, Royal Engineers.
 Lieutenant G. E. V. Rochfort-Rae, Grenadier Guards.
 Captain C. E. M. Clarke, Royal Artillery.
 Major J. A. Croft, M.C., Royal Artillery.
 Major C. D. Rees, The Royal Welch Fusiliers.
 2nd Lieutenant M. J. Simmons, 14th/20th King's Hussars.
 Lieutenant G. G. Allt, The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
 Lieutenant G. W. Preston-Jones, Royal Engineers.
 Captain M. A. Taylor, R.A., T.A.R.O.
 Colonel B. E. Wallace, M.C.
 Lieutenant S. J. Bryan, R.A.A.C.
 Major E. R. E. Dayrell, Royal Artillery.
 Lieut.-Colonel P. M. Brooke-Hitching, late The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
 Captain C. A. Calow, Royal Pioneer Corps.
 Captain J. H. Jacob, The Durham Light Infantry.
 Captain R. T. Hone, Royal Signals.
 2nd Lieutenant T. H. Picton-Howell, The Durham Light Infantry.
 Brigadier D. W. Price, C.B.E.
 Lieut.-Colonel Mohd. Soleman, Royal Pakistan Signals.
 Lieutenant F. W. Ward, Royal Artillery.
 Captain A. F. S. Wilson, M.C., The Border Regiment.

AIR FORCE

Flying Officer D. J. B. Keats, R.A.F.
 Pilot Officer J. R. Lambert, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant E. Williams, M.C., R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader A. D. Rutherford-Jones, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant A. Collins, A.F.C., D.F.M., R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader E. B. O'H. Bennett, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant E. F. Hemming, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant G. R. G. Gimblett, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant P. W. Shaw, R.A.F.
 Wing Commander H. B. Martin, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.
 Flying Officer W. A. Long, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader B. B. Johnson, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader R. E. Powell, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant E. L. Beverley, D.F.C., R.A.F.V.R.
 Flight Lieutenant J. C. Pearson, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant H. G. Bullen, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant N. S. Howlett, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader W. L. Hitchcock, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant J. R. Austin, R.A.F.
 Flying Officer G. B. H. Norris, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant W. F. Hubert, R.A.F. Reserve.
 Squadron Leader N. Cameron, D.S.O., D.F.C., R.A.F.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub-Lieutenant J. C. S. Lea, R.N., 2nd Lieutenant R. P. Morgan, R.A., and 2nd Lieutenant A. J. B. Arthur, The Rifle Brigade, have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated to all members.

This materially assists the Institution because it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription. It is emphasized that a Deed of Covenant entails no additional expense to the member, but it goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration. Second and subsequent covenants may be executed at the old rate of £1 5s. od. per annum. The Council wish to thank the many members who have re-covenanted since the beginning of the year.

To date, there are 1,463 annual and 702 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place :—

| <i>Establishment or Command</i> | <i>Name</i> |
|---------------------------------|--|
| ROYAL NAVY | |
| Flag Officer, Submarines ... | Captain A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N. |
| R.N. Barracks, Chatham ... | Commander G. H. Evans, R.N. |
| Plymouth Group, R.M. ... | Captain F. R. A. D. Taylor, R.M. |
| ARMY | |
| Western Command ... | Major G. A. F. Steede. |
| Staff College, Camberley ... | Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Young, M.B.E. |
| ROYAL AIR FORCE | |
| Maintenance Command ... | Wing Commander O. Gradon, O.B.E. |

PRIZE ESSAYS

Gold Medal and Trench Gascoigne Competition, 1952.¹ The following entries were received :—

Gwyn Ow Bys.
 Mon centre cède ; ma droite recule ; situation excellente ; j'attaque.
 Unite for the public safety, if you would remain an independent nation.
 Constantia et virtute.
 He rides fastest who rides alone.
 Vi et virtute.
 Ars artis.
 Kismet.

Eardley-Wilmot Competition, 1952.² The following entries were received :—

Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis.
 Arma parata fero.
 Cave Quod Celo.
 It is possible to be too quick in discarding as well as too slow in adopting.
 Change is inevitable. In a progressive country change is constant.

Westland Prize. The following entries were received :—

A ffyuno Duw derfydd.
 Without vision the people perish.
 Banners flout the sky.
 Ca Ira.
 Cogito ergo sum.

¹ For results of the Gold Medal and Trench Gascoigne Competition, 1952, see Anniversary Meeting.

² For result of the Eardley-Wilmot Competition, 1952, see Anniversary Meeting.

This I'll defend.
 Baseline.
 Dinna haver but hover.
 He either fears his fate too much, Or his deserts are small, That dares not put
 it to the touch, To gain or lose it all.
 Cabar Feidh.
 Pioneer with courage.
 They shall mount up on wings as eagles.
 Non recuso laborem.
 If you must fly, fly well.
 Deus gubernat navem.
 Quis dabit mihi pennas sicut columbae.
 Let us, then, be up and doing.
 Désir n'a repos.
 Give me the wings, Magician, or I die.
 Give me time.
 Bahut Achcha, Sahib.
 Accipiter.
 A little learning is dangerous.
 Per Heliks ad Olympus.

The result of the Westland Competition will be announced in the August number of the JOURNAL.

MUSEUM

ADDITIONS

An officer's full-dress uniform, a regimental medal, five water-colour paintings, a painting of a mounted officer, and a coloured print, all of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons. Bequeathed with other items by the late Major S. S. Jackson, 6th Inniskilling Dragoons.

An autographed photograph of H.M. Queen Victoria (9594) and a print entitled "Combined Operations, 1904" (9595). Given by the Rev. J. Stileman.

A silver equestrian statuette of a trooper of the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers, 1903 (9596). Given by the surviving Officers of the Cape Mounted Riflemen.

A life-size marble bust of Napoleon (9597). Given by F. C. Daniell, Esq.

An elaborately carved cheroot-holder which is said to have belonged to Vice-Admiral Viscount Nelson (9598). Given by W. M. Mollison, Esq.

A helmet of the Light Company, 5th Foot, *circa* 1775 (9599). Given by D. Hird, Esq.

JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the recent war; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.



Photograph by Dorothy Wilding.

HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II



Elizabeth the Second, By the Grace of God of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories
Queen, Head of the Commonwealth,
Defender of the Faith

Succeeded to the Throne 6th February, 1952

Patron of the Royal United Service Institution
since 23rd June, 1952

God Save The Queen

To



The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty

May it please Your Majesty:

WE the Chairman, Council and Members of the
Royal United Service Institution

with humble duty to Your Majesty beg leave to affirm our loyalty and devotion to Your Throne and Person on the occasion of Your Majesty's Coronation.

WE are deeply sensible of the high honour You have conferred on the Institution by becoming our Patron and we are ever grateful for the privilege of the use of Your Majesty's Banqueting House of Whitehall, granted to us by Your illustrious forbear Queen Victoria, which royal favour the Institution has enjoyed by Grace of the Sovereign ever since

WE trust that Your Majesty may long be spared to reign over Your devoted and loyal subjects amongst whom we pray You ever to include those officers of the three Services who are Members of this Your Royal United Service Institution.

I have the Honour to be, Madam,
Your Majesty's loyal and most obedient
servant.

James Robb

Air Chief Marshal
Chairman of the Council.

June 1953.

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THE CROWN AND THE INSTITUTION

By LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON

IN the last Coronation number of the JOURNAL the story of the Crown and the Banqueting House was told, and these present notes deal only with the link between the Crown and the Institution.

The word 'Royal' in our title not only signifies the grant of a Royal Charter; it also symbolizes the gracious interest taken by the Sovereign in the Institution ever since its foundation by King William IV on 25th June, 1831. From that day we have been continuously honoured with the Patronage of the Sovereign, and the Royal Dukes of Cambridge, Connaught, and Gloucester have been our Presidents since 1870.

The most outstanding mark of Royal appreciation in our history is the grant by Queen Victoria in 1890 of the use of the Banqueting House to house the treasures of the Institution's Museum; until that year it had been a Chapel Royal since the reign of King George I. The former premises of the Institution in Whitehall Yard had long been insufficient for our needs and, following the Queen's gracious act, a Crown lease was obtained covering the ground adjoining the South end of the Banqueting House, which was then occupied by the stables belonging to Dover House.

A request to the Treasury for a grant to meet the cost of the proposed new building failed, and a bazaar was organized under the patronage of The Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, "to arouse interest in the Institution to a still greater degree, and to commend it to the more general support of the Services and the public."

On 6th June, 1893, the memorial stone of the new wing was laid by H.R.H. The Prince of Wales, "the streets bordering on the new home of the Institution were thronged with eager sightseers, who found a continual source of interest and amusement in the Guards of Honour which lined the roadways." The Guards, furnished by the Royal Navy and the Coldstream Guards with the Band of the Portsmouth Division of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, were drawn up at the North entrance, and Horse Guards Avenue was lined by detachments of The Life Guards, In-Pensioners of the Royal Hospital, the Royal Hospital School, Greenwich, and the Duke of York's Military School.

Incidentally, it was on this day that Horse Guards Avenue was formally opened as a public thoroughfare.

On the site of the new building a large marquee was erected. In addition to the high commanders of the Services, His Royal Highness was accompanied by the Princess of Wales, the Duke and Duchess of Teck and their daughter, Princess "May," later Queen Mary, whose engagement to the Duke of York had recently been announced,—“ the presence of the Princess ' May ' was naturally a source of pleasure to all the guests ”—the Duke and Duchess of Edinburgh, Prince and Princess Christian, Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein, and Prince Louis of Battenberg. When Their Royal Highnesses had taken their place on the dais, the National Anthem was sung by the Choir of the Chapel Royal, St. James's, and the Archbishop of Canterbury then offered a prayer. An Address was presented by the President of the Institution, the Duke of Cambridge, to His Royal Highness who, in accepting it, said, “ May this new building and ancient Institution always flourish.” During the ceremony a casket containing coins and papers, of which the nature unfortunately is not recorded, was deposited below the stone ; the casket can be seen to-day at the top of the first flight of the main stairs. After the laying of the memorial stone, Their Royal Highnesses toured the bazaar laid out in the Banqueting Hall, and later there was a concert in the marquee. The acoustic problem, from which the building still suffers slightly to-day, evidently goes back to its foundation as “ both musicians and vocalists laboured under great disadvantage.”

The building was completed within two years, and at noon on 20th February, 1895, the Prince of Wales, accompanied by the Duke of York, later King George V, the Duke of Connaught, Prince Christian, and Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, performed the opening ceremony.

The Institution has been honoured with visits by many Members of the Royal Family. The most frequent, and certainly one of the best-informed on the contents of our Museum, was Her late Majesty Queen Mary who, only two years ago, in her eighty-fourth year, spent an active hour on the premises and imparted some of her great knowledge to those who attended her.

ROYAL NAVAL REVIEWS AT SPITHEAD

By REAR-ADMIRAL F. D. ARNOLD-FORSTER, C.M.G.

THE only precedents for a Coronation Naval Review are those of King Edward VII, King George V, and King George VI. But since the time when King Henry VIII built a "Royal Navy," many of our Sovereigns have reviewed the fleet, and as King Henry VII had already selected Portsmouth Harbour for the site of a Royal dockyard, the convenient roadstead at Spithead was chosen for most of these displays.

Much of the ceremonial observed at Reviews with regard to flags, command, and salutes owes its origin to King Charles II. By this date the fleet was organized in squadrons—'centre,' 'van,' and 'rear,' wearing flags and colours—red, white, and blue, respectively. This led to the institution of Admirals of the Red ranking above corresponding grades of the White because the Commander-in-Chief's station was in the centre, Admirals of the White above those of the Blue because the van was a more honourable position than the rear.

The first Royal Review to be generally reported was held by King George III. When in July, 1773, he paid a four days visit to Portsmouth to inspect the dockyard and fortifications and review the fleet, "great preparations had been made for that unprecedented event." That fleet and many of its officers had won renown in the Seven Years War; but subsequently the King's well-meaning attempts to run things himself had led to inefficiency and corruption in Government departments. The ships assembled at Spithead, their sides enlivened with a lick of paint and varnish, their elaborate figureheads and embellishments on stern and quarter galleries furnished up, looked smart and efficient. Actually, some of them had rotten below-water timbers and many were full of defects due to years of dockyard neglect.

The King arrived from Kew early, and was saluted by a triple discharge of cannon on the ramparts on entering the Land Port gate. After official receptions, the Royal party, conducted by the First Lord of the Admiralty, proceeded to the dockyard landing place, where the admirals and all the captains of the fleet were assembled, their barges waiting to escort the King's and Admiralty barges to Spithead. The captain of the Royal Yacht steering the King's barge and the procession of boats, all flying their flags and pendants, rowed out to Spithead where the King boarded the flagship *Barfleur*, already cleared for action. After inspecting the quarters, the King went aft to the cabin, and at 3.30 p.m., "sat down to a table of thirty covers" with officers of high rank, the Royal health being drunk to a salute of 21 guns. After pulling round the lines with his escort of captains, being cheered and saluted with 21 guns from each ship he passed, he boarded the Royal Yacht *Augusta*, a ship-rigged sloop, and sailed up harbour. Early each morning, the King inspected some military work or naval establishment. Each day he dined on board the *Barfleur* at Spithead, the programme being varied by cruises in the *Augusta*. On the fourth day, the Royal Yacht led the Blue division of the fleet to Sandown Bay. There was a stiff beat back, after which the Blue division proceeded to Plymouth and the *Augusta* anchored off Southsea Castle. Here all captains and lieutenants at Spithead were received by the King and kissed his hand, whilst the land forces fired a *feu-de-joie* and a triple discharge of cannon.

After the Treaty of Paris, a naval display was organized for the Allied Sovereigns, who wished to see "the tremendous naval armaments which had swept from the

ocean the fleets of France and Spain and secured to Britain the domain of the sea." The Review was held in April, 1814, by the Prince Regent, the King of Prussia and Emperor of Russia with their families being accommodated at Portsmouth. At Spithead lay 15 ships of the line and 31 frigates and sloops, all veterans of the war, rows of open red-lipped gunports showing up the brightly varnished yellow strakes on their black sides. Black yards, white-edged with neatly furled sails, cut sharply across the yellow and bare greased spars of their masts. Every ship carried a spanker gaff and boom on the mizzen, instead of the old-fashioned lateen yard of most of the ships at the 1773 review. When the Royal barges passed between the lines, the ceremonial included "manning yards" and a 42-gun salute. On board the *Impregnable* each Sovereign was called for in turn to be cheered by the boatloads of sightseers swarming around. Next day the Royalties embarked in the Royal Yacht *Royal Sovereign*. The line-of-battle ships and frigates stood out to sea, the Royal Yacht leading. At 5 p.m. the fleet hove to in order to transfer the Royal Yacht's party to the flagship for refreshment. Beating back to Spithead, the fleet carried out battle manoeuvres by signal "with amazing accuracy," with much firing of guns to add to the effect.

In 1842, Queen Victoria with Prince Albert visited Portsmouth when a Grand Naval Review was held in their honour. The young Royal couple were received by Sir Edward Codrington and were shown round his flagship, the *St. Vincent*, and the new three-decker *Queen*. Except that their sides were striped with white and yards were yellow, these ships differed little from those of the three earlier reigns. And though there was little difference in the character of their officers and men, there were changes in their appearance which the venerable Duke of Wellington, who was present on behalf of the Government, could have specified. He could remember the captains taking to epaulettes with their new tail coats when Nelson held that rank; these officers all had epaulettes, and wore their cocked hats fore and aft instead of athwartships. The queue had disappeared, and neat white breeches, stockings, and buckled shoes had been discarded for gold-laced trousers and pumps. The seamen, with jackets, blue white-taped collars and black silk scarves, baggy trousers, and beribboned straw hats, were hardly in uniform to the military eye; but they looked less piratical than did Nelson's Jack Tars in their pork-pie hats, with their flaming waistcoats, loud check shirts, and blue and white striped pants. Old hands present had once been proud of their pigtails, but now all wore 'love-locks' instead. When the *St. Vincent* piped to dinner, the Royal party went round her mess decks. Stopping at the mess abreast the mainmast, the Queen suddenly said she wanted to taste the grog, there and then. A mess basin was immediately filled from the nearest grog can and presented to her by Captain Rich, on bended knee. She took several sips and said it was good. This impromptu event hugely delighted the men, who gave her three hearty cheers and drank to her with "Her Majesty's health, God bless her!"

In June, 1845, when the Queen inspected the Experimental Squadron, formed to test rates of sailing, she used her new yacht, the *Victoria and Albert*, first of the two paddlers of that name. There were eight line-of-battle ships, of which Her Majesty visited the flagship *St. Vincent*, (120), the *Trafalgar*, (120), and the *Albion*, (90), whose "splendid fittings" she greatly admired. The *Superb* was then ordered to weigh whilst the rest carried out sail drill at anchor, and Rear-Admiral Parker transferred his blue flag to the mizzen of that ship. From the paddle-box of the Royal Yacht, the Queen watched the *Trafalgar's* men run aloft "with feline agility." Sails were let fall, sheeted home and hoisted, topsails reefed, double and treble reefed,

"with astonishing celerity." Meanwhile, the *Superb* was under way and soon running under all plain sail, followed by the Royal Yacht. On the latter coming up, starboard stunsails were set. The wind freshening beyond the Nab, the *Superb* was obliged to shorten sail, and the Royal Yacht returned to Cowes. Never again was there a Royal Review of sailing ships pure and simple. The same year when the Queen again inspected the squadron it included the new screw sloop *Rattler*, which had pulled over the paddle-sloop *Alecto* in a fair tug-of-war—a portent of an era of change in warship design and the art of naval warfare.

On 11th August, 1853, when war with Russia was imminent, the Queen and Prince Albert held a Naval Review which was particularly notable because it marked two important stages in scientific progress: at Spithead there was gathered a fleet which included screw ships-of-the-line and paddlers, while ashore for the first time visitors were brought to witness a Naval Review by train. The paddle yacht, *Victoria and Albert*, which had superseded the *Royal George*, the last of the sailing Royal Yachts,¹ conveyed the Royal party out to the anchorage. On arrival they went on board the steam line-of-battle ship *Duke of Wellington*, flagship of Sir Thomas Cochrane, Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth and Vice-Admiral of the Red. At the head of the other line was the *Agamemnon*, another steamer, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Cory, Rear-Admiral of the Blue. The Board of Admiralty were accommodated in the paddle yacht *Black Eagle*. Having completed their inspections, the Queen and Prince Consort re-embarked in the Royal Yacht which then led the fleet to sea. Outside the Nab, an 'enemy fleet,' consisting of the three great sailing ships-of-the-line, *Prince Regent*, *Queen*, and *London*, under Rear-Admiral Fanshawe, was engaged by the steamers. This was followed by a race back to Spithead "the screw ships making their way through the crowds of yachts, whilst far astern under a press of sail came the sailing ships."

Even more spectacular was the Review of 1856, in recognition of the Navy's services in the Russian War. At Spithead were 24 line-of-battle ships—three only without engines, 19 screw frigates, and 18 single-decked, barque-rigged paddlers. Off Monckton lay the grey mortar vessels. Off Southsea Castle were four iron-clad floating batteries of 1,500 tons, designed to keep out Russian shell and whose presence spelt the doom of our wood-built Navy. Over a hundred gunboats "puffing about like locomotive engines with wisps of white steam trailing from their funnels," produced a striking effect. Led by the Royal Yacht, the fleet in two columns steamed out to the Nab, wheeled round two mark vessels at anchor, and returned to Spithead. Then came a furious gunboat attack on the land defences from Browndown to Southsea Castle. Unfortunately the soldiers being peppered with blank by the sailors, were unable to reply, the Lieut.-Governor having discovered at the last moment that he would have to pay for every round fired. At 9.0 p.m., every gunport in the fleet burst into vivid light whilst hundreds of rockets went up.

Uniform regulations for seamen were issued in 1857. At later Reviews they appeared in the rig which, with modifications, is worn to-day. The smart blue tunic worn over the white "frock" was last seen at the Queen's Diamond Jubilee Review, but cloth trousers and white straw hats were retained until much later. Apart from the stately arrival of the Royal flotilla, piloted by the small Trinity House yacht, the inspiring ceremonial, and the lively panorama of Spithead with illuminations in the

¹ The figure-head and stern scroll-work of the *Royal George* were presented to the Institution by King Edward VII.

evening, the chief interest now lay in the new types of warship that appeared on each occasion. At the Review of 1867 in honour of the Sultan of Turkey, when every ship for the first time flew the white ensign, one of two columns was entirely composed of iron-built broadside ships and iron-plated wood-built ships with turrets. Heading this line was the five-masted flagship *Minotaur* and her three-masted 10,000-ton sister, *Achilles*. Next came the two long 14-knot sisters *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, built on the lines of the graceful fast wood frigates in the other column. For once 'Queen's weather' failed the occasion. When the *Osborne*, bringing the Sultan over to Cowes, passed the fleet, the white-frocked sailors manning the yards were drenched with rain, their remarks on foreign potentates being borne away on the wind.

By 1873, when the Prince of Wales accompanied by the Shah of Persia inspected the fleet, it included twin-screw mastless turret ships. Instead of manning yards, as a compliment to Royalty, for these ships the less distinctive gesture of manning ship had to be invented. Amongst the new types were the fine-looking central-battery ships of which the heavily masted *Hercules* was a handsome example. Newest of all was the hideous, low freeboard *Devastation* with four heavy M.L. guns in turrets. There were also a number of small coast-defence turret and box-battery ships, which turned up with the 'freaks' at later reviews.

The most lasting impression of the Jubilee Review of 1887 was the churning past of the smart paddle yachts, followed by three great Indian troopships, *Euphrates*, *Crocodile*, and *Malabar*, with the glimpse of the Queen sitting under an awning on the quarter-deck of the *Victoria and Albert*, surrounded by her grandchildren, and smiling graciously as each ship took up the cheering. The low-ended barbette ship *Collingwood* of the new *Admiral* class was there. The five-masted *Minotaur* was still a flagship. But the flag of the Commander-in-Chief was flying in the clumsy-looking brig-rigged *Inflexible*, with four 80-ton muzzle-loading guns in turrets *en échelon*. Her smaller edition, the *Edinburgh*, with breech-loading guns, was also present, and the *Impérieuse* with heavy breech-loading guns *en barbette* in disappearing mountings. There were torpedo-boats and some small 'torpedo-cruisers,' and, amongst the 'freaks,' a big muster of the gunboats known as 'one-gun pelters.'

A distinguished guest at the 1889 Review was the German Emperor Wilhelm II. He arrived in his white yacht *Hohenzollern* with a squadron of seven 7,000-ton battleships, most of them old but all with Krupp breech-loading guns. That same year his Naval Secretary, Admiral von Tirpitz, with the strong backing of his Imperial master, persuaded the Reichstag to pass his Navy Bill, providing for 17 battleships and 26 cruisers. This time, the Commander-in-Chief's flagship was the 10,000-ton *Howe*, of the *Admiral* class, four of which were present. Other big ships were of the same assorted types as before, but there were five 'belted cruisers,' some protected cruisers, and torpedo-gunboats. A novelty was the 19-knot White Star liner *Teutonic*, fitted as an armed merchant cruiser. Built for heavy Atlantic weather, this sturdy vessel was still good for hard work right through the 1914-1918 War, when she was employed on the Northern Patrol, on convoy duty, and on trooping. The Review had to be postponed over the week-end on account of weather, and the Emperor filled in Sunday by informal ship visiting. First he asked to see the *Teutonic*, he then inspected the *Howe* in great detail and went over the belted cruiser *Immortalité*. Next day the *Victoria and Albert*, with the Prince of Wales's and the Imperial standards flying side by side at the main, passed through the lines, the *Hohenzollern* and *Osborne* following astern. The Kaiser stood on the bridge with the Prince of Wales acknowledging the salutes.

At the Diamond Jubilee Review of 1897, the Prince of Wales again deputized for the Queen. Masts and yards were still in evidence in old iron-clads, in many useful corvettes and sloops, and in the training brigs. But in modern types there was a better balanced fighting fleet than had been seen at Spithead since the Prince Regent's Review of 1814. High freeboard battleships were represented by seven *Majestics* and four *Royal Sovereigns*. The single 110-ton guns seen on the high barbettes of the *Benbow* of the Admiral class, were gazed at with awe. There were homogenous batches of cruisers large and small, flotillas of destroyers, and a flotilla of torpedo boats with their depot ship *Hecla*. The disappearance of the reciprocating engine in men-of-war was heralded by the small *Turbinia* with Parsons' turbines, which darted up and down the lines. Many of the ships at this last Royal Review of the Victorian era did useful service of one kind or another in the 1914-18 War.

King Edward VII's Coronation Review in 1902 was the last at which the ships appeared with black hulls with red or green waterlines, white and yellow topsides, yellow masts and funnels and, in some cases, gilded scroll-work on bows and stern. Soon afterwards, by Admiralty order, seamen, stokers, and marines were busy with paint pots and brushes making an end of the colourful Navy of the past and converting it into the grey warlike fleet as we know it to-day. With this change something has been lost in the picturesqueness and romance, though not in the dignity and impressiveness of Royal Naval Reviews.

Naval Reviews followed each other in fairly rapid succession in the early years of the new century. Following the Coronation Review in 1902, a combined British and French Review was held in 1905 to celebrate the Entente Cordiale; then two Reviews in 1909, one in the Thames and one at Spithead, another Coronation Review in 1911, a Review in 1912 for the benefit of the Members of both Houses of Parliament, and that famous one in July, 1914, which consisted of the ships mobilized in preparation for the war with Germany.

The passage of these years was marking many new changes, and the overall pattern of the Navy was keeping pace with the years. The new King's desire for friendship with France, so soon to prove a corner-stone in the building of a new foreign policy for Britain, was reflected in the assembly at Spithead, on 9th August, 1905, of a combined British and French fleet, so proudly inspected by King Edward VII as a visible sign of the new alignment of power. For the first time the tricolour of France flew at Spithead in full equality with the White Ensign of Britain, a truly historic moment.

How far the new British friendship with France stimulated Kaiser Wilhelm II to initiate the German bid for sea power in the first decade of the new century can never be known, but by 1909 the full effect of the naval building race with Germany was beginning to be seen. Of the 150 ships of the Home and Atlantic Fleets in the two Reviews held that year, no fewer than 24 were battleships, with 26 armoured cruisers. There were, also, 35 submarines among the warships, an indication of the high value placed by the Admiralty on this new type of ship in naval warfare. Great Britain had been the last maritime nation in the world to adopt the submarine, long standing out against it on the grounds of its being an inhuman weapon. In 1900, giving way before the pressure of public opinion and the threat of large-scale French submarine building, the Admiralty had ordered its first five Holland boats. Now, in 1909, Great Britain was leading the world in this new weapon.

The Coronation Review of 1911 saw another great assembly of warships at Spithead, 167 British and 18 foreign being gathered there to do honour to a new King,

and one who had made the Navy especially his own by years of service in it. King George V had been in command of a gunboat during his father's Coronation Review in 1902, and now it was he who stood upon the bridge of the *Victoria and Albert* and received the Royal Salute from so many ships. As he stood there, he could see for himself how the fleet was still growing in size under the spur of German competition, and also the reality of Lord Fisher's dreams in the great *Dreadnought*, with her two wing turrets, and the three battle-cruisers *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Indomitable*, with their two midship turrets set at right angles. He could see, too, the odd-looking *Neptune*, so recently completed, with her midship turrets *en échelon* and a midship superstructure looking like two arches of a railway bridge.

The Review of 1912 showed even more progress towards the creation of a mammoth fleet. Of the 223 ships present, 44 were battleships, five were battle-cruisers, and 46 were cruisers. To the battleships of the previous year were now added two of the new 13.5-inch gunned ships, the *Orion* and *Monarch*, with two more of the same class just about to be completed. Design was reaching a more normal phase so far as the placing of the turrets was concerned, for these ships had all five on the centre line. These ships were what was known as 'Conditional Dreadnoughts,' only to be built if the European situation looked threatening enough. Any doubt that may have existed in 1908, when the ships were first projected, had become certainty in 1910, when all four were laid down.

The discerning spectator in 1912, as well as marvelling at a great array of British sea power, could also catch a glimpse of the future. For the first time in a Review, naval aircraft were among the exhibits. Three of them were present and there was a universal gasp of amazement and incredulity when one of them made an ascent from the deck of H.M.S. *London*.

Spithead in 1914 saw the fleet, although assembled for a great spectacular occasion, already preparing for the war whose clouds were even now darkening the horizon. As it lay at anchor it covered an area seven miles in length and two in width. It was "the most magnificent and powerful fleet ever known in naval history," and like its immediate predecessors echoed the firm belief of the Admiralty in the battleship as the acme of naval power. There were 59 of them assembled on that day, of which 24 were Dreadnoughts, and at the head of the line lay the new *Iron Duke* of 25,000 tons, so soon to lead the Grand Fleet into action. Perhaps it was fortunate that, on that July day of 1914, no one could foresee the fate of so many of those fine vessels lying at anchor, for it would inevitably have clouded what was, in fact, a proud spectacle of majestic naval might.

The Review of 1919, part of the peace celebrations, was held in the Thames, but in 1924 King George V came to Spithead to review his fleet, just as he did eleven years later, in 1935, to celebrate his Silver Jubilee. Both these Reviews at Spithead reflected the rapidly changing opinions on naval warfare, for the unwieldy bulk of the aircraft carrier could be seen among the assembled ships, an ever-growing revelation of the way in which the aeroplane was beginning to dominate naval thought. There were still many battleships present, though fewer now than before the war, and the bitter experience of unrestricted submarine warfare between 1914 and 1918 was reflected in a big increase in the number of destroyers, with all their attachments for bringing death to these scourges of the sea.

Two years later, in 1937, the ships of the fleet assembled once again in Spithead for a Coronation Review. Battleships by now were reduced to eleven, a sad commen-

tary on what once had been the pride of the British Navy, but the presence of five carriers, two more than had previously been collected together at Spithead, showed the bid that the Fleet Air Arm was making to be considered the premier striking force of the new Navy. The 60 fleet destroyers which graced the Review with their swift, slim hulls were an added commentary on the overall cost of the battleship, for their duties were largely tied up in the essential service of escorting the bigger ships in war.

Now, in 1953, another fleet is to assemble at Spithead for a Coronation Review. Another great war has been fought, and the discerning spectator can see, in the composition of this new fleet, how the cumulative experience of war has influenced naval thought and design in these last decisive years. For the fleet of to-day is devised to implement those many, and often painful, lessons that the last war taught, and is designed to give effect to the modern weapons and aids that the great advance in scientific knowledge and achievement has provided to the fighting Services of the Empire.

This year's Review is notable, also, for other reasons. The Dominions are sending ships to do honour to the new Queen on the occasion of her Coronation, and their presence will play a large part in this present spectacle of naval strength and power. Carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, all belonging to the Dominion Navies, are coming from the ends of the world to represent the Empire which recognizes The Queen as its head. The Merchant Navy and the fishing fleets, too, are sending contingents, and the warships of foreign naval Powers will add yet another touch of colour as their flags and ensigns fly alongside those of our own ships.

CORONATIONS AND THE ARMY

By LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. G. ARMSTRONG

MILITARY forces have been closely connected with the Coronation of the Kings and Queens of England for over 800 years, but the character of this association has gradually changed throughout the centuries. In the earliest times, they were often used to support the claims of the rightful heir against aggression or by a usurper to overthrow the legal succession and to intimidate the population. The Coronation of King Henry VIII in 1509, however, ushered in a new era. With the firm establishment of the Monarchy in the hearts of the people and with the growth of civilization, the employment of military forces at the Coronation lost its former character and assumed the present day aspect of ceremony, pomp, and pageantry.

A snowy Christmas morning, 1066, marked the Coronation Day of William, Duke of Normandy. At the invitation of the Witenagemot the Duke met the Saxon chiefs at London Stone (the old Roman milestone in Cornhill) and rode with a Saxon bodyguard along the North bank of the Thames to the rich Abbey of Thorney Isle—now Westminster—where he was to be crowned King. The Norman guards, arrayed in hauberks and steel helmets and armed with lance, sword, and shield, were drawn up outside the Abbey, and when the Duke entered the building for the Ceremony, Normans and Saxons once more stood face to face. Barely two months had passed since that fatal day at Senlac, where the Saxon King Harold had fallen to a Norman arrow, and generations were to follow before mutual confidence could be established between the two races. The Norman guards, stronger in armament and discipline but weaker in numbers, were desperately afraid of treachery, and when the Saxons burst into round upon round of cheering for the new King in their own tongue, the Normans mistook the applause for the Saxon battle-cry. In a few moments the guards were fighting shield to shield and the snow was crimson with their blood. King William, hearing the uproar, refused to interrupt the Coronation Ceremony. But as soon as the Crown had been placed upon his head, he rushed out of the Abbey and leaping upon his charger, galloped mace in hand into the thick of the combat. Belabouring both Normans and Saxons alike, the King at last succeeded in separating the combatants and stopping the affray.¹

The Coronation of King Richard III affords a notable example—fortunately rare in our long history—of the use of military forces to overthrow the lawful succession when Richard, Duke of Gloucester, guardian of the boy King Edward V, seized the King's person and confined him, together with the young Duke of York, in the Tower of London. Assembling four thousand mounted men-at-arms from the North, clad "in their best jacks and rusty² sallettes, with a few in white harnesses but not burnished," Richard had himself crowned King at Westminster on 6th July, 1483. The loyal men of Kent to the number of some two thousand, rallied at Southwark for the defence of King Edward but, unable to pass over the Thames at London Bridge and overawed by the superior strength of Richard's adherents, dispersed quietly to their homes without striking a blow. This ruthless *coup d'état* was shortly followed by the murder of King Edward and the Duke of York in the Tower.

¹ See *A History of the Coronation*, by W. J. Passingham.

² Rusty = russet.

The general outline of the arrangements for the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1559—only seventy-four years after the death of Richard—show clearly the striking change in the spirit of the times and the firm hold that the Monarchy was beginning to take on the affections of the people. The display of military force was reduced to a minimum. The streets were lined only by the apprentices of the City Guilds and by the City Constables clad in silk and velvet, while the Queen was escorted by the Yeomen of the Guard. The Ordnance at the Tower fired the traditional Royal Salute as the Procession entered Tower Street and marched by way of Old St. Paul's and the Strand to the Abbey. The River Thames was—in those days—the main highway of London and the custom was for the Sovereign to sail in the State Barge from Hampton or Greenwich to the Tower, whence the Procession marched through the unpaved lanes of the City to Westminster Abbey. The route was thronged with spectators and the Queen received a royal welcome from the cheering crowds.

The Restoration of King Charles II was the occasion for an imposing military display at Blackheath. After landing at Dover, the King was met by the Lord Mayor of London and 120,000 citizens and rode down the ranks of 20,000 Horse and Foot of the Commonwealth Army drawn up to receive him. His Majesty then crossed London Bridge escorted by Colonel Browne's Regiment of Horse uniformed in silver doublets with black scarves. This magnificent force, however, was shortly afterwards disbanded and England was again left without a Standing Army. The Coronation in 1661 differed only in detail from that of Queen Elizabeth, and the route followed was identical. The ways were lined by the London Militia—the direct descendants of the old trained bands—and the King was preceded by the Duke of York's Horse Guards, led by the Duke who wore a tall "Restoration" hat. The private gentlemen of the Guards wore full-bottomed wigs, long skirted coats, and high leather boots. They were armed with ceremonial maces carried at the slope on the right shoulder and with swords worn in a sling on the left hip, while their horses were turned out in rich saddle-cloths. The King rode in the centre of the Procession and was guarded by the Gentlemen Pensioners, equipped with swords and pikes, and by the Yeomen of the Guard clad in scarlet and bearing the ancient shields which they have now discarded. King Charles II will always be affectionately remembered by the Army as, the year after his Coronation, owing to Venner's plot against the Monarchy, he raised the first Regular Regiments of Household Cavalry and Foot Guards, the nucleus of our Army of to-day.

The customary organizing ability of the Civil authorities seems to have deserted them at the Coronation of King George III in 1761. The columns of the Press were full of complaints of the faulty seating arrangements in the Abbey and at the Royal Banquet, of the high price of seats on the route, and of the unpunctuality of the Procession. Comic interludes were not lacking. The Earl of Talbot, whose duty was to ride beside the King's Champion, had so thoroughly trained his horse to rein back in the presence of Royalty that the unfortunate animal refused to march in any other way and insisted on accompanying the Procession "in reverse." This caused so much laughter amongst the crowds that several ladies had to be carried away in hysterics. Nor did the Army escape from the general fire of criticism, and allegations were freely made that the troops unnecessarily belaboured the crowds with the flat of their swords and for a consideration allowed individuals to slip through the cordon in order to see the Procession more closely. "Other times, other manners" and history records that only one civilian was seriously hurt and

he by a kick from a horse. The troops present on parade included Sir Robert Rich's Dragoons (now 4th Queen's Own Hussars), a detachment of Sir John Mordaunt's Dragoons (now 10th Royal Hussars)—the Regiment being on active service in Germany at the time—and 2,800 of the Foot Guards.

Field-Marshal Lord Ligonier, the Commander-in-Chief, was in general control of the military arrangements, and although aged eighty, showed that his soldierly spirit was not abated by setting up his headquarters in a tent in Old Palace Yard. Ligonier was the forerunner of a long list of famous men who have been in command at the Coronation, and had a remarkable career. During the religious persecution of the Huguenots, young Ligonier was smuggled out of France in a barrel and joined Marlborough's Army in the Netherlands, where he purchased a commission in the Xth Foot (The Lincolnshire Regiment) and later rose to the rank of Major-General at Fontenoy. Lord Ligonier, Rich's Dragoons, and the Foot Guards had all served under the King's grandfather—King George II—who was the last British Monarch to command an army in the field, at the hard fought action of Dettingen.

Sunrise on 28th June, 1838, saw the troops on the march to their allotted stations for the Coronation of Queen Victoria. Detachments of The Life Guards, 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, and the XXth Foot (The Lancashire Fusiliers) mounted Guards of Honour outside the Palace, and the 9-pounder guns of the Royal Artillery posted in St. James's Park fired a Royal Salute. After a lapse of nearly 200 years, the connection between the Coronation and the battle of Dettingen was still in evidence, for The Life Guards and the XXth Foot had served in that action with King George II. The Commander-in-Chief at the Coronation was the Marquis of Anglesey, better known to soldiers as Lieutenant-General the Earl of Uxbridge, commander of the Allied Cavalry at Waterloo. He was obviously a man of decided character for having the misfortune to lose a leg in action, he caused the limb to be buried on the field and a monument erected over it.

Major-General Sir Charles Dalbiac, who was in executive command of the troops numbering about 2,000 Horse and 4,000 Foot, had at his disposal The 1st and 2nd Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, 10th Royal Hussars, 12th Royal Lancers, Royal Artillery, 1st and 3rd Grenadier Guards, detachment 1st Coldstream Guards, 1st and 2nd Scots Fusilier Guards, XXth Foot, a detachment from the Royal Marines, 1st and 2nd Rifle Brigade, and the Honourable Artillery Company. These numbers were considerably in excess of those present at the Coronation of 1761, but the bulk of the Army was at that time on service in Germany and fewer men were therefore available for duty at home. The Royal Procession drove via Constitution Hill—Piccadilly—St. James's Street—Whitehall to the Abbey, and the Queen was escorted by squadrons of the Household Cavalry and by the Yeomen of the Guard. As Her Majesty drove along the gaily decorated streets, the crowds gave her a tumultuous reception, at which she was obviously delighted. The only mishap was due to the breaking of a trace of the Royal Coach in the Pall Mall on the return journey, but this was speedily rectified and the delay was short.

The Coronation of King Edward VII introduced many innovations. During the long and illustrious reign of Queen Victoria, India had passed from the rule of the old "John Company" to the Sovereignty of the Crown, and the Colonies—as the Dominions were then styled—had taken their place in the Imperial Commonwealth. Important military contingents from India and the Colonies made their appearance at the Coronation for the first time. The troops of the Colonial detachments, more-

over, numbered in their ranks many men who had served their Queen in the South African War. Few of the officers and men serving in 1902 can have foreseen that the day of the horse was passing and that the era of mechanization had dawned. Yet H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, who was in command of the troops, was to be seen driving along the processional route, talking to officers in charge of sections and inspecting the arrangements in a motor car: this was the first power-machine to make an appearance at any British Coronation, and was, in a sense, the forerunner of the new mechanized Army.

Although peace had been signed on 31st May, 1902, a substantial portion of the Army was still in South Africa. Nevertheless, an imposing force, totalling some 1,300 officers, 23,000 other ranks, 34 guns, and 4,000 horses, and including detachments of 1,500 Colonials and 1,000 Indians, had been assembled to do honour to Their Majesties. June was the original date fixed for the Coronation, but owing to the sudden and dangerous illness of the King, necessitating the performance of an operation for appendicitis—then highly hazardous—the day had to be postponed. The King, however, made a striking recovery, and announced the 9th August, 1902, as the new date for his Coronation. On that day, Guards of Honour drawn from the Royal Navy, the Foot Guards, and The King's Regiment (Liverpool)—one of Marlborough's veteran battalions—mounted at Buckingham Palace. The Royal Procession moved off at 11 a.m., one hour later than the time fixed for Queen Victoria, and took a shorter route via The Mall and the Horse Guards to the Abbey. The King's health may have been the reason for this, and the authorities probably intended to shorten the day as much as possible in order to save His Majesty all unnecessary fatigue. The King and Queen Alexandra drove in the State Coach used by King George III, and were escorted by the Life Guards, the Yeomen of the Guard, and by detachments of Colonial Mounted Rifles wearing the new khaki uniforms with 'slouch' hats and by Indian Cavalry gorgeous in blue, scarlet, and gold. X Battery R.H.A., stationed in Hyde Park, fired a Royal Salute, and composite battalions of Infantry, detachments of Yeomanry Cavalry, the Honourable Artillery Company, and the Militia lined the ways. A quaint touch was introduced by *The Times*, 11th August, 1902, in their description of the men of The Highland Light Infantry as "slender youths for the most part, but graceful and refined." Many famous soldiers took part in the Procession; to name only a few—Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, just returned from South Africa, and Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur—while the leading officer was Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Cowans, later known to history as General Sir John Cowans, Quartermaster-General of the British Armies in the 1914-18 War. Owing to the unexpected length of the Service in the Abbey the return journey started nearly one hour late and alarmist rumours spread among the waiting crowds, but all fears were finally put at rest by the welcome appearance of Their Majesties in the State Coach, though many remarked on the look of pallor and fatigue on the King's face.

The strength of the armed forces assembled to do honour to King George V at his Coronation exceeded all previous figures and numbered no less than 60,000 fighting men. Europe, in 1911, lay in the shadow of coming war, and the armed might of Germany threatened the peace of the world. This display of British troops may therefore have been intended to impress foreign observers and to show that Britain was ready and able to defend herself on land as well as on sea. The Coronation Processions were divided into two parts; the first was to include the Ceremony at the Abbey on 22nd June, and the second, the Royal Progress through the City and South London, to take place the following day. On Coronation Day, Royal Salutes

were fired by B.B. Battery R.H.A. and by detachments of R.G.A. stationed at the Tower. A Guard of Honour of the King's Company, Grenadier Guards, mounted in the forecourt of Buckingham Palace; Royal Marines took post in the quadrangle; the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards were stationed outside the Palace, and Guards from the Royal Navy and Foot Guards mounted at the Abbey. The day was grey and gloomy, and the sky overcast when the Royal Procession left Buckingham Palace. Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener who rode on the right of the State Coach also received the high distinction of carrying the Third Sword in the Ceremony at the Abbey. H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught and Prince Arthur of Connaught followed with the Royal Standard bearer directly in rear of the Coach, and Field-M Marshals Lord Roberts, Lord Grenfell, and Sir Evelyn Wood rode together in a section.

The Cortege took the direct route to the Abbey by way of The Mall, Trafalgar Square, and Whitehall, and for the first time passed under the newly built Admiralty Arch, the top of which was used as a central signalling station by the Army. The escort was furnished by the Royal Horse Guards, the Yeomen of the Guard, and by detachments of Colonial and Indian Cavalry. Their Majesties received a splendid welcome from their people, and in particular from a body of two hundred Chelsea Pensioners seated on a stand near the Palace. The streets were lavishly decorated with scarlet drapings, regalia, and evergreens, and the Service Clubs in Piccadilly did their utmost to show their loyalty to the Throne.

On the day following the Coronation, Their Majesties undertook a Royal Progress through the City, over London Bridge, round Southwark, and back over Westminster Bridge. The Procession was formed in two sections: the Colonial Procession and His Majesty's Procession. The former included detachments of Colonial troops from Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, Royal North West Mounted Police, and Indian Imperial Service Cavalry; the latter consisted of a gun detachment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Royal Artillery, and composite squadrons of Hussars, Lancers, Dragoons, and Dragoon Guards. The King and Queen drove in an open State Coach, the King wearing the uniform of a Field-Marshal with the ribbon of the Garter. The roads were lined by detachments of Regular troops, Officers Training Corps, and Territorial Army, and one Crimean veteran was noticed wearing the old pattern scarlet tunic and shako of the Royal Marine Light Infantry.

Thirty thousand troops marched on parade on 12th May, 1937, to take part in the Coronation Ceremonies of Their Majesties King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. Formations included representatives of every unit and corps in the British Commonwealth and Empire.

The Coronation Procession was organized in two parts: in the first Their Majesties drove in the Imperial State Coach drawn by eight grey horses from Buckingham Palace by way of The Mall, Admiralty Arch, and Whitehall to Westminster Abbey. This Procession was described in Coronation Orders as the "To" Procession. These orders were issued under the authority of Field-Marshal The Earl of Cavan, Commanding Coronation Troops, and were signed by his Chief Staff Officer, Major-General B. N. Sergison-Brooke.

Shortly before the Coronation, Their Majesties honoured the Army by the assumption of the Colonelcy-in-Chief of certain regiments and corps. These included: The King—1st The Royal Dragoons; The Queen—The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey). These famous regiments shared a common origin for both were raised in the reign of King Charles II for the defence of Tangier. The Queen's, newly landed

from Tangier under Colonel Kirke, took a prominent part in the suppression of Monmouth's rebellion which culminated at Sedgemoor, 5th July, 1685—one of the last battles fought on English soil.

The "To" Procession consisted of mounted troops and included detachments of Yeomanry, Honourable Artillery Company, Mounted Band Royal Artillery, Cavalry of the Line, "K" Battery, R.H.A., The King's Indian Orderly Officers, Aides-de-Camp, Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., Sir Claud Jacob, Sir William Birdwood, Bt., Gold Stick in Waiting, officers of the War Office Staff, members of the Air Council, the Army Council, and the Sea Lords. Acting as close escort to Their Majesties rode the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions of The Sovereign's Escort with Standard accompanied by the massed bands of The Household Cavalry.

At Buckingham Palace, the Royal Navy, 3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards, and The Royal Air Force mounted Guards of Honour, each Guard corresponding generally to the strength of an infantry company. Signal arrangements for the movement and control of such large numbers of troops had to be both detailed and comprehensive. Telephone points were established on the Queen Victoria Memorial and the top of the Admiralty Arch, while at selected places wireless sets were manned by the Metropolitan Police. Wireless cars equipped with loud-speakers also took part in patrolling the Coronation area.

In the second part of the Procession—known as the "From" Procession—Their Majesties on conclusion of the Abbey Ceremonies proceeded by way of Victoria Embankment, Northumberland Avenue, Pall Mall, St. James's Street, Regent Street, Oxford Street, Marble Arch, East Carriage Drive, and Constitution Hill, back to Buckingham Palace. This Procession, which was much longer than the "To" Procession, covered two miles of road and took about forty-five minutes to pass a given point.

Overseas troops taking part included contingents from Southern Rhodesia, Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of Canada. Next in order marched detachments from The Royal Air Force, the Indian Army, the Territorial Army, the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Nearer to the State Coach marched detachments of Infantry of the Line, the Brigade of Guards, the Royal Corps of Signals, the Corps of Royal Engineers, the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy.

As an example of the care and attention to detail that was required in the organization of the Ceremonies it is interesting to note that bands were authorized to play only standard Marches. Any tunes that might have encouraged the dense crowds lining the route to accompany the music with word and song were ruled out. This precaution was taken to avoid possible danger of upsetting the greys drawing the State Coach and making them unmanageable. All the arrangements for which the army authorities were responsible passed off without a hitch. The weather in the morning and early afternoon smiled on The King's Coronation, but later in the day heavy showers caused the crowds much discomfort. The loud shouts of acclamation and fervid demonstrations of loyalty which greeted Their Majesties at every point gave proof of their peoples' whole-hearted devotion to their Throne and Persons.

THE CROWN AND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

By AIR VICE-MARSHAL W. M. YOOL, C.B., C.B.E.

ALTHOUGH flying in this Country in one form or another dates from 1784, when the first balloon flight in the United Kingdom was made in August of that year at Edinburgh, it cannot be said that much interest was shown by the Royal Family in aviation prior to the formation of the Royal Flying Corps in May, 1912, after the title had been approved by King George V. This indifference was, however, in line with the general attitude towards flying, not only in this Country but everywhere, an attitude that was not finally broken down until the rapid strides made by the air arm during the 1914-18 War made it evident that the aeroplane could no longer be ignored, and that it was going to exercise an increasingly potent influence on world affairs.

After the formation of the Royal Flying Corps, and subsequently of the Royal Naval Air Service, an increasing interest in air matters was shown by the King and the other members of the Royal Family, but this does not fall properly within the scope of this article, as until the Royal Air Force came into being as a separate Service on 1st April, 1918, following a Royal Proclamation in March of that year announcing the approval of the title by the King, the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service were subsidiary arms of the Army and Navy.

The formation of the Royal Air Force was marked in a special form, however, as it immediately established a close personal relationship with the Crown, owing to the fact that Prince Albert, who was then serving in the Royal Naval Air Service, was automatically transferred to the Royal Air Force with the rank of captain on the absorption of the Royal Naval Air Service, and his name appeared in the first list of those appointed to permanent commissions on 1st August, 1919. This close relationship was maintained to a large degree up to the time he ascended the Throne at the end of 1936 as King George VI.

On transferring to the Royal Air Force he and his brother, the Prince of Wales, were both trained as pilots in 1919, Prince Albert's instructor being the present Air Chief Marshal Sir Alec Coryton, and Air Commodore Sir Edward Fielden, as he now is, instructing the Prince of Wales. The aircraft on which Prince Albert took his first lessons was an Avro 504J, and an Avro 504K, probably the best known training aircraft the Royal Air Force has ever had, was used for the rest of his training which was carried out at Croydon, on completion of which he was awarded his wings. The actual Avro he had used for the latter part of his training took part in the first Royal Air Force Display at Hendon in 1920. The rear control column which the Royal pupil had used was removed and kept by Sir Alec Coryton until 1951, when the King accepted the control column as a memento of his flying instruction at Croydon.

When the only post-war Royal Air Force Display was held at Farnborough in 1951, in the presence of the King and Queen and Princess Margaret, the King was particularly interested to see included amongst the veteran aircraft which were flown at the Display, an Avro 504K that was an exact replica of the aircraft on which he had originally learned to fly. This particular aircraft had not been flown for many years and had to be completely reconditioned by the makers for the occasion.

After being transferred to the Royal Air Force, and learning to fly, the Duke of York, as he became in 1921, followed the normal promotion sequence of his brother

officers, being promoted to Air Chief Marshal on 21st January, 1936, and appointed Personal Aide-de-Camp to King Edward VIII in June of that year. In particular he paid a special compliment to the Royal Air Force by wearing his uniform as a Group Captain at his wedding on 26th April, 1923.

King George V, although he wore Royal Air Force uniform, with wings, as a Marshal of the Royal Air Force on occasion, did not hold rank in the Royal Air Force, but assumed the title of Chief of the Royal Air Force. As part of the celebrations for his Silver Jubilee, he paid a signal honour to the Royal Air Force by holding a Review on 6th July, 1935, which was the first of its kind ever to be held. The Review was divided into two parts and was held at two aerodromes, Mildenhall, Suffolk, and Duxford, Cambridgeshire.

In the morning at Mildenhall, King George V inspected the Royal Air Force Guard of Honour, and the assembled squadrons, which were drawn up in eight lines in review formation. There were some 350 aircraft present, drawn from some 40 squadrons representing all the various types of squadrons then in the Country, including those of the Auxiliary Air Force. As illustrating the changed pattern of the Royal Air Force of to-day there are no longer, as there were at Mildenhall, Auxiliary Bomber Squadrons, Special Reserve Squadrons, and Army Co-operation Squadrons, and even the commands themselves have nearly all been merged into new formations, Coastal Area Command being the only one whose title still exists, though in a modified form, to-day.

After the inspection at Mildenhall the King proceeded to Duxford, where he was joined by the Queen. After lunching in the officers' mess Their Majesties took up their positions on the Royal dais, from where they reviewed the squadrons as they flew past, and where the King took the Salute. The squadrons flew over first in squadron formation in succession at short intervals, and immediately afterwards a display of squadron drill was given by one of the fighter squadrons. The other squadrons in the meantime assumed wing formation and flew past again by wings in succession, thus completing the Review, which was attended by large numbers of the general public at both aerodromes, in addition to numerous spectators from the Royal Air Force and the other Services.

To-day, even the names of the aircraft at the Review have largely faded from the memory. They included Gauntlets, Furies, and Bulldogs amongst the fighters, and Overstrands, Heyfords, and Virginias amongst the bombers. Contrasted with the aircraft in service to-day and those coming into service in the next few years they give a good idea of the startling progress that has been made in the intervening 18 years, during which such enormous strides have been made in the speed and striking power of aircraft.

When King George VI ascended the throne he assumed the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force as had his brother King Edward VIII on his accession, the latter being the first member of the Royal Family to hold this rank. At the Coronation Ceremonies in 1937 the Royal Air Force played only a comparatively minor part. They provided some 400 men for the Procession from Westminster Abbey to Buckingham Palace, and some 2,000 men to line the route. In addition they provided a proportion of the men for the inter-Service Guards of Honour that were mounted at the Palace and the Abbey. Although these numbers may seem small to-day in view of the present size of the Royal Air Force, it must be remembered that in 1937 the pre-war expansion from a strength of 30,000 officers and men in 1936 had only

just started, and that the representation of the Royal Air Force in the Coronation Procession was in proportion to its strength at the time.

On that occasion there was no Ceremonial Fly-past such as it is intended to have at the Coronation of The Queen, nor was there a Review or any other ceremony specially to mark the Coronation in which the Royal Air Force took part. However, in 1950, King George VI gave his approval to participation by the Royal Air Force in special ceremonial occasions such as the King's Birthday taking the form of a Ceremonial Fly-past. The Birthday Fly-past is carried out by each command in turn, beginning with Bomber Command in 1950, followed by Fighter Command in 1951, and by Coastal Command in 1952. In accordance with the precedent that has now been established there will therefore be Ceremonial Fly-pasts this year at the Coronation, in honour of the Queen's Birthday, and at the Review at Odiham.

The Royal Air Force College at Cranwell, where Prince Albert served in 1918, was founded in 1920, and has been honoured by Royal visits on a number of occasions. The present permanent buildings were opened by the Prince of Wales on 11th October, 1934, and in 1946 King George VI attended the Ceremony (which had to be postponed from the previous year because of the war) to mark the 21st anniversary of the College. The King visited Cranwell again in 1948, when he presented the first Royal Colour ever to be awarded, and on 1st August, 1951, Princess Elizabeth paid her first visit to the College when she was Reviewing Officer at the Graduation Parade. Her Royal Highness also presented the Sword of Honour and other awards, inspected the Flying Wing, and afterwards watched a display of aerobatics by the cadets.

Another important day in the history of the Royal Air Force was 26th May, 1951, as it was the day on which Princess Elizabeth, acting on behalf of the King who was indisposed, presented the King's Colour to the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom at a parade in Hyde Park. Two thousand five hundred men and women took part in the Ceremonial Parade, which was representative of all the commands in the United Kingdom; immediately following the Royal Salute marking the opening of the Ceremony, 96 jet fighters of Fighter Command flew past the saluting base in four wings.

A third Royal Colour was subsequently presented by Her Majesty, after her accession to the throne, to No. 1 School of Technical Training, Halton, Bucks., on 25th July, 1952. This is the Aircraft Apprentices' School, which, like the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell, was also founded in 1920. It is therefore singularly appropriate that these two establishments which play such a large part in building up the traditions of the Royal Air Force, should both have received Royal Colours. On this occasion some 1,700 apprentices were on parade for the Presentation Ceremony, after which The Queen inspected the station.

As with Cranwell, there have been a number of Royal visits to Halton, starting in 1922 when the Duke of York inspected the new barrack blocks that had just been completed and took the Salute at a march past of the apprentices. He visited the station again as King George VI in 1939, when he inspected the new workshops that had just been completed. The Princess Royal, who is Air Chief Commandant of Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service, has also visited the station twice, the first occasion being in 1927 when she opened the new hospital buildings, known since as Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Hospital, Halton, and the second on 1st November, 1948, in honour of the coming of age of the hospital. The late Duke

of Kent, who was an Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, visited Halton in 1942 and inspected the Air Training Corps who were in camp there, together with the apprentices' workshops.

A fourth Royal Colour was presented to the Royal Air Force Regiment at a Ceremonial Parade at Buckingham Palace on 17th March of this year, when The Queen thus endorsed King George VI's decision to grant the award.

The first occasion on which the King's Colour of the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom was paraded after it had been presented by Princess Elizabeth was in celebration of the King's Birthday on 7th June, 1951, when the Royal Air Force, who had been granted Freedom of Entry into Bridgnorth in 1950, exercised for the first time their privilege of marching through the town with bayonets fixed, drums beating, and a Colour flying, whilst a flight of Lancasters flew overhead. It was over 300 years since armed troops had marched through the historic North gate of Bridgnorth, the last occasion being when the town was captured from the Royalists by Cromwell's parliamentary troops.

The Colour was paraded again in honour of The Queen's Birthday at Uxbridge on 5th June, 1952, when the Salute at the march past after the Ceremonial Parade, was taken by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff. On this occasion the Royal Standard was also flown and a Royal Salute was given, which, when the Sovereign is not present, can only be done in honour of The Queen's Birthday.

Special recognition has been granted to the Royal Auxiliary Air Force by a number of Royal appointments as Honorary Air Commodore. The Queen was originally appointed Honorary Air Commodore of No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron, No. 2603 (City of Edinburgh) Light Anti-Aircraft Squadron, and No. 3603 (City of Edinburgh) Fighter Control Unit, as Princess Elizabeth, in 1951, and since her accession has graciously consented to retain these three appointments.

One of the first engagements Princess Elizabeth fulfilled after taking up her appointment as Honorary Air Commodore was to present the Lord Esher Trophy to No. 603 (City of Edinburgh) Squadron at Leuchars on 4th August, 1951, when the Princess arrived from London Airport for the Ceremony in a Viking of the King's Flight. This trophy is presented annually to the most efficient fighter squadron in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and it was therefore particularly gratifying to the squadron that the trophy should have been presented to them by their Royal Honorary Air Commodore, and that The Queen should have retained the appointment after her accession to the Throne.

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother is Honorary Air Commodore of No. 600 (City of London) Squadron, and of No. 2600 (City of London) Light Anti-Aircraft Squadron, and the Duke of Gloucester, who has held the rank of Air Chief Marshal since 1944, is Honorary Air Commodore of No. 501 (County of Gloucester) Squadron and of No. 2501 (County of Gloucester) Light Anti-Aircraft Squadron.

Other Royal appointments held by members of the Royal Family include that of Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother as Commandant-in-Chief of the Women's Royal Air Force, and of the Duchess of Gloucester as Air Chief Commandant of the of the Women's Royal Air Force, whilst the late Duke of Kent was an Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force when he was killed in an air crash in Scotland while on active service in August, 1942.

Early this year it was announced that The Queen had appointed the Duke of Edinburgh to a commission in the Royal Air Force with the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, as from 15th January, 1953, and he thus became the third member of the Royal Family to hold that rank. The Duke has also been appointed Air Commodore-in-Chief of the Air Training Corps in succession to the late King.

The holders of these various Royal appointments have taken a close interest in the squadrons and branches with which they are associated, and have honoured them with their presence on many occasions, both formal and informal. The Royal Auxiliary Air Force has been particularly fortunate in this respect, in that the comparatively small numbers in the units means that when a Royal visit is paid the members have a better opportunity of meeting their Honorary Air Commodore informally than would be the case in larger formations and units.

In addition to having been granted the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, and appointed Air Commodore-in-Chief of the Air Training Corps, the Duke of Edinburgh is following in the footsteps of the Duke of Windsor and King George VI by learning to fly. He had his first lesson in a Chipmunk at White Waltham on 12th November, 1952, and made his first solo flight on 20th December, 1952, under the supervision of his instructor, Flight Lieutenant C. R. Gordon. Since then he has been following the normal training sequence as opportunity offers, and has progressed from the Chipmunk to the Harvard advanced trainer.

Another mark of the Sovereign's appreciation was the announcement made during the war on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Royal Air Force in 1943, that King George VI had approved the award of a ceremonial flag, to be known as "The Standard," to operational squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Shortly before his death the King was pleased to approve that squadrons of the Royal Air Force Regiment, and of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, should also be eligible for the award of "The Standard."

Subject to the prior approval of Her Majesty The Queen, squadrons qualify for the award of Standards,

- (a) by having earned The Queen's appreciation for specially outstanding operations, or
- (b) by having completed 25 years in the Royal Air Force, the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, the Royal Flying Corps, or the Royal Naval Air Service.

So far some 55 Standards have been awarded to Regular squadrons, one to a squadron of the Royal Air Force Regiment, and five to Auxiliary Fighter Squadrons. Included in the Regular squadrons are Nos. 120 and 617 Squadrons, which have not been in existence for 25 years, but qualified because of their outstanding operational record. No. 120 was the squadron in Coastal Command with the greatest number of U-Boat kills, and No. 617 was the famous dam-buster squadron of Bomber Command. Each squadron has its battle honours inscribed on scrolls, which are added as necessary to the Standards, up to a maximum number of eight.

Another link between the Crown and the Royal Air Force is established by the Queen's Flight, which is commanded by Air Commodore Sir Edward Fielden, who holds the title of Captain of The Queen's Flight. The Flight dates its inception from the accession of King Edward VIII, when the private aircraft he had owned as Prince of Wales was transferred to the Crown. The Flight was disbanded during the war, and subsequently revived by King George VI. Since then the aircraft of the Flight have been used on many occasions by the Sovereign and other members of

the Royal Family for flights both at home and overseas. The aircraft were used during the Royal Tour of South Africa in 1947 to shorten the time spent in travelling, and to ease the strain of the exacting programme. The four aircraft of the Flight flew some 16,000 miles without incident, and the Royal Family made a number of flights.

Up to 1951, however, it had invariably been the custom for the King and Queen to fly in separate aircraft, but on 13th May of that year history was made, in that the King and Queen, accompanied by Princess Margaret, flew in the same aircraft for the first time since their accession to the Throne, when they flew from London Airport to Dyce, en route to Balmoral.

The history of the Royal Air Force may be brief in term of years, and the Force may have suffered somewhat in its earlier days from the lack of those established customs and traditions with which the older Services are so richly endowed, but two world wars have shown that, though lacking in history, the achievements of the Royal Air Force can already stand comparison with any of the great feats of arms of the past. Sir Walter Raleigh gave perfect expression to the spirit of the Royal Air Force when he wrote in *The War in the Air*, "The Latin poet said that it was decorous to die for one's country; in that decorum the Service is perfectly instructed."

The fact that that spirit is now being enshrined in tradition by the various ceremonial observances established in recent years, owes much to the interest shown by King George VI, The Queen, and other members of the Royal Family, and to the encouragement given to the Royal Air Force by the many special marks of Royal favour.

CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHER COUNTRIES

By WING COMMANDER SIR JOHN HODSOLL, C.B.

On Wednesday, 14th January, 1953, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR OUVRY L. ROBERTS, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : It is my pleasure and privilege to introduce to you Sir John Hodsoll, who is the present Director-General of Civil Defence training, which appointment he has held since 1948. He has, however, been connected with Civil Defence ever since 1930, when he was occupied in research into what were called " Air Raid Precautions "—and some of you know about them ! From 1938 to 1948, right through the war, he was Inspector-General of Civil Defence. I cannot believe that there is anyone here who has heard of Civil Defence but has not also heard of Sir John Hodsoll. He is undoubtedly the most prominent expert on Civil Defence in the world to-day, and in the past few years he has been to very many of the countries of Europe and to America to advise them on their civil defence organization and measures.

He has not confined his activities to the passive side of Civil Defence. During the 1914-18 War, he was involved in the opposite, the active side. He was dropping bombs as a member of the Royal Naval Air Service. He has long been connected with the Air Service and at the moment is a member of the R.A.F. Reserve.

There will be an opportunity for questions afterwards, and Sir John has very kindly said that he will answer any questions that you like to put to him.

LECTURE

WHEN the war in Europe ended, General Eisenhower addressed a special letter to all the Allied Governments drawing their particular attention to the need for Civil Defence as an essential complement to the armed forces. And, undoubtedly, one of the many lessons from the last conflict was the importance, under conditions of modern air warfare, of organizing the civil population to defend itself.

THE OBJECT OF CIVIL DEFENCE

One of the most important principles of war has been stated as " the maintenance of the will to win." This principle, under modern conditions of total war, must apply to the whole nation, and not just to its fighting services.

The battlefields of the future will only be limited by the range of aircraft or mechanical weapons and will, therefore, be conducted in great depth. There will not only be the combat between the actual fighting forces themselves on land, on and under the sea, and in the air. But the enemy who is equipped for this purpose will attempt to envelop the country or countries with which he is at war by attacks designed to break the morale of the civil population, to destroy vital war industries and public services, and so to disrupt the life of the country that it cannot continue the struggle.

It may be truly said that there will be two major conflicts going on at the same time ; one to defeat the enemy's armed forces in the field and one to defeat the population behind them and, in so doing, to destroy the foundations on which they depend and without which they must sooner or later collapse.

It is clear that if this double thrust is to be countered successfully, the citizens must possess their own organization with which to protect themselves and everything on which their existence depends. This organization has now come to be known in Great Britain as Civil Defence. Its task, very broadly, is to take all possible steps to minimize the effects of the enemy's air attacks. To accomplish this it must be trained and equipped so that it can (i) save life and reduce casualties, (ii) limit the spread of damage, especially fire, (iii) deal with the civil population who have been rendered homeless or otherwise affected by the results of bombing, and (iv) restore the situation as quickly as possible in so far as this may be practicable. A good deal of this work of restoration, however, will lie outside the normal field of Civil Defence activities.

It must be appreciated that Civil Defence cannot by itself defeat the enemy's air attacks. It can only hope to be successful if the scale of these attacks is kept within reasonable bounds. If the enemy is able and free to attack a country when and how he likes, in other words if he has achieved command of the air, the situation will rapidly get out of control, as experience in Germany and Japan has already shown. Once this happens the war will sooner or later be lost. Speers' oft-quoted letter to Hitler of 15th March, 1945, may be mentioned again. "The final collapse of the German economy can therefore be counted on with certainty within 4-8 weeks. After this collapse, even military continuation of the war will become impossible." And while bombing was not the only factor in achieving this result, it was a largely contributing factor.

It has been truly said that, while Civil Defence cannot by itself win a war, it would be quite possible for it to lose one. On the other hand, if a reasonable balance in regard to the scale of attack is achieved, even though severe damage may be done, Civil Defence can hope successfully to accomplish its mission.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENCE TO THE N.A.T.O.

It will thus be seen that, just as the armed forces under General Ridgway are now being built up and organized to resist aggression, so must the countries which are concerned in this defence, and indeed any countries which might be faced with the risk of strategic bombing, set about organizing their Civil Defence on which these combined forces will depend to an important extent for their ability to wage and sustain war. It must also be remembered that the fighting Services have homes and that if they know that these homes are being directly attacked and that there is no proper organization to look after and protect their families, their morale will be immediately affected. This point was brought home to me by the remarks of a naval officer who, having been through the blitzes of Portsmouth and Plymouth, was posted to the Far East. One of the first things his Commander-in-Chief asked him to do was to go and give a talk on board the ships in the Command, most of which were manned from Portsmouth and Plymouth, to tell the ships' companies what was happening and to give them re-assurance about the work of the Civil Defence services.

It is no less vital that the war industries, on which the armed forces depend, are kept in production and that the flow of vital equipment is interrupted as little as possible and, at the very most, to an extent which will not seriously impair the fighting efficiency of the navies, armies and air forces.

FORMS OF ATTACK

The forms of attack against which Civil Defence must be prepared are as follows:—

- (i) The atomic bomb.
- (ii) Heavy saturation raiding by explosive and incendiary bombs.
- (iii) Attacks by mechanical weapons, e.g. the flying bomb and the rocket.
- (iv) Gas attacks.
- (v) Biological warfare.

Any or all of these weapons or methods of attack may be used strategically against a country, though obviously some of them are likely to be more effective than others. It is of the highest importance, however, that any weapon which could be used should be studied and that the Civil Defence organization should be trained in the methods of protection against it. In considering what forms of attack are most likely to be experienced, account must be taken of the size and value of the probable target, the weapons which the enemy is known to possess, his means of delivering them, and the ranges over which he will be operating. It is equally important to study the sort of tactics which have been used in the past and may be developed in the future. I should like to quote two examples from the last war to illustrate my point. In the days of the Battle of Britain we were subjected to all-night attacks, though we were fairly free in the daytime; whereas during the attacks by flying bombs and rockets, we experienced round the clock bombing, which provided its own special problems, particularly when reliance had to be placed largely on volunteers.

The technique of highly concentrated raids was developed to a high pitch towards the end of the last war and may well be capable of further development in the future. And the atomic bomb really represents in one weapon the effect of a concentrated raid by, for example, a thousand heavy bombers.

It is important for Civil Defence to remember that to effect, in the shortest space of time, the most widespread disruption to war industry, it is necessary to select as targets those things the destruction of which will have the greatest overall effect, and that, if disruption is to be continued, the attacks must also be continued. Experience in the last war showed what incredible recovery efforts were possible.

But, apart from attempting to destroy the war potential, the enemy may have in mind, also, to dislocate the internal economy of a nation, and may select his weapons and tactics accordingly. The successful accomplishment of this aim might not only gravely affect the civilian morale, but might equally imperil the existence of the nation and the armed forces dependent on it.

It must always be difficult to predict accurately what the enemy will do. We know that fire caused the greatest amount of destruction in the last war, and we know also that blast is a most potent weapon. The really important consideration is for Civil Defence to avoid being surprised and thereby, perhaps, losing the confidence of the public. Some of the weapons available, or likely to be available, are 'panic' weapons, e.g. gas and biological warfare, and knowledge and careful training beforehand are essential.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF CIVIL DEFENCE

The tasks which Civil Defence must undertake can be grouped broadly under three headings:—

- (a) Measures of prevention.
- (b) Measures of reduction.
- (c) Measures of restoration.

While this grouping is convenient, it must be realized that, in practice, there cannot be any such clear cut divisions. Rather do parts of one group tend to merge with parts of another. Still, it is clearer to consider the tasks in this way.

Without going into a lot of detail, it is important to recall that (a) measures of prevention include such matters as the provision of a warning system, shelters, the evacuation of certain classes of the population, the evacuation of hospitals from probable target areas, the protection and dispersal of vital industry, black-out, and the provision of emergency water supplies. And that many of these measures are highly costly.

The whole object of such measures is to lighten the burden on the Civil Defence services and to make it harder for the enemy to achieve his object.

The task of reducing the effects of bombing—(b) measures of reduction—depends on the existence of adequate forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for this purpose. In Britain these forces are the Police, the Fire Service, the Civil Defence Corps, the National Hospital Service (which sponsors the emergency casualty organization), industrial Civil Defence units, and the emergency repair services of the public utilities.

Both the Police and the Fire Services will need to be greatly expanded for this purpose and must possess mobility to enable help to be brought where it is needed.

The Civil Defence Corps is planned in two echelons—the local divisions and the mobile columns. The former are organized by the principal local authorities and are designed for the immediate protection of their areas against light or medium scales of attack. They consist of five sections in England and Wales and four in Scotland, i.e. headquarters, warden, rescue, ambulance, and welfare. In Scotland, the ambulance service is centralized and is not a part of the Civil Defence Corps.

The mobile columns, which do not yet exist except for a small experimental group, are intended to form a tactical reserve and will have rescue as their chief task. Police and fire mobile reserves are also planned. The present experimental group is composed of two-thirds army personnel and one-third R.A.F. personnel. They are all volunteers, and we are greatly indebted to the Army and the Royal Air Force for their co-operation and help in enabling us to set up this extremely valuable experimental group and for loaning us the personnel for a period of a year.

Industry has the task of defending itself, if capable of doing so; that is if it employs enough personnel to make this possible. And the public utilities, as well as protecting themselves, have as a special task the provision of an organization to deal with emergency and long term repairs.

It will thus be seen that in all the principal local authority areas—the Corps Authority areas as they are known—there is a number of independent services; and that the successful defence of these areas can only be accomplished if the controller—the operational commander of the local Civil Defence division—and the heads of these other services co-operate most closely and fight their battle on one broad tactical plan.

There is one other source of help which must be mentioned if the situation became extremely serious, and that is from the armed Services. Any such help would naturally be governed by the operational commitments of the Services concerned, who must, in any event, look after the Civil Defence requirements of their own establishments. So far as the Army is concerned, first help will normally come from the Home Guard.

Once the immediate effects of the attack have been dealt with, which may take a considerable time, then phase (c), measures of restoration, comes into force. This phase is not strictly the responsibility of the Civil Defence and allied services. They should be withdrawn when their tasks are completed, and rested and refitted against the next attack. The task of restoration will be the responsibility of the local authority, industry, public utility, and householder, so far as their resources permit. And help will be available from the Works and Buildings Emergency Organization, which can mobilize contractors and plant for this purpose. In view of the heavy damage which must be expected, only first priority tasks can probably be undertaken at this stage.

I should like to make the point about the great importance of planning and organizing beforehand. I think it is fair to say that the two organizations which were then regarded as emergency organizations—Civil Defence or Air Raid Precautions as it was called, and the emergency feeding arrangements, including rationing—had both been thought out very carefully and so far as was possible established before the last war. Although, naturally, adjustments had to be made from time to time, fundamentally these two organizations stood up to the test of the war without any major or drastic alterations, which was of very great importance to us in surviving the difficult times, particularly in the early days before we had gathered our strength. Civil Defence especially was able to adjust itself to the different types of attack without any major difficulties.

THE TRAINING OF CIVIL DEFENCE

I have tried to show how the three essential parts of Civil Defence are interlocked and how there must be much thought and preparation beforehand. An essential part of this preparation must be training; and since the size of the Civil Defence services in peace-time must almost inevitably be much smaller than would be required in war—a nucleus in other words—they must be trained to the highest pitch and should also provide a good proportion of leaders. Since attacks might open the war in great strength, a smooth and rapid expansion must be planned.

Civil Defence helps to protect the morale of the general public and if it is to succeed in this task the public must have confidence in the organization and its personnel; not only in their courage and devotion to duty, but in their knowledge and the confidence they feel in their ability successfully to accomplish their mission.

With all these requirements in mind, every member of Civil Defence in Britain is required to undertake:—

- (a) A basic general course to learn about the various forms of attack and what can be done to counter them (including elementary fire fighting).
- (b) A course in elementary first aid.
- (c) A course in elementary rescue (normally men only).

After this, they are required to learn the work of the particular section of the corps to which they belong, e.g. wardens, rescue, ambulance, as individuals, as members of a team, and as part of the section. It is calculated that each volunteer should carry out 60 hours of training a year for three years to become fully qualified.

Highly specialized training is needed for certain tasks, such as rescue and hospital work, and as many volunteers as possible are urged to take a full first aid course in addition to rescue personnel for whom it is normal.

The keystone of all this instruction is the instructors. There are roughly three types, though they can, on occasions, be interchangeable—general instructors, rescue instructors, and tactical instructors. All first aid instruction is undertaken by voluntary societies, e.g. the British Red Cross. To train these instructors three central schools are provided in Britain, each split into two wings, one to train general instructors and the other rescue instructors. Courses last three weeks and are essentially practical. Each school can take 60 students at a time—30 in each wing.

Particular stress is laid at these schools on realistic instruction. On the rescue side, as an example, each school possesses what amounts to a blitzed street, in which all types of rescue problems are represented. Furthermore, all rescue training is carried out using live casualties who are, in addition, 'faked' to represent the type of injury they would probably have sustained.

Certain of these instructors are entitled to train other instructors locally, since the numbers passing through the central schools would be insufficient. Local instructors must eventually take a week's course at a central school finally to qualify. This scheme has the great advantage of enabling many to volunteer as instructors who could not afford to spend three weeks away from their work. There are over 20,000 instructors in Britain today.

Civil Defence is an art and, just as in the fighting services, its higher direction and its tactics must be carefully studied. Because it is made up of a number of separate organizations, it is all the more important that they are most closely co-ordinated so that they can fight as one force. To cover these aspects of Civil Defence, Britain has set up a Civil Defence staff college and a tactical school.

On every course at the staff college, and normally at the tactical school, representatives of all the Civil Defence interests and organizations are present—police, fire, civil defence, industry, voluntary aid societies, the fighting services, public utilities. And, in addition, the directing staff includes an army and a police representative; and there is a close liaison with the Fire Service College.

At the staff college, students are given a thorough background knowledge of Civil Defence operations and requirements, their control and direction, and all the problems which the forces must be prepared to meet and defeat. More than 1,000 students have now passed through this college, including many from N.A.T.O. countries.

The tactical school, which is run as a separate wing of the staff college, will study and teach the tactics of Civil Defence operations in all their aspects, paying special attention to fire and debris. The capacity of these two establishments is 120 students.

CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH AND EMPIRE

Since Civil Defence is now a permanent part of the defence system of Britain, so should it be regarded as a part of the strength of the Commonwealth and Empire. And I should like to give a brief account of the progress which is being made.

Broadly speaking, today we are concerned with countries North of the Equator, for obvious reasons; and I shall not journey South of that latitude.

CANADA

Civil Defence is the responsibility of the Minister of Health and Welfare at Federal level, and there is a co-ordinator and a small staff at Ottawa to direct the

organization. Each province has a minister responsible for Civil Defence—though not his only job—and a co-ordinator at provincial Government level. Below the provincial Government there are co-ordinators for the big cities, like Toronto, Montreal, and Quebec, while certain cities are grouped, as it were, with the surrounding areas. For example, there is a co-ordinator for the greater Winnipeg area, the greater Vancouver area, and the greater Victoria area. The municipality, or in the cases quoted above, the greater area, is responsible for Civil Defence at that, the lowest level.

Because of the vast distances and the isolation of some areas, 'no boundary' agreements have been reached between Canadian provinces and municipalities and states in the U.S.A., such as between the State of Washington and the Province of British Columbia.

The organization follows broadly that adopted in Britain so far as the local division is concerned, though it has naturally been adapted to suit Canadian conditions. Civil Defence is financed on a 'matching up' basis, which means that the Federal Government pay 50 per cent. of agreed expenditure to the Provincial Government and the latter have a similar agreement with their municipalities.

The whole organization is on a sound basis. There is a federal school and provincial and municipal schools, and Canada has probably by now got over 100,000 volunteers under training.

HONG KONG, SINGAPORE, MALAYA

Civil Defence is being organized in all these Colonies, and staff and instructors have been trained and supplied by the United Kingdom. Singapore and Malaya each have a commissioner of Civil Defence and local schools have been set up.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India has just recently sent a representative from Bombay Province as a first start, and Pakistan has a director of Civil Defence and has gone a good way in getting an organization over the country and in setting up training establishments.

ADEN, CYPRUS, MALTA, GIBRALTAR.

Aden has recently had staff over in the United Kingdom for training, and Cyprus is organized under the Commissioner of Police and is making good progress despite certain local difficulties. Malta has an independent commissioner of Civil Defence. An excellent central school has been set up and a number of instructors trained. Recruiting is going ahead and the broad lines of the organization have been settled, which include the Island of Gozo. In Gibraltar, the Commissioner of Police is also in charge of Civil Defence, supported by a Civil Defence officer. Here again progress is good and they have 600 out of the 900 volunteers required and adequate local training facilities.

CIVIL DEFENCE IN N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES

Finally, I should like to take a brief glance at the position in the chief N.A.T.O. countries, who are our close Allies in this organization.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Civil Defence in the U.S.A. is the responsibility of the Federal Civil Defence Administration, which forms a part of the President's Executive Office.

It is decentralized, as constitutionally it must be, to the 48 states and the District of Columbia, State Governors having a responsibility usually discharged through a Civil Defence director for the state. From the state, the responsibility stems down to the municipality and the county, both of which have their Civil Defence directors. It has been estimated that the U.S.A. requires 17,000,000 volunteers and that at present they have somewhere in the region of 3-4 million.

They have a federal school—a sort of combined staff college and technical school—at Olney in Maryland, not far from Washington; and had also three other technical schools in the East, Middle West, and West, but they seem to have been discontinued.

The United States have tackled the problem rather differently from us and have directed very great efforts to 'alerting' their civil population as to the dangers that might face them in the future.

The problem in this vast continent is not easy, but progress is being made generally, and to a notable extent in some states and cities, for example, New York, Michigan, California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

NORWAY, DENMARK, HOLLAND, BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, GREECE, TURKEY

Norway, Denmark and Holland are all forging steadily ahead, and in Norway and Denmark Civil Defence forms a part of the national service obligation. Belgium is not so far advanced but is progressing. France, Italy, and Turkey cannot yet be said to have got beyond the planning stage. In Greece, the Civil Defence organization is under the Minister of the Interior.

It is worth remarking that, outside the N.A.T.O., both Sweden and Switzerland have excellent Civil Defence organizations; Sweden being perhaps the most advanced in Europe. Eire is also building up a Civil Defence organization and has an excellent school near Dublin.

It is encouraging to us that all these countries have sent representatives over to Britain for training and that a close liaison exists, including the affiliation of the Canadian Federal School at Ottawa to the Civil Defence Technical School at Taymouth Castle in Scotland, and that of the school at Malta to the Civil Defence Technical School at Easingwold in Yorkshire.

CONCLUSION

Civil Defence, then, is a vital complement to the fighting Services. Without it their bases may be lost and the will of the peoples to continue the struggle may be broken. It is a vital part of the present re-armament programme, and as such must surely form one of the bastions of peace. It will be required as a permanent part of a country's defence so long as any threat of war exists.

Every country must design its Civil Defence organization to fit its own political and local government machine. Nevertheless, there is much that is common ground, of which perhaps training is the best example. There are big problems to face, but if we all pool our ideas and, so far as we can, our facilities, and if we cultivate in our Civil Defence the same fine offensive spirit as exists in our fighting Services, then surely we can face the future with sober confidence.

But the best and only real answer to these problems is prevention, and as Field-Marshal Smuts, the great South African statesman and soldier, remarked many years ago, "It is important for the winning of the war that we should not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a very large scale."

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN : The lecture is now open for discussion, and I shall be pleased if you will put any questions you have to the lecturer.

COLONEL R. A. HARRIS : Would the lecturer tell us something about the system of training in the Civil Defence Staff College ?

THE LECTURER : It follows very much the same general lines as the Service staff colleges—that is to say, a combination of lecturers from outside and lecturers from inside, exercises, and syndicate studies. We try at the staff college not only to give people the broad Civil Defence background but the wider background as well ; a broad defence aspect, as is done at the Service staff colleges. Then we give them Civil Defence problems to work out—the sort with which they might be faced at any time. To back up the theoretical talking, we have the practical exercises, a good many of which are done by models and floor maps. We have a certain amount of instruction given by films.

BRIGADIER H. A. JOLY DE LOTBINIERE : Could the lecturer say whether there is any possibility of getting a text book for the wardens' section ? At the present time we are left to the tender mercies of lecturers, who are purely voluntary and are not paid. You have to take notes as best you can and, if the lecturer speaks quickly, it is rather difficult to listen and write at the same time. There is also no system of examination. One does not have to pass any standard at all to become a qualified warden. I do not see what guarantee there is that they will know anything about their tasks.

THE LECTURER : There are publications on sale at the Stationery Office, unless they are temporarily out of print, where they can be bought for a modest sum ; or from any of their agencies in the Country. One especially on the warden's section. We have not introduced examinations, except for instructors. One of the difficulties, if I can put it forward without being rude to anybody, is that, naturally, we are dealing with the older part of the population, and I always feel that if we started introducing a system of examinations it might not be popular with people who left school many years ago. We rely on the instructors in order to reach the required standard, which I hope and trust they are doing.

Any question of holding examinations like those in the Services—promotion examinations—would be extremely difficult, but for the instructors' course they have to pass an examination, and we hope we are succeeding in keeping up the standard.

BRIGADIER JOLY DE LOTBINIERE : Is the publication up-to-date ? I made an inquiry and I was told by the instructor that it was out-of-date.

THE LECTURER : Of course, we are always seeking to go ahead all the time. I am not going to say that all the things you read in the handbook are necessarily the last word, because a certain time will have elapsed since it was printed. We are trying to get these publications revised as soon as they are sufficiently out-of-date, but naturally, particularly in tactics, our thought is moving ahead all the time, and there will be things in the books which get out-of-date and which I hope the instructors will know. We hope they can guide you in those things.

MR. W. J. DALRYMPLE : We are thinking in terms of an atomic bomb. If we are to have anything worse than that—attack by hydrogen bomb, for instance—is there any integration between local authorities, or will there be, so that if one Civil Defence unit gets knocked out completely, neighbouring authorities will be able to take over the responsibility for that area ?

THE LECTURER : Yes, I did not mention that ; it is a wide subject and one needs time to cover it. Thank you for asking the question. The really important, probable target areas will be grouped or zoned for purposes of mutual aid, and above that there will be a regional organization under a regional commissioner, such as we had in the last war and which exists to-day in England and Wales with a small skeleton staff. Any area getting an attack with which it cannot possibly cope can get assistance from neighbours,

either through a group or zone or some automatic arrangement, assuming that they are in a position to help.

Failing that, they will get help from a region. If a region cannot send help, it will have to come from another region which can spare it. As a matter of interest, thanks to the kindness of the Army, our regional boundaries coincide with army boundaries, so that we have ironed out what might have been certain difficulties there.

MAJOR H. L. DUNCAN : Could the speaker describe, briefly, the organization of one of these mobile columns, and how they are intended to function ?

THE LECTURER : I should like to qualify what I am going to say by pointing out that we are experimenting at present. We have reached the stage in which we are training a part of a column preparatory to sending it on the road this Spring. The normal column in war-time we plan to be about battalion strength—800 men. It will consist of three groups and a headquarters section ; each group will consist of fully-trained rescue personnel, and it will have an ambulance group. Each column will be commanded by a column commander. On the headquarters side, there will be a small reconnaissance unit of its own.

It is planned to be reasonably self-sufficient. When it goes into an area it will feed and look after itself, which is a very important point. That is about as far as I can go at the present time as we have still to test out our proposals.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL B. G. ALLEN : May I ask another question bearing on civil mobile columns ? How long does the lecturer think it will take to train a column until it is efficient enough to go into action ? Some of us feel that it will take, conservatively, six months, particularly if it is made up of civilians, and that will probably mean that they will not be available for the first six months of war. Nevertheless, in certain London exercises, the assumption was that these columns are available. Is that quite sound ?

THE LECTURER : The question of their training depends on how you get them. If personnel were available whole time, they could be knocked into reasonable shape—I do not say as good as one would like—in about three months ; and provided they were trained together as a composite unit.

I must say that I am always a little chary about making too many assumptions about things which do not exist, and one does not know the future of getting personnel for mobile columns. It is a manpower question which has to be thrashed out. They are vitally important. I need not remind you that they are the only thing between us and the Services, and if they were not there, the local resources, under really heavy attack, would not be able to cope. But we have to make certain assumptions for exercise purposes, and I agree with you that we want to be very careful and to make it quite plain that they do not exist at the moment. What the future is I do not know. Those are the hard facts.

COMMANDER F. PITT PALMER : I have done my best to join Civil Defence since 1949 and have been turned down all round. I was told to write about it, and I did so. The local authorities send round these chits about Civil Defence in your rate demands, which is very encouraging. I answered, and put in what qualifications I have—a great many—and a man came round in Civil Defence uniform, but he said, " You are much too good for us "—and that was that. I also wrote to Sir John Hodsoll, but that did not get me very far. I thought you were short of people, but to-day you suggested that things are all right.

THE LECTURER : I did not mean to give that impression. I said we were aiming at about 600,000. I think our actual recruiting figures are round about 200,000. We have got one-third of what we hope to get for peace-time. If there is anything else I can do in your case I shall be delighted to do it.

COMMANDER PITT PALMER : I have been Passive Defence Officer to two admirals, A.C.O.S. and Allied Naval Commander, Norfolk House. I possess an Admiralty letter of thanks for work on mustard gas decontamination trials in H.M.S. *Conquest* in 1928-29,

and I finished the last war as Superintendent of the R.N. Anti-gas School at Devonport. I am also a qualified doctor, but I find that gets in the way. This chap who saw me said that if only I could forget being a doctor they might give me something to do.

THE CHAIRMAN : Perhaps you could see the lecturer afterwards.

MR. F. W. DYSON : Could the lecturer elaborate very briefly on industrial Civil Defence units and their relations with local authorities ?

THE LECTURER : It has been agreed that there should be a separate industrial Civil Defence service. Its primary task is for the defence of itself. Let us take an industry—assuming it is large enough for the purpose, which is normally one employing over 200—it might, depending on the type of work, be operating on a three-shift basis : in which case it would have to organize its Civil Defence also on a three-shift basis. It must have first call on its own Civil Defence for its own protection.

With that proviso, it should work as closely as possible with the local authority. When its people are off duty, especially if they are trained, they should help the local Civil Defence division if required. Similarly the local authority will give any assistance it can to industry.

The industrial units are there primarily for the protection of their own organizations ; but there should be the closest co-operation and interchange of facilities and everything else.

MR. W. J. DALRYMPLE : With reference to recruiting, I was rather surprised to hear what a former questioner said, and I am very interested in this problem because I am vice-chairman of my local authority Civil Defence Committee. We find it extremely difficult to get recruits. I do not know whether this comes within the scope of the lecture, but if the lecturer has any advice to give us on the best way of going round and getting recruits, I should very much like to hear it.

THE LECTURER : The best advice I can give you is to use the personal approach. We have suggested this house-to-house canvass. I think it has now to be done on a personal basis. I think we already have those splendid people who always come forward at once and volunteer, and it is rather a question of spade-work to-day. The best way is to use the canvass, getting all the volunteers who have joined—provided they are satisfied—to get their friends to come in. It is a case of getting the chap who was at the warden's post last time and who was popular and asking him to try to get his friends to come back and join up. It all adds up to the personal approach. I am sure that is the only way we are going to get them.

Our public appeal campaigns are essential because they show that the Government are taking things seriously, but they do not bring in recruits by themselves. They are just the general background. The personal approach is the most effective way of getting recruits, and the method can be varied. For instance, by trying to get volunteers to bring in their friends, particularly those in charge of a warden's post or a depot ; or by getting teams of canvassers—that is what it amounts to—to go round all the houses in an area. These methods have given the best results and they are being used now and are producing far more volunteers than we have had for quite a long time.

BRIGADIER W. C. GREEN : Who is responsible for the provision of shelter and food after a raid ? You say it is not a Civil Defence responsibility to restore the situation. Can you define the demarcation line between the Civil Defence and the local authority ?

THE LECTURER : You are talking about homeless people ?

BRIGADIER GREEN : Yes.

THE LECTURER : It is partly a Civil Defence responsibility. I do not want to give another lecture, but I could put it briefly like this. People rendered homeless as a result of bombing will be looked after by the welfare services. They will be put into rest centres, or whatever cover is available, and will be fed under emergency feeding arrangements which are also a part of the welfare section.

The moment we start to get them sorted out and away into billets, it becomes the local authority's responsibility. It is during the actual period of emergency, when they are homeless, and until we have got them back into circulation and have restored the situation again that Civil Defence is responsible. It is difficult to draw a hard and fast line as the two phases inevitably tend to merge.

THE CHAIRMAN : Before I sum up I should like to welcome here a number of visitors who are not members of the Institution. I am indeed pleased to see you. You may like to know that the lecture will be published in the *JOURNAL* of the Royal United Service Institution, which costs 10s.

You may care also to look into the museum, which you can enter from this building. In it there is a famous Rubens ceiling. I will give you even more welcome news. If you go through the door of this building you will get in free, whereas if you walk into the street first you will have to pay.

I do not think the discussion calls for any summing up; the questions have been admirably answered. I should like to emphasize two matters from the point of view of my Service. The first is that it is of vital interest to us in the three Services, and particularly to the Army, for a reason which you will hear, that we should have an adequate Civil Defence backing.

There are three reasons. First, none of us can operate without a secure base. Secondly—the lecturer emphasized this point, and I entirely agree with the emphasis which he laid upon it—if our Service personnel overseas are not satisfied that their wives and children at home are being looked after, their morale will break. There is no doubt about that. Lastly—and this mainly concerns the Army, which is why I said “particularly to the Army”—if the Civil Defence organization breaks down the Army will have to help to do the job which the Civil Defence organization ought to be doing—and we cannot spare the personnel to do it.

I should like to add that we are trained to do it. We have had columns out on this task in training and in close co-operation with the Civil Defence organization, but to every one of you here in any way connected with Civil Defence, I would beseech you to remember that that is not the Army's job. I ask you to see that your organization can cope with the task without calling on the Army to do it, although, in point of fact, in the last resort the Army will always help if it possibly can.

The other point which I should like to emphasize in what the lecturer said is with reference to those three words “avoid being surprised.” I am quite sure that that is the crux of the whole position; and you will avoid being surprised only if your training and thought have been carried out properly in peace.

I should like to express on your behalf our appreciation of the wonderful lecture and of the most thorough and admirable way in which the lecturer answered all the questions. I ask you to give him a very hearty vote of thanks. (*Applause.*)

THE MIDDLE EAST TO-DAY

By MR. MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE

On Wednesday, 28th January, 1953, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE ERSKINE, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It is with great pleasure that I introduce our lecturer this afternoon. He is an author, playwright, journalist, editor, and a man who has very great practical knowledge of the Middle East—Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge.

LECTURE

IT is a very great pleasure to come and see you again, although I cannot help thinking that to a certain extent it is under false pretences, because when your Secretary asked me to come I was the deputy editor of *The Daily Telegraph*, an honourable position, and now I find myself by chance the editor of *Punch*! I cannot believe it is fitting that in my capacity as editor of *Punch* I should lecture to such an august assembly as this on the subject of the Middle East. In fact, I shall always think of it as something in the nature of a record in that it is probably the first time and, indubitably, will be the last!

It has been said that *Punch* is intended to be a humorous publication. I am bound to admit that, having hunted through its files, I have been able to find very little support for that proposition! However, that appears to be the popular view and therefore the editor of *Punch* is expected to be funny. I stand here to-day in my old capacity and not in the new, and you will not expect me to be funny, particularly on a subject such as the Middle East, which can hardly be said to lend itself to humour.

What I thought I would do is to go over and review, as far as I can, the various things that have happened in the Middle East since I last had the pleasure and privilege of speaking to you, and perhaps see whether it all makes any kind of pattern or sense, and whether we could project a look into the future.

I might add in passing that, apart from the bizarre situation of the editor of *Punch* lecturing on the Middle East, there is the equal absurdity of someone like myself lecturing on the Middle East with General Erskine in the chair, because as a matter of fact, it would be far more agreeable to me, and more fitting, that it should be the other way round. However, I have had the pleasure of lunching with him to-day, and in the course of that lunch we discussed this subject together and found ourselves in very substantial agreement.

PERSIA

I should like to begin this survey of this vitally important area in the world with Persia. It was in Persia that our recent trouble, as we agreed last time, began. It was from Persia that a chain reaction was set up which ran through the whole area, making trouble wherever it went, and resulting in the equally turbulent happenings with which our chairman was so intimately concerned in Egypt.

I think we could say of Persia that Dr. Mossadeq, the Prime Minister, has surprised everyone, including possibly himself, by managing to hang on. The strange technique which he has used to get himself into power and to maintain himself in power has, to everyone's astonishment, proved continually practical. That is to say, on the one hand he has continued to hold out vague hopes of an agreement with

Britain and America over oil, thereby collecting occasional substantial dollar tips, and on the other hand has maintained his position in Persia and, indeed, increased his own personal powers by always, when it comes to the point, refusing to accept any agreement whatever. This peculiar feat of juggling has now been protracted for a long time and is still going on. He was aptly described in an American magazine when they chose him as the man of the year as one who had "oiled the wheels of chaos," a description which fits this particular situation extremely well!

The question is, how long can it go on? We know that the economic situation in Persia is steadily deteriorating. Taxes are not coming in, public servants are unpaid, even the troops collect their pay with difficulty, and at the same time, of course, the oil industry, which was the staple industry of Persia, is completely moribund. Such a situation cannot but be favourable to the Tudeh Party—the Communists—and therefore ultimately to the U.S.S.R. At the same time, Dr. Mossadeq has quarrelled with some of his own supporters. He has quarrelled with Ayatullah Kashani, the leader of the fanatical Moslems, and with some of his own followers such as Mr. Maki. But still he continues to be able, when necessary, to mobilize an overwhelming majority in the Majlis, and by means of this majority can get his way.

From the British point of view we have gone from one humiliation to another. When I spoke to you before the memory was still fresh of the withdrawal from Abadan, of the abandonment of one of the largest refineries in the world, and of a strategic position of immense importance. Since then we have been forced to sever diplomatic relations with Persia, and now find ourselves represented in Teheran to all intents and purposes by America, and find negotiations being conducted on our behalf by the United States ambassador. Happily he is a very agreeable and sympathetic ambassador, but it is a sad come down for our great Country.

In addition, we have the affair of the *Rosemarie* which, you will remember, was a tanker which went to Abadan, loaded up with oil, and the ownership of it was challenged in the courts at Aden. The case went in our favour, but now there are at least two other tankers making their way to Abadan, and obviously, sooner or later, one of them is going to get through, and then we may expect a deluge. It would always be an attractive proposition to offer for sale crude oil at cut rates. Crude oil is there and the readiness to sell is there. Thus it would seem to be the case that, whatever else can be said about the Persian situation, it is clearly still, as it was when I spoke to you before, highly unstable, with the strong probability that any change that may take place there will be for the worse.

Dr. Mossadeq is an old man; his regime is a very ramshackle one, and we know that the only substantial and coherent organization left in Persia is this Tudeh Party. Therefore the dangers of a *coup d'etat* in the interests of the Tudeh are not less, and may well be greater, than they were before. Nor is there any reason to suppose that yet another version of the offers, which have already been made on our behalf by the United States, for a settlement of the oil dispute will be, in the last resort, agreed to by Dr. Mossadeq, for it is quite obvious that were he to agree with them more likely than not that would be the end of him. In other words, his curious, precarious position in Persia which I have described rests essentially on his not making an agreement. The moment he makes one, then he becomes the target of the two forces which increasingly emerge in each Arab country, the force of fanatical Islam and the force of Communism, the two together in a strange, ominous partnership.

IRAQ

Let us move our view on from Persia to Iraq. Since I last spoke to you we have seen in Iraq another of these outbursts of highly synthetic violence, again following this strange pattern; a Moslem element driving itself against the Westerners, the European; the Christian combining forces with the Communist who is anxious for his own reasons to eliminate all Western influence in these Arab countries. Thanks to the astute, capable, and sensible Nuri Said Pasha, the troubles in Baghdad were handled with great skill. An election of sorts has now taken place, and you have a government in Baghdad, headed by Nuri Said, commanding a comfortable majority in the Parliament, which gives every sign of being able to carry on. We may be thankful that that is how matters have turned out. I should, however, like to give one word of warning, and that is I do think that it is frightfully dangerous even to carry on the pretence that elections in countries like Iraq are serious elections in our sense of the word. Such statements are liable to boomerang. The fact is that the return of Nuri Pasha to power, for which we may be thankful, was certainly not achieved by means of popular democracy in any way conforming to our ideas, and I think that it is not only reprehensible but dangerous to pretend otherwise. It often seems to me that if you could hazard a generalization, 90 per cent. of the troubles of our time are due to the boomerang effect of pretences which were maintained for propaganda purposes. Before the 1914-18 War, for propaganda purposes, we maintained this rather ludicrous proposition of self-determination, and a bitter harvest it produced afterwards. In the 1939-45 War, because we needed the Red Army to help us to achieve victory, we said that the Soviet regime was a humane, forward-looking, peace-loving regime, which was pure nonsense.

Those pretences are sustained at our peril, and I think that to pretend to ourselves or to others that these elections in Iraq are veritably elections is decidedly dangerous. What we can say is that we are very glad that for once a friend rather than an enemy finds himself in power; that with that friend we have been able to do business in a sensible and practical way; that a very advantageous oil agreement has been negotiated; and that the oil is flowing merrily along facilitated by a magnificent new pipeline coming out into the Mediterranean in Lebanon, rather than one which was cut coming down to Haifa, and that the royalties on this output of oil, which has been stepped up in the most miraculous way (largely to replace that which was thrown away in Persia) are accruing to the Iraq Government on terms which all sensible members of it must consider to be advantageous. On the other hand, it would be pure wishful thinking to suppose that the last has been heard of possible emulators of Dr. Mossadeq in Baghdad. I am sure it has not. I am sure that this game of asking for more and more is irresistible, and there will be those to take advantage of it and those below the surface to make sure that they will do so.

EGYPT

Let me now move on to Egypt, the area of the Mediterranean where the change has been most dramatic and, perhaps, significant since I last spoke to you. If you remember, then we had had those very violent riots directed to a great extent against Westerners. Nahas Pasha was enjoying one last flicker of popular acclaim. Since then the position has been reversed. King Farouk has disappeared from the scene to no one's regret, and the somewhat enigmatic General Neguib has emerged as a figure of great power and, in certain respects at any rate, deserving of respect. It is natural in the circumstances that one should think of Neguib as possibly another

Mustapha Kemal, and that one should think of his following as the equivalent of the Young Turks; but I think myself that any such speculation should be engaged in with very great prudence. There are certain obvious and tremendous differences between the personalities of Neguib and Mustapha Kemal and, above all, between the circumstances with which Neguib is called upon to deal and those with which Mustapha Kemal was called upon to deal.

Already Neguib has shown a rather lamentable propensity to turn away from essential undertakings such as land reform, administrative reform, and the purging of the Civil Service, in favour of the old old game of "Pashas be deposed"—the game of pretending that the solution to everything lies in getting rid of the foreign invader, the British.

All I would say is that before going nap on the subject of Neguib, before assuming that Neguib is our man and that if we make an agreement with him all will be well, we should pause a little and look at exactly what the situation amounts to. You will note that the Egyptian Press, for what it is worth, and remember it is a controlled and censored Press and in that sense has more bearing on the view of the Government than would otherwise be the case, is at least as anglophobe as it has ever been, and that some of Neguib's closest colleagues have associated themselves with that view, and with sentiments which Nahas would certainly have found congenial. The indefatigable efforts that the British ambassador has been making to come to terms with Neguib—efforts which have involved accepting decided rebuffs without complaint—have not in fact so far borne any apparent fruit.

You have read and seen about this extraordinary character, Major Salem, who has been up in the Sudan trying to convince those tall, strange, naked people who live in the southern part of the Sudan that they are nature's pashas, and you will have realized the significance of the mission in which Major Salem has been engaged. You will notice that he has been able, without any great difficulty, to reach an agreement with certain little groups of politicians in Khartoum. I would point out again this fallacy of accepting the word 'democracy' as a reality. We talk of democracy in the Sudan, and we say that there are four parties there, that one of these parties will form a government, and that another party called the Socialist Republicans represent these people in the South. The whole thing is, of course, complete and utter nonsense, and although it may be necessary at times for reasons of State to accept this nonsense, it is very important, I think, that in shaping policy one should know that it is nonsense, and that when Major Salem comes back to Cairo and says "I have been able to reach agreement with all the Sudanese parties," what he really means is that he has been able to reach agreement with perhaps 40 or 50 individuals in Khartoum who claim to represent large numbers of other people. To accept pretensions like that and jeopardize all that has been done in the Sudan, in order to reach agreement with Neguib, which would involve, not a promise on his part to come into a five-Power defence command, but a statement that he probably would when all things had come to pass, seems to me to be an extremely hazardous undertaking.

Here I want to ask a genuine question which I believe the chairman is better placed than anybody I know to answer. It is this. If, as we understand, a N.A.T.O. command is to be created at Smyrna, and a line of defence against possible Russian attack on the Middle East is to be created there, what, when it comes down to it, is the importance of this Middle East command for which such immense sacrifice and risks are going to be taken? That is something I should very much like to know.

We have already gone a long way to conciliating Neguib. Sterling credits have been made available. When recently a glorious victory was celebrated—a glorious victory which involved the murder of British nationals—jet planes flew overhead to celebrate it, and those jets were British made. We had provided them. Is such a policy really getting us anywhere? Supposing it is true that Neguib would like to reach an agreement with us, is that, in fact, the right technique to induce him to do so? Are we not ourselves being rather feeble and over-eager to conciliate? Every time the British ambassador calls on Neguib and is told that he is out he goes back and calls the following day. We ought to realize that, far from strengthening Neguib's hand, a little opposition might weaken it. Anyway, should we assume that Neguib wishes to reach agreement with us on this question of common defence in the Middle East?

I pose those questions in order that we shall not fall into the trap of assuming that, by conciliating Neguib, we shall achieve this Middle East command which we are told is so important. Ever since I can remember Egyptian affairs, which dates back to the late twenties, I can recall people insisting that if only we would make one more concession it would be possible for that Egyptian leader to be our friend as he wanted to be. The concessions have all been made one after the other, but where are the friends? I do not see them.

Incidentally, I wanted to draw your attention in connection with this business of the South Sudan (now I am no longer the deputy editor of *The Daily Telegraph* I can recommend another newspaper) to two extracts in *The Times*, dated 25th and 26th January, from the Upper Nile Province and the Equatoria Province, to the effect that one thing is being overlooked in purely political speculation. It is that the people in the South are also human beings and that they have less in common with Major Salem than with you and me, and the idea that in any way the native of Cairo has a blood link with those people is complete nonsense.

OUTSIDE DEVELOPMENTS

I want to deal with three outside events which I consider to have a big bearing on the Middle East. The first—and it is in some way the most important—is this outburst of anti-Semitism behind the iron curtain and in Russia. It is the fashion for the Communist spokesman to deny that such a thing exists, but I think that anybody who had even cursorily gone over the cross-examination in the Prague trial would be forced to realize that this was direct, open, and unashamed anti-Semitism. There was one piece of cross-examination which I could not resist cutting out because it is so reminiscent of what went on under the Nazis. It read as follows:—

"The Prosecutor: 'You never learned to speak decent Czech?'"

"Answer: 'That is right.'"

"The Prosecutor: 'Which language do you speak usually?'"

"Answer: 'German.'"

"The Prosecutor: 'Can you really speak decent German?'"

"Answer: 'I did not speak German for a long time but I know the German language.'"

"The Prosecutor: 'As well as you know Czech?'"

"Answer: 'Yes.'"

"The Prosecutor: 'That means that you speak no language decently; a typical cosmopolitan?'"

"Answer: 'Yes.'"

I refer to that piece of cross-examination to indicate that these new purges which are taking place are open anti-Semitism, and that is a development which, for obvious reasons, has an enormous bearing on the Middle East because it affects the State of Israel. You know from my previous observations that I have for a long time held the view that the State of Israel, far from being a handicap or a disadvantage to the Western position, is in fact one of its assets, and the reason I have maintained this is that, quite irrespective of what the citizens of Israel might feel, they must recognize that their existence depends entirely on the maintenance of the Western position. Whereas there might be other possible lines along which their interests could diverge, it would be impossible for the interests of Israel to diverge from those of the West. I contend, if that required confirming or underlining, that this development behind the iron curtain has underlined it, and it has had immediate repercussions in the internal politics of Israel. We can undoubtedly consider the Israeli Army, which is a good army, as a force on the side of the West. That cannot be said with the same confidence of any other force in that area, not for any sentimental reason but for an extremely practical reason. What we have long noticed as a tendency for the Stalinists to ally themselves with Arab Communism is now out in the open, and that is the line-up. We have seen it in Persia and Iraq and in Egypt, and this development behind the iron curtain makes it obvious.

The second outside development which is of great importance is that of the drawing together, which is taking place, of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, with a view to creating a common defensive line in the East. Conversations are at this moment proceeding in that connection, and it would seem to me to be the case that such a development cannot but have a bearing on the degree of importance of maintaining our position in the Canal Zone. The maintenance of that position in the Canal Zone is, as you all know, an expensive one, not only in terms of money and troops, but even in terms of morale. It is asking a great deal of our soldiers for them simply to sit there and wait for something to happen. It is an expensive matter, and if it is the case that an international headquarters and force are to be created in the North, that force in the South, it seems to me, should also be a N.A.T.O. force rather than solely a British responsibility.

The third and last point I would mention is the election of General Eisenhower to the United States Presidency. It is a truism to say that the greatest handicap in the Middle East has been the failure to co-ordinate British and American policies. Everybody knows, alas, that co-ordination has not been achieved, and that it is not due to any malicious reason. The situation in Persia could have been saved if there had been true co-ordination. The situation in Egypt has been made vastly worse due to lack of co-ordination. But I have a great belief and hope that under General Eisenhower's Presidency the chances of co-ordination being achieved become immeasurably greater, if only because he is one of the few Americans—certainly of Americans in authority—who have any real knowledge of what the problem of the Middle East is, and of the strategic and economic importance of the Middle East. The fact of having a President of the United States who is in that position will be of enormous importance.

We have to have this co-ordination of policy, but that co-ordination of policy does not mean that whenever we wish to make a move or whenever we think a move

should be made we should first seek American approval for it. If we do that we shall always develop Abadans. Contrast in your minds what happened in Greece when, at one o'clock in the morning, the Prime Minister was rung up by General Scobie to know whether it was in order to prevent a Communist attack on Athens, and over the phone came the order, "Yes." That incident was followed by a political outburst of vituperation in the American Press, and even President Roosevelt felt bound to criticize Mr. Churchill. You will also realize that, three months later, there was not an American who was not profoundly thankful that that step had been taken and, in point of fact, if it had not been taken then, the events we are discussing now would have been theoretical because the whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean would have been lost beyond hope. Supposing Mr. Churchill had had to go to the Americans and say, "Will you agree? Will you support me if I do this?" The answer would certainly have been "No," and the position would have been lost. I think that it is very important to realize that, just as no good is done in playing with Neguib by mere conciliation, so in this essential task of co-ordinating British and American policies—and nowhere is it more essential than in the Middle East—no good is done by thinking that you can get cover in advance, an insurance in advance for whatever you may seek to do. The fact remains that British and American policies have to be co-ordinated. The election of General Eisenhower represents a great chance to achieve that co-ordination, and if it were really achieved and enabled us, not only to create our defensive lines, but to fight the cold war, and fight it in the Middle East, then I think that what seems almost a hopeless situation could still be saved.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that we should first endeavour to direct our discussion towards the three questions which have been asked, and I think I am right in saying that they are as follows:—

First, having got a N.A.T.O. command which stretches as far as, and includes, Turkey, what is the importance of extending it further in the Middle East and having another command there?

Second, are we going to do any good by appeasing those people in that part of the world? Are we going to get support, help, and friendship by giving all the time?

The third question is this. In doing that which we are doing now in the Canal Zone, does it affect the morale of the soldiers stationed there, and assuming that the defence of the Canal Zone is of vital interest to the West, should it not, in the same way as Korea or Smyrna, be a N.A.T.O. responsibility?

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL: I should like to know whether the lecturer agrees that what Neguib would like more than anything else would be for us to send for him and tell him exactly what we are going to do in Egypt and the Sudan in clear terms. In that event Neguib would be able to go back to his people and say, "I am sorry but the British insist on this." Instead of that we say to him, "We might be able to meet you," and then he goes back and says, "Look what I have got; have I not done well?" His supporters then say, "How splendid! We must turn guerilla warfare on the British and we will then get all we want." Surely it is time that we did what we know is right and regained the drive we had in the old days.

LIEUT.-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN: Are not the three questions rather interdependent? It seems to me that we cannot deny that service in the Canal Zone has an adverse effect on the morale of the very large garrison, because periods of foreign service and family separation are already much too long. That, I think, goes without saying.

The next point, I suggest, is whether or not the Canal Zone is any longer vital? We have always imagined that we must have a garrison there to protect the Suez Canal itself; but, now that we are no longer in India, the Cape route is very nearly as short to Australia and the Far East, and in any case the central Mediterranean would probably be closed again in war, so as an artery of communication the Canal has lost most of its value.

Admittedly, as a base of operations, the Canal Zone is incomparably the best in the Middle East, but can it function as a base unless we have a friendly Egypt?—a most improbable contingency so long as we remain in the Zone.

Finally, we have kept troops on the Canal in order that they might be in a position to re-occupy Egypt in case of trouble. In the present world situation this conception seems rather out-dated.

My suggestion is, therefore, that our Middle East garrison should be located in Malta, Cyprus, and Cyrenaica, where we can gradually prepare accommodation for them and give them reasonable living conditions. At the same time, either the N.A.T.O.'s Smyrna Command should be extended southward to embrace our Middle East Command, or else a separate Middle East Command should be set up which might include Admiral Mountbatten's Mediterranean Command—the whole under General Ridgway.

COLONEL R. A. HARRIS: I should like to ask the lecturer what he thinks of Israel as a bastion for Western power in the Middle East. He made the point very clearly that there could not be any divergence between the Western Powers and Israel, and, if I may say so, I think that is very true, the point being that our position in Egypt is becoming untenable. As General Martin pointed out, the necessity for troops to remain in the Canal Zone seems to have passed, but it seems to me that, with India having gone, we do want another bastion in the Middle East and it would seem that Israel could take a more active part in the N.A.T.O.

THE LECTURER: I entirely agree. Whether we base troops there is a matter of technicality, but it should be regarded as one of our major plans. The people of Israel, whether friends or not, are irretrievably on our side.

BRIGADIER H. A. JOLY DE LOTBINIERE: Bearing on that which the lecturer has been saying concerning the Middle East, what is the situation so far as Cyprus and Greece are concerned? Is Greece likely to press her claim with regard to Cyprus?

THE LECTURER: That is one of the things that should be mentioned in any survey of the Middle East. My impression is that it is not as serious a difficulty as it has been, and that the Greek Government, while on the one hand not actually coming out in the open and deploring this agitation, is not behind it. It is conducted very largely by the Church and the clergy, and although it provides the Communists with a useful flame on which they can blow, I would say that it is more difficult to conduct than it was before. Even the Greek clergy would realize that they would have more chance as a British Colony than as a Communist Greece.

COLONEL C. G. D. THRUPP: I had the curious privilege of being the chief instructor at the Egyptian Staff College at a time when the present officers who are in authority were either my students or colleagues. One of the many tours which we laid on was to the Sudan where we were helped by Sir Hubert Huddleston and his gallant A.D.C., Ali Neguib, younger brother of General Neguib. During that tour and for some time afterwards—and this point was put to me again when I was in Egypt in 1948-50—these Egyptian officers were often suggesting that after the war they could resettle down in the Sudan millions of people from crowded Egypt, especially those we had used in the war and had employed. It would be very interesting to know whether that is still in their minds particularly in view of their overtures to the Sudan.

Another point is this. All these Egyptian officers, and their colleagues who are not at liberty, can speak and read English fluently, and they used regularly to read English newspapers from London because they were of the view that they could always read the

truth in English newspapers. Therefore, I should like to ask whether the British Press ought not to be very careful when they refer to these present officers as "experts in Sudan affairs," the "strong men of Egypt," and so forth, because being vain like all of us, they are liable to believe these statements and to say, "I told you so; even the English believe it"!

REAR-ADMIRAL P. V. McLAUGHLIN: I have gathered that the answer to one of the questions posed is that there must be an extension of the N.A.T.O. Command to cover the Middle East. That being so, I cannot reconcile this with some of the views expressed that the Canal Zone is no longer needed as a base.

In the past India has always been the keystone and to some extent provided the strategic reserve. I should like to ask the lecturer whether he considers that if the problem of Kashmir were solved it would simplify the extension of the N.A.T.O. Command to the Middle East, and enable the defence system to be linked up with Pakistan and India.

THE LECTURER: I agree that it is essential, but whether it would be possible I am afraid I am a little dubious.

I should very much like to hear our Chairman's comments on the strategic importance of the Canal Zone base.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think that the N.A.T.O. Command stretching to Turkey is sufficient defence of the Middle East. If you stop where you do in Turkey you have thousands of miles of open desert and a huge gap in your defences which could be turned because you have nothing really between you and the passes which go over Persia into Russia. It is an open door unless steps are taken to close that right flank, so I could not agree that the present arrangements go far enough. Therefore, in my opinion, there has to be a further defence effort on the right flank of the Turkish position.

So far as the Canal Zone is concerned, I agree that shipping does not, during the course of a war, necessarily have a chance of using the Suez Canal, and I have never maintained that our position in the Canal Zone is directly related to the Suez Canal in case of war. What we require in the Canal Zone is a base from which to develop operations on the southern flank of the N.A.T.O. position. We require a base in that part of the world, but it is not a proper base if you rely on having the Mediterranean open for supplies, because air power could deny the use of the Mediterranean to shipping and it would be found to be impossible to sustain forces in that part of the world. The great advantage of Egypt as a base is that there are two ways of reaching it, either through the Mediterranean or through the Red Sea. I should like to see a link-up in which there was something further on the southern flank of the N.A.T.O. defences and behind that a base from which support could be given.

That takes you to the next question: how do you get that? I do not believe that you get it by giving the people in the Middle East everything they ask for. The more you give the more you will be asked to give until really you go on giving forever, and make no progress in creating a defence of that part of the free world. When dealing with the people out there I think that you have to make it clear what you are doing, why you are doing it, and you have to be firm and do it. You have to be prepared to accept criticism both from our own people and from foreigners. There will be criticism, and plenty of it; but if what you are doing is right, based on the need to keep the free world free, and you are proved right by subsequent events, the criticism will melt away, and you will find that support will come after you have taken the risk. You cannot expect foreigners, or even some people in this Country, to believe you before you take the risk.

The last point concerns the question of the morale of soldiers in the Canal Zone. I can speak with a little authority here because I was there for a little over three years. In many ways, particularly for married people, it is an extremely tiresome station, for you are almost bound to be separated; but we could not deploy the British Army only in places where it would be comfortable. We have to deploy our troops where it is necessary to carry out the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but if the job to be done is difficult

and unpleasant, my experience of the British soldier is that he will do it willingly as long as it is clear to him that it is worth while doing and important. I had no difficulty whatever in Egypt and the Canal Zone during the time of the troubles so far as morale was concerned. It was excellent. In fact, when the trouble started morale went up because people realized that they were doing an important job. The difficult time is not at the moment of the crisis; it is afterwards and between times. That is the problem of the troops in the Canal Zone to-day; if there is nothing obviously important to do they begin to think quite naturally of the amenities they do not have. But do not listen too seriously to the stories which are sometimes put about that the morale of the troops in the Canal Zone is low. I have a good many letters from friends out there and I know that it is not so. It is boring and tiresome for married soldiers, but with good officers and good arrangements to keep them interested in their profession there is plenty to do there of great interest, and it is an excellent training ground.

Of course, all the time you are in Egypt you have this uncomfortable feeling of hostility—hostility against the British. I agree with the lecturer that responsibilities should be broadened and put on a much wider basis. They should be international. Egypt and the Middle East in general is often represented as a British job because of British interests. That is not true. You have only to see all the oil tankers passing through the Canal flying the flags of the world to realize that. The whole free world is vitally interested in the products of the Middle East and the defence of its peoples and territory against Communist aggression.

I should like now to thank Mr. Muggeridge most sincerely on your behalf for a most inspiring lecture. He has put the position very clearly and it is a great privilege to have had him here this afternoon. I know that you would wish me to thank him sincerely for such a splendid lecture. (*Applause.*)

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN KOREAN WATERS¹

By REAR-ADMIRAL A. K. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 4th March, 1953, at 3 p.m.

VICE-ADMIRAL J. A. S. ECCLES, C.B., C.B.E., in the Chair

The CHAIRMAN: Admiral Scott-Moncrieff needs no introduction from me. He is known personally to most of you or, if not personally, by repute.

He took over command as Flag Officer, Second in Command, of the Far Eastern Station, in April, 1951, and relinquished the command in September, 1952. In April, 1951, the Inchon landing had already taken place, but the front line had not been stabilized.

At the end of his period in command, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff suffered a serious illness, and I am sure you will join with me in being glad that he is well enough, as you can see for yourselves, to interest us very deeply this afternoon in his subject. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff.

LECTURE

I WAS in command of the Commonwealth Navy in Korea from April, 1951, to September, 1952, during which time our command of the sea was never contested by the enemy. But much hard work and constant patrolling was done by the navies of the United Nations in order to maintain command of the sea.

NAVAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION

I should like first to sketch very roughly the general command situation in the United Nations naval set-up. The naval forces were under the command of Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, an American admiral, who was based in Tokyo alongside the Supreme Commander, Far East. This was General Ridgway when I first got there and latterly General Mark Clark. At the commencement of my time, Admiral Turner Joy was Commander in Tokyo but he, as you remember, was taken away to be the senior delegate in the truce talks and was relieved by Admiral Briscoe.

Under Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, in Tokyo, was formed a United Nations blockade and escort force, which was part of the United States Seventh Fleet. This task force was commanded by an American admiral to whom I acted as second-in-command, and as Commander of a task group.

My own command set-up was as follows. I had a rear headquarters in Sasebo, Japan, in a makeshift headquarters ship. This was a Yangtse river steamer, chartered by the Royal Navy and named H.M.S. *Ladybird*. There were also extra offices ashore. In the same harbour the Commander of the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force, my immediate superior, had his headquarters in a destroyer depot ship. Thus we were in close contact and our staffs were able to work close together.

In order to exercise general supervision of the coast in my war area, it was my habit to visit this area regularly, proceeding to and from it usually in the small ships of my command. I left my Chief of Staff in nominal control with the majority of my staff and proceeded to sea with the minimum of staff officers, but keeping, of course, in complete wireless touch. The cruiser on the coast acted as senior officer of the coastal area, and this enabled the commanding officer to administer the smaller ships and our islands, whilst I maintained a watching brief.

¹ A sketch-map of Korea faces page 286.

SHIPS AVAILABLE

Under my command I had the whole of the British Far Eastern fleet, consisting of two carriers, one operational and one for the transport and maintenance of the aircraft. You will realize that we were operating over 1,500 miles from our main base and airfield. In addition I had two cruisers, eight destroyers, eight frigates, and a fleet train consisting of supply ships, ammunition ships, store ships, and fleet oilers manned by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service.

Also, the Dominion navies supplied three destroyers from Canada, two from Australia, and for part of the time a carrier and destroyer, and two frigates from New Zealand. I had also under my operational control one American carrier, several fleet destroyers, some rocket ships, L.S.Ts and minesweepers, a Dutch destroyer, and frigates, gunboats, minesweepers, and M.T.Bs from the South Korean Navy.

BLOCKADE

A blockade had been declared in the early days of the war off the coast of Korea, limited within certain parallels of longitude, so that it only affected the waters immediately surrounding the Korean coasts. There was thus no restriction to ships passing round the Shantung peninsula on their lawful occasions to Port Arthur, Tientsin, and so on. However, our blockade did prevent any supplies from arriving in North Korea by sea.

From the opening days of the war, the command of the sea has rested completely in the hands of the United Nations, and this was fully exploited at Inchon in 1950 and, of course, in the evacuation from Hungnam. It subsequently enabled us to control and make use of many islands off enemy coasts well behind the front line.

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

As a rough rule responsibility for the blockade was so organized that the United States Navy looked after the East coast of Korea and our duty was to look after the West. This rule was naturally elastic, and I have operated off the East coast as well. We always supplied one destroyer or frigate to the East coast to compensate in some measure for the great help given to my coast by the American ships under my operational control.

There is a very great difference between the two coasts of Korea. On the East coast there is no real rise and fall of tide, no tidal stream, practically no islands, and very little shoal water. On the West coast, on the other hand, there is a rise and fall of over 30 feet, myriads of small islands with shoal water, and a tidal stream running up to eight knots in places. It is really full of very unpleasant waters.

These characteristics to a large extent dictated our operations. On the East coast, the Navy was able to give direct support to the Army. In fact, the 16-in. guns of the American battleships were used for the major part of my tour in direct support of the Army in the front line—and a magnificent weapon they proved to be!

On the West coast, naval support was only possible at the beginning of 1951, when our 38th Brigade, before the formation of the Commonwealth Division, was holding the bottom half of Kimpo peninsula. Then we were able to get some cruisers and destroyers up to Inchon and interlink them with the brigade artillery, but later on, when the front line advanced to its present position, it was not possible to get into close touch with the Army.

DUTIES OF SHIPS

Apart from the normal patrol work to prevent the enemy from using the sea in any way, our operations can be briefly described. The main striking forces of the Fleet were the aircraft from the carriers, and on the West our job was to interdict the main lines of communication within certain areas. The American task force, working off the East coast, looked after the other lines of communication in conjunction with the American Air Force. Our aircraft also had to protect our ships from air attack, to spot for our naval guns, to bomb and strafe enemy shore batteries, and generally to roam round the enemy countryside doing what damage they could to communications and troops. In addition, they worked with the Commonwealth Division in the front line whenever possible.

You will realize that that was quite a job for the 30 or so aircraft in our carrier. An average day's sortie was about 80, with a wonderful peak of 123 by the aircraft carrier *Ocean* last Summer. The aircraft carrier had a very hard day. In the Summer, the pre-dawn flight would go off at about 4.30 a.m., and they would be flying till 9 p.m., which meant that in addition to the pilots everyone—aircraft handlers, people bombing up the aircraft, ammunition, supply, engineers, everybody—had to work flat out. A tour of five months was about the maximum a carrier could be expected to do. As a general rule, they do a 10-day patrol with eight days in harbour.

The cruisers, one at a time, acted as the senior officer of the coast, apart from the aircraft carrier work. They administered the smaller ships and the islands under our command, which gave them a full job of work. The ship was constantly moving from unit to unit up and down the coast, bombarding here and smoothing the ruffled feelings of some guerilla commander there, fuelling smaller ships, arranging stores and supplies for the islands, and generally looking after the coast. In fact, on one patrol, my flagship, H.M.S. *Belfast*, worked cables 75 times in three weeks. The destroyers, as usual, did a bit of everything and by virtue of their high speed and good armament were always being directed to troubled areas in a hurry. Their main function was the anti-submarine and anti-aircraft protection of the carrier. Although we were never bothered by submarines in my time, we took no chances. They also bombarded and protected our islands and did many a run at high speed up to the islands in the mouth of the Yalu river as well as normal patrolling. At one period our destroyers were averaging over 7,000 miles a month, which put a great strain on their maintenance.

THE HAN RIVER

The frigates bombarded and escorted as was necessary, and they also had their share of looking after those islands in the North, i.e. up by the entrance to the Yalu river. At one period, it became necessary to penetrate the Han river. This estuary was the nearest we could reach to our armies in the North end of the Kimpo peninsula. It was a fearsome place, something like the upper reaches of the Middle Yangtse. There were no modern charts and no local pilots. We knew the sandbanks had shifted, for they always shift at one season of the year. The frigates were given the job of finding their way up as high as possible and patrolling the estuary and generally causing alarm and despondency on the enemy's doorstep.

After much unpleasantness a way was found. Every channel had to be surveyed by hand lead line from small boats and then buoyed before the ships could get up. I take off my hat to the captains, for the responsibility was extremely unpleasant. There were places where the ships had to pass a few yards off rocks in a high running

stream in which they had to go full speed in order to retain control of the ship. Some of the channels were right up against the enemy coast, within 300 yards, and the enemy did not take long to bring guns to bear. Duels were sometimes waged at 3,000 yards with army anti-tank guns, which can be very effective against a thin-sided frigate. However, the six 4-inch guns of a frigate can be very unpleasant at point-blank range too. In all, we patrolled this estuary for four months without serious damage and only a few casualties. I know we inflicted more than we received.

We had also, of course, a few Korean gunboats to help protect the islands in the estuary. Our presence there protected the islands, which were manned not by our Army but by guerillas, from invasion from the enemy held coast. We also helped the guerillas to invade the enemy coast and generally upset enemy movements. I sent a destroyer up there at one time, but as she dragged at six knots with both anchors down, I took her away. In the early stages we tried using American frogmen to find the channels, but the water was too dirty and although they did magnificent work we had to give them up.

ISLAND PROTECTION

Apart from the ordinary patrol work necessary to enforce a blockade, one of the major tasks for which we were responsible was the protection of certain islands off the West coast. Some of them lay off the enemy's coastline, and the United Nations command decided to hold them. This necessitated garrisoning the islands and protecting them by sea and air. In some cases, the enemy mainland was only one mile away, and many shore batteries had been mounted, covering the islands and their approaches. The protection and defence of these islands was put upon the Navy, and a novel job I found it! I was very grateful for the United States marine colonel who was given to me to be in general charge of the island garrisons and their shore defences. Each island had its own marine garrison commander to ensure protection against an enemy invasion.

The main group, the Choda group, required destroyers, frigates, rocket ships, L.S.T.'s, gunboats, and minesweepers. This group is just off the entrance to Chinnampo, and well within air striking distance of the enemy. It is only about five minutes from the enemy airfields above the Yalu.

The plan was to have a naval captain in a destroyer or frigate in charge of each area which was, of course, regularly visited by the cruiser, and it was not pleasant work. The waters were honeycombed with rocks and sandbanks, and the tidal stream could run up to five knots in places, particularly between Sokto Island and the mainland. Sokto was under fire by the enemy batteries on several occasions. The enemy batteries could also cover the approaches and waters round Sokto and East of Choda. And there was the constant possibility of air attack in confined waters. Many ships were hit by enemy gunfire but damage was slight.

There were several of these areas and each one was under a senior officer.

On the East coast we had an island up in the North and another further South off Kojo, South of Wonsan. These were under American command.

I was very grateful to the Americans for giving the commander of these islands his own helicopter so that he could move round as he liked—and magnificent use he made of it. Certain of the islands had also their own helicopters which made communication between ships and islands much easier, particularly in the Winter when there was ice on the water, or in rough weather. It was all very interesting and to a certain extent exciting.

ISLAND WARFARE

The enemy batteries were mounted all along the coast including Amgak peninsula for the Choda area and in many places for the Haeju area. Although in this area they could not reach our main island, our patrols could be taken under fire. In addition there were various small islands which were sometimes under command of our guerilla troops and sometimes of the enemy troops. You never knew when one was going to be raided or not, so our ships had to keep a watching brief all round the islands. The motor torpedo boats of the South Korean Navy were used for these small islands, and they did several raids up and down the coast and round the islands. They did a very good job of work, considering that they are a very new navy.

COMBINED AIR AND GUN STRIKES

On occasions it was necessary to carry out a combined air and gun strike against selected targets, and these were truly United Nations affairs. I remember one I was ordered to carry out off Kojo, South of Wonsan, in which I had an American battleship with two destroyers, the *Belfast*, and two Commonwealth destroyers as bombarding ships; an Australian carrier screened by Commonwealth, Dutch, and American destroyers; American and South Korean army spotters; and in addition a Colombian frigate, a South Korean frigate, and American minesweepers were in the vicinity. The aircraft spotted for the guns and bombed and strafed according to a co-ordinated programme. On this particular occasion we had more satisfaction than usual, as we caught many enemy troops without ground cover in the area.

MINESWEEPING

As regards minesweeping, in the early days of the war the enemy had a large supply of mines at his disposal and the coastal waters had been heavily mined. Most of the minefields have now been swept, but a constant watch has to be kept to prevent the enemy from mining by junks at night and other methods, practices at which he is becoming pretty good. The United States Navy have done a wonderful job of minesweeping in Korean waters, and a very unpleasant one it has proved to be, because of additional danger to the minesweepers from gunfire. Most of the waters to be swept are in range of shore batteries, and these little minesweepers have been under fire on numerous occasions. They have suffered considerable casualties but they have never been daunted, and they have earned our unqualified admiration and respect. They worked with us on many occasions and their technique was of a very fine order.

BOMBARDMENT

Most of the work in my time necessitated constant gun bombardment of shore batteries, railways, tunnels, main lines of road communication, and so on. The large majority of these batteries are sited in cliff faces with the guns in tunnels. They are run out to be fired and then retracted very often behind an iron shutter. Unless you get a direct hit, you do no good. They are very cleverly camouflaged and very difficult to see, even if you know exactly where they are. I am afraid that vast quantities of ammunition were used for very little damage done in the early days; but later a new policy was evolved, and we did not fire without exactly pin-pointing the target. We also used our dive-bombers with delayed-action fuses which caused much damage. Sometimes the ships were under fire and could not find the enemy, this was usually from large mortars sited behind the hills, and we had to leave our naval air cover to deal with them.

Our ships on both sides of the coast have been under fire on many occasions but the damage has been relatively light and the casualties very few. The batteries, as a general rule, are 75 mm. with some 105 and 120 mm. Some of the batteries, particularly on the East coast, kept up remarkably accurate fire up to 12,000 yards. On the East coast the main railway is forced by the topography of the country to hug the coastline for a major part of its way. Since there is deep water close up to the coast these lines are frequently under naval gunfire and several positions are kept under constant watch from the sea. "Train catching" by night has become quite a pastime. These railway lines run through myriads of tunnels, interspaced with open spaces. The enemy has a habit of putting his trains in the tunnels by day and dashing across the open spaces at night. We try to creep in to see or hear them and blow them up and get out before the shore batteries can do much damage to our ships.

WONSAN HARBOUR

At Wonsan, which the United Nations have kept open for over two years, the harbour is completely in our hands. The American Navy, and sometimes our ships, have bombarded this area for over two years. There are one or two small islands in the harbour which we hold, otherwise the whole of the surrounding land is held by the enemy, and we hope this constant bombardment of the network of roads and railways in this area has caused disruption to enemy supplies.

However, the fact remains that on both coasts supplies do get through, though slowly, and the enemy have been able, since the truce talks commenced, to build up large army and supply centres behind their lines. They used to keep literally thousands of North Koreans tucked away in the hills and in the tunnels. They came out at night and worked like beavers on the railway lines and putting up bridges which were usually knocked down next morning, but they got stuff through, some of it on their backs.

The minesweepers in the harbours have a very difficult time, because they have to sweep by day under a full barrage from the batteries, but they do it, and they stick to it.

A United States naval task force deals with the East coast and supplies the necessary air component to interdict enemy transport, and a most impressive force it is. I was privileged to visit it on several occasions. If you remember, it was aircraft from this force that did some of the most accurate bombing on the power stations on the Yalu river and further South. I saw the photographs taken at the time in full confirmation of their claims, and it was a very fine piece of work.

CO-OPERATION

As regards co-operation, there is no doubt this war has been of great value in advancing co-operation between our various navies. There is no incentive like the stress of an actual campaign to help on such matters, and there has been a great advance in communications alone, though more requires to be done. It was interesting enough merely to listen to the voice radio from the ships on the aircraft carrier screen to realize the difficulties of, say, a Dutch destroyer when English was coming over the air in accents of Cockney, Scotland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Yankee, and deep South. It was always a mystery to me how they understood it at all. I rarely did. Yet the manoeuvres were executed with a precision and despatch that would have done credit to our best fleet at any time.

FUELLING AT SEA

I might mention here that we all fuelled at sea, if necessary, from each other with complete ease and confidence and without difficulty, and this also applied to ammunitioning and storing. The American fleet train has to be seen to be believed; it is most efficient and made us green with envy.

The American naval air and our own air worked together irrespective of what ship was bombarding down below, and this included the South Korean guerillas, which really was something! The American Air Force worked with us many times. Here again active operations hastened co-operation; with different radio frequencies and different systems, it needed a lot of knitting together. However, it worked out and good results were obtained. They always gave us high cover over the ships at 30,000 feet or so, and they produced flare aircraft at night, in case of invasion of our islands, which were very efficient and surprisingly accurate.

THE U.S. NAVY

As always, the U.S. Navy was kindness itself and much help and consideration was given to us by them, and I think we did some good to them too. In the early days they lent us helicopters to work from our carrier, and invaluable work was done in saving our pilots who ditched near the carrier or behind the enemy lines. Some very spectacular rescues of our pilots were made by them behind the enemy lines. We used helicopters regularly for working with the islands, as I have said. In my flagship we were able to land them on the quarterdeck, but if this is not possible, they always have a wire attachment to transfer personnel or small stores without having to land. They are most impressive aircraft, and the U.S. Navy has practically replaced boats with them.

On one occasion I was lunching with the Commander of the Seventh Fleet off Inchon. Four generals came to lunch from the front line, each in his own helicopter with some of his staff. It was an impressive sight, watching these 'elephants' flying round and waiting to come down on the fantail of the U.S. battleship *Iowa*.

And so the war goes on. Although there are many 'unrealities' in the conduct of this war by world war standards, it is possible that such 'limited' wars, even to the extent of minor air opposition and non-intervention by submarines, may form a pattern for other 'small' wars.

As far as our Commonwealth naval effort has been concerned, a not insignificant contribution has been made and in return much valuable training and experience has been gained by a relatively small number of ships and personnel. Even if such training has been qualified by learning certain bad habits under conditions of calculated risks taken, e.g. operating against shore batteries in confined waters without air and anti-submarine protection, and even if our organization has been largely makeshift, born of one improvisation after another, it can still be a useful guide for future minor wars.

Perhaps the most useful lesson learned is that there is no such thing as a *small war*, and once committed, even to such a limited contribution as in this case, a steady drain on resources must be faced, and the demands for support will inevitably tend to increase as the war progresses.

DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN : Admiral Scott-Moncrieff will do his best to answer any questions anyone cares to put to him.

REAR-ADMIRAL G. BARNARD : Could you tell us a little more about the South Korean Navy ? Were they easy to control ? Did they always do what they were told ?

The LECTURER : The South Korean Navy was built up by the American Navy. To start with, they had only a few ex-Japanese gunboats, later they were given some American frigates and minesweepers and so on. They are now becoming a force worth talking about. At first they had, unfortunately, no trained men and had to take anybody they could for officers, and they were sometimes very difficult. Now they have a very good academy at Chinhæ down in the South where they are giving their officers an excellent training based on that of the American Naval Academy at Annapolis. They are turning out a very good force. It is interesting to realize that 300 years ago they had the makings of a fine navy and the first iron-clads ever produced ; they fought a magnificent battle against the Japanese with junks covered with iron tops. So they have a background of naval history behind them.

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR, R.N. : Two questions, please. You spoke of enemy mining. What type of mines do they use ? Also you were dancing about on their front doorstep. Did you ever get any real air attacks, as would be expected in such a case as that ?

The LECTURER : As you will have seen from the Press, a large number of the mines were Russian. I cannot tell you the type. Most of their weapons now are produced by Russia.

As regards air, we have been extremely lucky. We have had no air attack worth talking about at all. In the early days a destroyer, the *Comus*, was bombed and hit, and at the Inchon landing one aircraft arrived and was knocked down by our cruiser *Jamaica*. There was also another attack when a South Korean frigate was hit, but this attack was beaten off. I think that is about all.

The American Air Force keeps the MIGs up top. They came down twice, as far as I can remember, certainly once, to try to jump some of our naval aircraft over Chinnampo. The Furies shot one down and damaged two others. Otherwise, they have not worried us yet.

REAR-ADMIRAL I. M. R. CAMPBELL : Were there any limitations on your operations from extremes of heat and cold ?

The LECTURER : I do not know that there were from the naval point of view. The sea is cold. In the North it freezes over in a cold Winter, but we normally only get brash ice on these coasts. It is nothing like as cold as on shore. The Army get it 20 degrees colder. The naval air operations were never stopped except in a full gale or a fog. There is a lot of fog at certain periods of the year on the coast. Apart from this, the Navy's job was never interrupted by weather. In fact, for most of the year the weather was very pleasant off the coast.

CAPTAIN SIR ST. JOHN TYRWHITT, Bart., R.N. : Did your aircraft carriers and cruisers always operate with a screen in open water ? Could you tell us something about this ?

The LECTURER : The carrier always operates with a screen. We took a certain amount of chance with the cruisers because they were usually working inside sandbanks, and this is extremely unpleasant submarine water. It is very shallow, but this is not so on the East, where it is ideal submarine water, and there the Americans have full screens. The hundred fathom line on the East goes virtually up to the coast. The water is very deep everywhere and the task force had to be fully screened.

CAPTAIN D. GILMOUR, R.N. : In the operations being carried out regularly with aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, what degree of readiness did you have to have,

bearing in mind that risks are taken from time to time of submarine warfare and that there is little chance of air attack? Did you relax a bit, or were you kept at a certain degree of readiness, judging from the requirements of the last war?

The LECTURER: We definitely did not steam at full gun stations the whole time. I can never remember the degree of readiness, whether it is three, four, or five. You go in steaming watches and not at full stations.

CAPTAIN D. GILMOUR, R.N.: Where were the enemy's submarines based? Did they have any base on the East as well as the West?

The LECTURER: We think there are certain Chinese submarines which were available in their ports in North China. We never saw any Chinese, and as far as we know they never operated against us.

REAR-ADMIRAL A. D. NICHOLL: Could you tell us a bit more about the operations in the islands? Was there any serious attempt to capture them?

The LECTURER: No, we made a point first of obliterating everything moving on the sea in the way of sampans and junks. We destroyed them by air or from the ground. The enemy eventually constructed rubber boats or boats made of wood and rubber. The only attacks were on Taewha Island, which was held by guerilla forces and not garrisoned, it was bombed by the enemy and then taken by guerillas. There was one attack on Yong-do Island off the East coast where the enemy came over in small sampans and attacked regularly in waves with wireless control, but it was beaten off eventually by the garrison of the island. One of our frigates, the New Zealand frigate *Taupo*, happened to be there when the sampans were coming away and got in amongst them and sank 19 out of 25 before they got too close under the guns of the enemy coast. That has been the only real attack on the major islands which we hold. Many little islands on the West coast are held by either side indiscriminately. Various guerilla attacks were made on them from time to time, supported by our ships and naval air, but no attacks have been made on our garrisoned islands on the West coast.

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. E. FOOKS: What was the calibre of the North Korean coast defence guns which you had to engage from time to time?

The LECTURER: Usually 75 mm. or 120 mm. They were not really coast defence guns in the main, they were makeshift arrangements brought up and put in place.

MAJOR H. HAYDON: What would be the main disadvantage of a reduction in United Nations naval operations, firstly on the West coast and secondly on the East coast?

The LECTURER: You cannot keep a blockade going without a certain number of ships. If you reduce the naval operations, you stretch the blockade and make everyone work much harder with such ships as are left, the island warfare would suffer considerably, it is purely and simply a question of blockade. Do not forget that the enemy knows we have an amphibious lift which can land on either coast at any moment if we want to. That has been well demonstrated by the Inchon landing, and we threatened a landing, as you probably saw announced in the papers, at Kojo to show we could do it. This threat has deployed their forces all round their coast, and they are very touchy on both sides. If you take away the Navy, you reduce that threat.

REAR-ADMIRAL I. M. R. CAMPBELL: You mentioned that the United Nations help each other with supplies, fuel, and ammunition. Does that imply that a large measure of standardization of stores and supplies has been achieved?

The LECTURER: Unfortunately, no. We kept one ship up on the East coast which used to get its supplies from the American fleet train, but they had to be put in the fleet train in Japan. The situation was pretty difficult because you had a frigate with 4-inch guns at one time, then a destroyer with 4.5-inch and afterwards a destroyer with 4.7-inch guns. The oil fuel system was standardized.

REAR-ADMIRAL I. M. R. CAMPBELL: Were any of the air items standardized?

The LECTURER: No.

COLONEL F. H. SMITH: I was interested in your remarks regarding the wonderful effectiveness of the American 16-inch guns. I remember back in the days of the Dardanelles that we did not have quite the same good results with the *Queen Elizabeth's* 15-inch guns.

The LECTURER: Since then the naval gun has advanced slightly, and it is a good bombardment weapon, given spotting either by air or on the land. These guns have a range of 20 miles and the Army and ships have their spotters. I was told by army officers that they are an extremely valuable weapon.

COLONEL F. H. SMITH: I was trying to imagine the tide rising 30 feet and a speed of eight knots, and how we would get a 6,000-ton, 25-foot draught cargo steamer into Inchon, our nearest base to the front line. Could you advise?

The LECTURER: Inchon is an open port now, since we have taken it. A large percentage of the supplies go up in anything up to 10,000-ton ships and are landed at Inchon by a lighter and some of the L.S.T.'s which beach. This is the nearest point to the front line. It is a great help as compared with sending stuff up the pipeline by land. It is not a pleasant entrance, but it is perfectly feasible and it is all buoyed and fixed.

COLONEL F. H. SMITH: You were able to do that with the tidal rise of 20 to 30 feet and the speed, say, 10 to 12 knots of 6,000 to 10,000 tonners requiring 25 to 28 feet of clean water?

The LECTURER: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: As you will have realized from the lecture, the war in Korea is a peculiar war in many ways, with no anti-submarine threat and little or no air opposition at sea, and with undisputed sea power on both coasts. It is a very valuable training ground for United Nations forces of all kinds, but always bearing in mind that it is a limited war and one from which, perhaps, wrong lessons can be learned, although, as I say, jolly good practice!

The operations of every kind of ship in this war differ very largely from their normal operations in a major war. What I have in mind is that the war has been going on now for such a long time that people take it almost as a matter of course. And yet what we have heard from Admiral Scott-Moncrieff about the hard work in the carriers, the long hours in all the other ships, and so on, has made us appreciate that the ordinary serving man out there is having a very tough time. He is working very long hours in very awkward conditions, great climatic variations, and some danger.

Nowadays, any mention of Korea seems to be right at the bottom of the column, and I am sure we are all very glad indeed to have heard about it at first hand in such an interesting manner.

I should like to thank you very much indeed, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, for your talk this afternoon. (Applause.)

GOLD MEDAL AND TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY, 1952

By MAJOR M. E. BRANSBY-WILLIAMS, R.A.

SUBJECT

"How far does the rising tide of Nationalism in the countries of the Middle and Far East affect previous strategic thought?"

BEFORE considering the effect of the rising tide of Nationalism in the East on previous strategic thought, it is necessary to mention briefly the new form of strategy which has also appeared recently on the world scene, and which must be taken into account at the same time.

COLD WAR STRATEGY

As cold war strategy is an art still little understood this side of the iron curtain, it is only possible to make some tentative remarks.

Cold war is in the first place a war for men's minds. Not educated minds in the main, but simple minds. Its weapons of attack are the written and spoken word, its main defence censorship and the exclusion in every way of the enemy's weapons of attack.

In the second place it is a battle of intelligence; the acquisition of intelligence about the enemy, not only military intelligence but also political, economic, and all other forms. A fifth column is the main short range weapon and agency for gathering intelligence. The long range weapon is the radio.

In the third place cold war is all that used to be understood by diplomacy. No diplomatic move can be taken without its effect in the cold war being carefully calculated.

In our conduct of the cold war the main weapons of attack and defence are largely ignored. Our security measures are negligible in comparison with our opponents; the Farnborough Air Display is only one of a multitude of examples. Our censorship does not exist, and perhaps, most important, our creation and infiltration of a fifth column not only into enemy countries, but into so-called neutral countries, is not apparently considered.

In the cold war there are no neutrals. As on a previous occasion when two creeds were in conflict "he that is not with me is against me." A legitimate target for our cold war attack are all those who are not definitely on our side. This definition embraces all the peoples of the Middle East and Far East with only one or two possible exceptions. The exclusion of Communism from our own peoples is not enough, it must if possible be excluded from all peoples and our own case must be continuously stated to all peoples.

Our idea (ideology or *weltanschauung*) was last firmly stated in about 1900. In many countries of the Middle and Far East our Victorian idea of Democracy did in fact prevail, and various forms of parliamentary government were set up. In these countries we are, so to speak, on the defensive. In some of them our ideas have been found not to be workable. Persia and Egypt are two particularly outstanding cases.

This is so much a question of politics that it cannot be further dealt with here. The point it is hoped to make is that the actual meaning of the word strategy has changed, or perhaps that it has now two meanings. The strategy we must first consider is cold war strategy because we are already engaged in the cold war. In fighting the cold war we are incidentally manœuvring for a possible hot war, but the results we achieve in the cold war can be decisive in themselves, and the other war may never be fought; indeed, as the situation is today, it is more probable than not that there will be no world war within the next 20 years.

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

The rising tide of Nationalism in the East appears at first to be to the disadvantage of Colonial Powers. The subject peoples become intransigent; customary sources of raw materials are threatened or even denied; where native governments come into being in backward countries, they prove so inefficient in the primary task of government, that of keeping law and order, that, as in the case of Burma, production falls off severely. The customary view to take of such a situation is that this provides a chance for Communist infiltration, and that the spread of want provides a wealth of recruits for the Communist idea. This is true in the short run, but Nationalism as such is antipathetic to Communism or at least to the Russian version, and if handled correctly may in the long run prove an ally. The appeal of Communism in India, Pakistan, and Burma may have grown as a result of worsening material conditions, but it should lessen if it is represented as the appeal to come again under the domination of a foreign power. As long as Communism and local Communist parties take their orders from Moscow they cannot be expected to appeal to a true Nationalist, except as a temporary ally in throwing off the yoke of an existing Colonial Power.

NATIONALISM WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION

It is very mistaken in the matter of Nationalism to believe it stops short at the borders of the Soviet Union. A world trend of this kind cannot be isolated, and there must be at least a potential comparable force within the Soviet Union. It exists, we know, in the satellites and has already manifested itself decisively in Yugoslavia. There is every reason to believe and hope that the Ukrainians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Turkis, and all the other racial minorities in the Soviet Union have National aspirations at least as strong as those manifested in those parts of the Middle and Far East outside the Soviet frontiers. Above all in China, where Nationalism is as pronounced and aggressive as anywhere in the world, a desire for independence from foreign domination is probably the most powerful force in the country, more powerful than the Communist idea, and the potential differences stemming from this between China and the Soviet Union are perhaps the most important factor on our side in the world situation today. There will be further mention of this below.

Having discussed the general situation resulting from the rise of Nationalism and Communism together, it is proposed now to study the situation in the more important individual areas or countries, to suggest a line of action, and to consider traditional strategy in the same areas at the same time.

THE MIDDLE EAST

In all strategic considerations of the Middle East the first point to decide seems to be where does the Middle East start and finish. Since the present problem is to consider the effect of the rising tide of Nationalism in both the Middle and Far East

the boundary between these two is, perhaps, not important. For convenience, however, it must be defined, since the changes in strategic problems in the western end of this very large area are, to a certain extent, different in kind from those at the other end. It is proposed, therefore, to take the Middle East to extend from the western borders of Turkey and Egypt to the eastern borders of Persia, and to consider the rest as the Far East, because it is on the borders of Persia that the problem changes.

TURKEY AS AN EXAMPLE

The violent Nationalist spirit in Turkey which manifested itself under Kemal Ataturk has in the event proved on balance to be to the advantage of Britain and her Allies. There is scarcely any point in recapitulating history when considering this problem because the situation throughout the Middle East has changed so radically since even 1945, and is continuing to change so fast, that the past has fairly little bearing on the present and future. In Turkey, however, the revolutionary change took place earlier and may help as an example of what may be the outcome in some other States. There will probably not be much argument that a stout-hearted and fiercely independent Turkey placed across the Bosphorus is a very valuable bulwark against Soviet Russian expansionism in that direction.

The rest of the Middle East constitutes a power vacuum the like of which the world has hardly hitherto experienced. Britain's shrinking power and loosening grip, resulting more from her failing sense of purpose even than from her reduced material means, have been partly the reason for the creation of this vacuum. The rising tide of Nationalism has been the final cause of the withdrawal of our influence from Persia, as by mischance it coincided with a Socialist Government's period in office in Britain. It may be, however, that we have done the right thing for the wrong reason, and in the wrong way. We may yet find it expedient to withdraw from Egypt, but if we do so, it must be with dignity, and because it is in our interest to do so. Whether it is in our interest depends on its strategic value in war, and the balance of advantage in the cold war.

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

What strategic value has the Middle East, first to us and secondly to Russia?

The answer, if given without prejudice, is that the area is not exceptionally valuable to either. This is not perhaps a novel idea, but it is certainly not widely held.

"The cross roads of the world" was not long ago a favourite description of the Suez Canal. The Suez isthmus is also sometimes referred to as the "land bridge to Africa." These titles would lead one to suppose that the Suez Canal Zone is an area of exceptional strategic importance. This was certainly the case before air power made its appearance and while sea power alone was predominant. Since the arrival of air power the case has been different. The strategic value of the Middle East in war has been very much reduced in some respects, and in one respect increased.

Soon after hostilities started the canal would almost certainly be made unusable, and for a cross roads the traffic would at the least be light. As a land bridge to Africa it is doubtful whether the isthmus has, in fact, ever been such a great attraction. Certainly Alexander used it, and also the Arab hordes and even Napoleon, but the truth is that it does not lead to anywhere very desirable beyond Egypt itself, whose inherent value in war is very limited. Beyond Egypt vast expanses of desert have to be negotiated in all directions except up the Nile, and to conquer Central and South Africa with a force maintained only by a land line passing over the isthmus does not

bear consideration. The fact is that to conquer Africa command of the sea and air is essential. The strategic value of the Middle East, therefore, reduces itself to oil and that is indeed a considerable item, because not only is it a vast reservoir of oil, but it is oil in the right place to sustain a war either in the Balkans or in the Indian sub-continent.

From the Russian point of view the value of the oil would be rather a long term one. She could not use it except for any force she might hold in the Middle East as defined above. She could not get it back to Russia in any quantities without a pipeline to the Caspian or Black Sea, which she could hardly expect to be allowed to build without interference. The main object to her would be to deny it to ourselves. Another interest Russia is sometimes expected to have in this part of the world is as an outlet to the Indian Ocean, but here again the value is very slight except as a very long term matter, because even if she were on the Persian Gulf she would have no ships in which to sail upon it. As mentioned above, the Bosphorus is a much more attractive proposition, and it has been shown that a Nationalist Turkey is fortunately most unlikely to concede that without a struggle.

Apart from Turkey, what difference then does Middle East Nationalism make to our strategic thinking? The answer is very little, once war breaks out, but a great deal until then.

The greatest effect lies in the power vacuum created in the first instance by our withdrawal, and further accentuated by the hostility of Jews for Arabs which largely neutralizes the resistance value of either, and by the quarrels and intrigues amongst the Arab States themselves which further neutralize their resistance value.

To sum up, therefore, the strategic value of the Middle East itself in war is not of the first order, and lies almost entirely in its oil. Militarily, none of the Middle East States, except Turkey, which is very important, and, to some extent, Israel, which is not on the way from anywhere to anywhere and matters very little, can be said to count at all in opposition to a great Power. Whether these States, always excepting Turkey, are Nationalist or not matters very little after the outbreak of war.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE COLD WAR

The strategic importance of this area in the cold war, however, is hard to over-estimate, and the effect of local Nationalism at the present stage might be enormous and is largely unpredictable. It is fairly certain, though, that it is better to let local Nationalism work itself out as far as possible on its own. The example of Turkey is one which other States should be encouraged to follow. Certainly the national qualities of the Turks are different from those of, for instance, the Persians or Egyptians, but it may be surprising what changes the Nationalist spirit may bring about.

On balance, therefore, it seems to be our best policy to retire as far as possible into the background in the Middle East at the present juncture. When the Nationalist dust eventually settles economic interest will again assert itself, and there is no reason why we should not then still find ourselves with an advantage over the others. Meanwhile the local Governments must be given every chance to deal with their own Communism, and our attacks must be all with cold war weapons.

THE FAR EAST

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Nationalism in India having already reached full expression, this area hardly comes within the subject of this paper. Nevertheless, it is necessary to mention that

Indian and Pakistani Nationalism has, within the last five years, brought about a situation whereby the whole of the Indian sub-continent has been virtually neutralized so far as international politics and world strategy are concerned.

It is, in fact, in this area that rising Asian Nationalism has wrought the greatest change of all. The previous British concept was of India as a great strategic base for action on any part of the periphery of the Indian Ocean, whether the East coast of Africa, Persia, Burma, or the East Indies. It was also a plentiful manpower reserve and source of important raw materials. Theoretically, this situation has not suffered a great change, as India and Pakistan are still part of the Commonwealth, but in practice it is totally different for at least two reasons.

(a) The internecine struggle over Kashmir has fixed almost the whole of the armed forces of both Dominions facing each other, and until the problem is solved the potential of both countries for an outside war is likely to remain slight.

(b) There is no certainty that either Dominion will, in fact, join in any future world war unless directly threatened themselves. Such a direct threat was until recently improbable. However, the growth of Nationalism in China has led to the annexation of Tibet, and Chinese claims to Nepal and to considerable parts of Assam and Burma have made the threat to India more real. Nevertheless, there is a danger that each Dominion might wish to gain an advantage in the Kashmir dispute by keeping out of a general war and hoping to see the other in it.

As far as conventional strategy is concerned, therefore, the situation in India has taken a turn for the worse from our point of view. In the cold war, however, things are quite the reverse. Communism in itself does not seem to have any great appeal to the Indian peoples. There was, however, always a chance for it to ally itself with native Nationalism as long as the British Raj offered a common opponent. Now, however, it is faced with the stupendous task of converting a people, all of whose traditions, habits, religion, and whole way of life are based on the exact antithesis of Communism. The Yogi and the Commissar truly are absolute opposites.

A further disadvantage now suffered by Communism is that it can and should be represented as the influence of a foreign Power. In fact the very weapon they could use against us while we were there can now be turned against themselves.

BURMA

The strategic importance of Burma is that it lies across the back door to both China and India. Until recently this was not a matter of great importance, but in the late war it became a part of the vital supply route to our Chinese Allies fighting the Japanese. It remains of great importance now that a hostile China stands along the common border. It is also significant that the Chinese lay claim to considerable areas of Burma. The assertion of Burmese independence has had a very considerable effect on this situation. The weakness of Burma, reft by internal dissension, has produced a vacuum almost comparable to that which exists in the Middle East. Sooner or later Chinese expansionism is bound to press across Burma's borders. When that time comes the Burmese may well call on the help of the United Nations, but it will then be too late. The reactions of India are bound to be immediate, and in the whole of this area, i.e., Burma, Assam, Nepal, and even Tibet, a potential threat of war exists. The threat is new and results from the rise of Chinese Communism. It is made more imminent by the weakness of Burma and India resulting from their domestic troubles in one case and the Kashmir issue in the other.

In another respect, which has strategic implications, Burma's new status has caused a change for the worse. This is the decline in production of Burma's main industries of rice growing, oil, and timber. The most serious of these is probably rice, since the disappearance of the large exportable surplus previously available to other countries of South East Asia, and especially India, has two main results. In peace, food in those countries is even shorter than it otherwise need be; in war, the balance of India's needs, if they had to be brought as at present from America and Australia, would be a serious drain on available shipping.

In the cold war, Burma's new status is far from being an unmixed blessing. Local Communists can look to Communist China for every kind of assistance, and the Government has not the power to guard its own frontiers or control all its own territory. On the other hand, if we had still been in charge, all the elements at present warring against each other might by now have made common cause against us, and we might have found ourselves in a situation similar to that of the French in Indo-China. To have continued to draw on the wealth of Burma, and maintain its production at the level of pre-war, might have been a costly drain upon our strength.

Strategically speaking, both for cold and hot war, Burma must now be regarded as a dangerous vacuum.

MALAYA

Malaya is not in the same category as the other countries so far mentioned since Nationalism there is not, strictly speaking, a problem at the moment if the Chinese are regarded as a foreign element. Malayan Nationalism, however, is growing and is of value on the side of law and order. The solution in Malaya can never be a Nationalist one when two races, indeed five races if one includes Indian, Sakai, and British, are so interspersed.

The strategic importance of Malaya always lay in the naval base of Singapore, and in the strategic materials—rubber and tin—which it produces.

The strategic importance of Malaya has in no way changed in these respects. Strategic thinking about Malaya has, however, been altered by the situation in Indo-China.

INDO-CHINA

The rise of Nationalism in Indo-China is perhaps the most ominous occurrence in the whole area. The French have been forced into just the position in which we might have found ourselves in Burma, India, or even Persia. They are upholding a regime which has no wide basis of popular support and lacks that support largely because it is backed by the French. Something in the nature of an *impasse* has resulted. The strategic importance to us, and indeed to the whole free world, of Indo-China is very great. If the Communist Viet Minh should gain control of the whole country the situation in Malaya would be aggravated to a serious degree. Indo-China must, therefore, be held. It is perhaps a pity that the French were unable or unwilling to set up an indigenous non-Communist Government, and then get out. Indo-China would probably now be another power vacuum, but that is preferable to a scene of actual hostilities. Fifteen years ago Indo-China would not have been picked out by many people as an area of vital future strategic importance, and nowhere else, perhaps, is the result of the sudden rise of Asia more apparent.

CHINA

It is not intended here to consider Korea or Japan, as neither country comes within the terms of the subject. The last country to be considered individually is, therefore, China.

The Japanese invasion of China greatly speeded up the growth of the Nationalist spirit in China. The fact that this newly awakened China has fallen under the Communist spell has resulted in the tempo being further accelerated, as the Communists of course have worked on patriotism to achieve their ends and, like all autocratic regimes, have found it convenient to direct the attention of their people against the foreigner first within the country as a scapegoat for the evils and shortcomings which result from their own actions, and later towards the bordering States so that a policy of aggressive expansionism can continue to serve as a distraction from internal difficulties. Strategically speaking, the emergence of China as a united and expansionist Power would, whatever the internal form of government, have been a tremendous new factor. When that country is in fact Communist, the significance is far greater still.

Strategic considerations in the recent past must always have been largely concerned with the possible results of a conquest of large parts, or even all, of China by Japan. The consolidation of a large Japanese empire on the Chinese mainland would have been, and indeed was, only a first step towards expansion southwards with the object of conquering all of South-East Asia. The Japanese threat has now receded and, in view of the power of the new China, it does not seem likely that Japan will be able to get a foothold again in Manchuria, Korea, and North-East China, unless China first became involved in a war with another great Power, of whom the possibilities seem to be four: Russia, India, the U.S.A., and Great Britain. Without the economic basis provided by the mineral and other wealth of the continent, Japan alone cannot in the future develop a serious threat to our possessions in Malaya and the Indies, or to Australasia, always assuming that we remain in close alliance with the United States. This change in the Japanese state is the first of the new considerations.

Events centred on China may take one of several courses: China may remain bound to Russia by their common ideology. If this happens it will be the first time since the days of Ghengis Khan that a large part of the main land mass of the world is under one domination. It will be the first time that sea power has faced such a situation. It would be more correct to say sea plus air power facing land plus air power on such a scale. The advantage of sea power in the past has been two-fold.

(a) It has made possible the movement and concentration of forces to be carried out more quickly than by the opposing land power, the initiative in fact provided by choice of time and place—flexibility.

(b) It enabled its possessor to deny his opponent access to vital supplies.

Against a Chinese-Russian combination the first principle would continue to apply, indeed the vastly increased area would provide a proportionately greater number of possible points of attack and an increased area to defend. It is the second principle that will no longer apply. The whole vast area will be virtually self sufficient. As they would also have the advantage of numbers, flexibility of attack by air or sea would be the only inherent advantage remaining (superiority of industrial production is not permanent, and is, therefore, not included as an inherent advantage).

Events, however, may not take that course in China. The Russians are an arrogant people, and what happens when they have dealings with another proud people we have already seen from the example of Yugoslavia. There is, fortunately, much more ground for contention between Russia and China than between China and any other country. The Russians may well treat China as another satellite, and everything in Russian past behaviour, in their expressed doctrine, and in their national character, make it probable that they will do so. It seems a very strong probability that the U.S.S.R. is congenitally incapable of working with anyone for long; she will want to dominate. Chinese Nationalism will not accept that situation, and in the many possible subjects of disagreement, such as Port Arthur, Manchuria, and Outer Mongolia, there is enough material to start the Chinese on Tito's course many times over.

A third possible course for China is that she continues to expand South and East, and in doing so acts as a cat paw for Russia in draining the strength of the Western Powers. As long as China is engaged in wars such as that in Korea she is forced to remain on terms with Russia.

This then is the second main strategic factor for us to consider. We should at all costs disengage ourselves from conflict with China, and remain disengaged. The long term aim must be to see China and Russia at war, either a cold or hot war.

THE RISE OF ASIA

The rising tide of Nationalism in Asia means, in effect, the rise of Asia, and this rise of Asia is the outstanding fact of the second half of the XXth Century. The rise of the dark continent of Africa may be delayed some generations yet, but what used to be described as the yellow peril is upon us now. The spread of Communism has coincided in many areas, but it must not be confused. The yellow peril may not actually be a peril. Asian Nationalism is in itself no enemy of ours; the creed of Communism on the other hand is the deadly enemy of our way of life. Our main problem is not to let the one harness the other against us. It has been the intention here to show that this need not come about; indeed that Soviet Communism is the enemy of all Nationalism except Russian Nationalism.

The main factors in the situation seem to be :—

(a) For Colonial Powers the pattern everywhere is much the same. Communism can enlist local patriotism against the governing Power.

(b) A newly independent State is exceedingly jealous of its independence, not only from its old master, but from any foreign State. It may also be aggressive. The chance of such a new State combining with others is slender. The Arab countries, India, Pakistan, and Burma are examples.

(c) The result of this has been the creation of several areas of great internal weakness which amount to power vacuums.

(d) The Suez Canal, and, indeed, the Middle East, is no longer of the same vital strategic importance it once was to us.

(e) Singapore and Malaya remain vital. Fortunately Malaya has a mixed population.

(f) Burma is one of the weakest points, and potentially the most threatened.

(g) Indo-China is the gravest actual danger.

(h) Nationalism does not stop short on our side of the iron curtain.

(i) The greatest single factor is the rise of China. The course China takes (or is driven into) may decide the fate of the world. Amongst other things in her rise she has overshadowed her dangerous neighbour Japan.

(j) China and Russia together would produce a situation new in the modern world, where sea power would lose one of its great advantages, the ability to starve out its enemy.

OUR FUTURE COURSE

The British Commonwealth, and especially the United Kingdom, must trade or perish. Our problems are increased in proportion as we lose control of our sources of raw material and of markets for our manufactured goods. Nevertheless, the conclusion from all this is that the rise of Asian Nationalism is not necessarily all to our disadvantage, it can be a valuable ally or a dangerous enemy; our strategy must aim continuously to make it work in our favour. The requirements of cold war strategy may be different, or even the opposite, of those of hot war; our absence may be more effective in fighting the cold war enemy than our presence, because ideas cannot be fought with troops or ships. That is not to say that the troops and ships must not be available, but they must be in the background; in this war the primary weapons are different. This is especially apparent where Soviet Russia is concerned; she has been much more truly successful where her armies have not been, such as in China and Indo-China, than where they have been, such as in the European satellites. In the cold war we must direct all our effort to foster national resistance to the expansion of Soviet Communism outwards; we must encourage by all means the growth of Nationalism within the borders of the Soviet Union. Every situation holds within itself the seeds of its own decay, and the monolithic block of the Soviet Union may yet be split open by the very spirit of Nationalism. We must, above all, disengage with China, and aim to detach China from Russia. It is no use trying to halt the rising tide, the only thing to do is to pick up our chair and move back a few paces. A people who live so much by the sea as we do should know that the tide ebbs as well as flows.

AIR STRATEGY

By ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD A. R. P. ERNLE-ERLE-DRAX, K.C.B., D.S.O.

A WRITER in the February number of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL¹ suggests that in a future war our Army and Air Force may be heavily out-numbered and we therefore must aim to win by superior strategy and tactics. If this is so, there is no room for trial and error and no room for mistakes. We must have the closest possible co-ordination of our three fighting Services, no shadow of disagreement between them, and the most able direction of each. Needless to say, they must be directed in accordance with sound principles which are accepted without question by all three Services. But the foundation for such happy results does not seem to exist to-day. In the same issue of the JOURNAL there is a lecture entitled *The Air Battle*,² by Air Marshal Sir R. Saundby. He states (p. 31) that in the 1914-18 War "military thinking was still substantially two dimensional and the 'classical doctrine' built up through centuries of two dimensional warfare, still governed the conduct of war." He then suggests (p. 33) that "air forces in war should not be confined to the narrow object laid down by the classical doctrine—the destruction in battle of the enemy's armed forces."

Later he says that the classical doctrine, of which he evidently does not approve, had been valid for so long that it had almost usurped the status of a principle.

So the R.A.F. set to work to produce a new doctrine, which they have taught and adhered to for more than 20 years.

It seems evident, and regrettable, that the three fighting Services are by no means in full agreement on the views stated briefly above and elaborated in the lecture referred to.

There are, of course, many pros and cons, for the problem is one of great complexity. Let us try to get to the bottom of it by explaining the views of each Service in turn and then trying to find some ground for common agreement. For this purpose we will imagine the summoning of a conference to be attended by one officer from each of the three Services, and one politician or member of the Government, representing the Minister of Defence, to act as arbiter. Each officer in turn will state his case, the arbiter will then sum up and endeavour to set down a few principles on which the three Services might be persuaded to agree. It is understood that each member has read the Air Marshal's lecture and is well acquainted with the history of the late war.

Our conference is now opened as follows :—

THE AIRMAN.—"Gentlemen, you have all read the lecture now under discussion and you will note that it may be regarded as a semi-official, indeed almost official, document for its author was, we gather, employed extensively during the war to lecture and explain the new doctrine at all three staff colleges. This doctrine dates back a long way for you will note that (on p. 32) '... soon after the end of the [1914-18] war, the study and understanding of the new doctrines, which followed the coming of the third dimension into warfare, began to make headway.' I need not repeat to you the many arguments which in my opinion demonstrate the

¹ *Reflections on the Conduct of a Future War*, p. 72.

² p. 29.

soundness of our case, but I would emphasize that times are changing rapidly and the following points are now likely to need our special consideration.

"First, we seem to be getting steadily nearer to, and may have reached, the time '... when aerial operations, with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale, may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate. . . .' (p. 30).

"Next, there is the advent of the atom bomb, of which we have written (p. 33) '... there is always the possibility, especially in these days of atomic weapons, that the enemy might collapse as a result of the bombing while his defending forces were still far from being defeated.'

"Lastly, just as the Navy aims to obtain command of the sea, so we attach immense importance to obtaining its equivalent, air superiority. But we must study relative importance and therefore (p. 29), 'I hope to show how the air battle, from small beginnings, has become the most important battle of all, on the result of which the whole conduct of a war may depend.'

"It naturally follows that, if this is so, a continually increasing proportion of our available air strength must be devoted to the requirements of the air battle, leaving less and less for military and naval co-operation duties. This has not been publicly stated but it seems a logical deduction; in fact 100 per cent. of our total strength might still be insufficient against a superior enemy, for you will see on page 38 the following—'If, therefore, local superiority is a thing of the past, it will be necessary to aim, at the outset, at nothing less than total air superiority.'

"The problem is certainly difficult and harassing, but I hope you will agree that our conclusions are sound. I will now ask for your comments."

THE SOLDIER.—"May I say that your argument is interesting and ably stated but not very easy to follow. You say (p. 31) '... the term Independent to describe air operations not directly associated with land or sea operations . . . gave rise to a fear that the newly created Air Staff wished to engage in a private war of its own, separate from, and quite unconnected with, current land and sea operations.' But that is almost exactly what your lecture sets out to describe. It is headed 'The Air Battle,' which suggests a study of tactical matters, but it deals mainly with strategy, including the grand strategy of a whole campaign in the air.

"There is practically no mention of the Army and Navy, to show how their needs and their plan of campaign would interlock with the proposed air strategy.

"I have, therefore, three fundamental points to draw attention to, and I believe my naval colleague will fully agree with me.

"First, a future war can only be won if our three fighting Services are closely co-ordinated from the start, working on principles that have the full agreement of all three.

"Next, I consider that, until they have been rendered impotent, it is entirely unsound to divert our efforts from the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. From this it follows that I am opposed to any plans which aim at winning a quick war by evading the enemy's armed forces and destroying his centres of population with super-bombs, whether atom or otherwise.

"Let me say why. Our plans for the future must work out a British strategy to meet the requirements of some particular war. In the last war we fought Germany,

plus one European ally and a powerful ally in Asia. A future war might be similar: perhaps Russia, with satellite allies in Europe, and China to help her in Asia.

"In such a war, our Army and Air Force would be heavily outnumbered at the start. Therefore, for every 10 bombs we dropped in the back areas of Russia and China, after working our way across vast areas of hostile territory, 20 or more would be dropped in Britain. But that is not all. Britain, with 85 per cent. of her population living in large towns, is the perfect target for the heavy bomber. In Russia and China many of the most important munitions factories are inaccessible, the cities are smaller, and the total effect to be obtained by back area bombing would be immensely less. In any such competition the scales would be far too heavily weighted against us. The only sound strategy therefore must be based on the principle of the fencer, 'parry and return.' In other words, study the directions in which the enemy's armed forces might deal a fatal blow at you, make sure that he is foiled, and then stage a counter-offensive as early as you can.

"You may disapprove and say 'defensive strategy,' but, as history has often shown, it will prove far better than a rash and premature offensive. After all, that was the way in which, in the end, we won the last war, but our preparations for parrying the Germans' early blows were, I suggest, sadly at fault. I cannot discuss with you any details of a future war because I do not know how you intend to apply the new doctrine. One would need to know what machines you are building for back area bombing, how many fighters you have ordered, etc. One might, however, guess at your intentions by studying your strategy in the last war, for that is well known. In general it would seem that you cherished the hope of winning a spectacular three-dimensional victory by back area bombing with machines that had by-passed the enemy's armed forces. It is of interest that, away back in 1940, when a small reduction in our fighter strength would have lost us the Battle of Britain and opened the road to the invasion of England, Lord Trenchard wrote a letter to *The Times* (14th August, 1940) urging that we needed more bombers to enable us to take the offensive.

"In a reply printed a few days later the following argument occurs:—

'We need in our construction programme a very careful balance between the bombers that are to devastate Germany and the fighters that are to devastate the enemy's bombers. At the moment we need more of both: let us be careful not to swing the pendulum to either extreme. Too many fighters is perhaps a waste of offensive power: too few fighters may only lead to the destruction of the factories in which Lord Trenchard's bombers are to be built.

'There is, however, this striking difference: if we start with too many fighters we can add the bombers afterwards. If we start with too many bombers our whole offensive effort may be shattered by the destruction of our factories.'

"We now know that our fighter defence at home was only just sufficient to avert disaster. Of our excessive bomber effort Admiral Richmond, an able historian as well as a brilliant strategist, wrote as follows in his book *Statesmen and Sea Power*:—

'The "maritime" school regarded it as axiomatic that command of the sea is the first and essential object in a British war. . . . ' (p. 314.)

'The new "continental" school had advanced the view that the development of the air had introduced an entirely novel factor into all strategy, a factor which rendered obsolete the old and hitherto accepted principles of war. The air arm, it had been argued, could strike directly at the enemy in his muscles,

his heart, his stomach, and, not least, his nerves. By bombardment it could not only destroy his resources, his factories producing war material of all kinds, but also his ships in harbour and on the slipways,³ his internal means of communication and, even more fundamental, the will of the enemy people to resist.' (p. 315.)

'The decision between these two conflicting conceptions of strategy rested, as it always had in the past, with the statesmen.'

'The decision was, to devote the greatest effort possible against the objectives in Germany. So, during the months between the defeat of the German attempt at invasion and the German attack upon Russia which brought that Power into the war on the 22nd of June, 1941, the major effort in the air was directed against the cities and factories of Berlin, Essen, Skoda, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Mannheim, Hamburg, and Hanover.' (p. 316.)

'The losses [at sea] due to known causes lead to the conclusion that those [officers] of the "maritime" school were right who dissented from the view that the most effective defence of shipping was to be found in attacking the submarine in its shelters and slipways, and who urged that it was by operations upon the high seas that security was to be sought in the combined action of surface and air forces: for 550 submarines were reported to have been destroyed at sea and no more than 37 in the shipyards.' (p. 317.)

"Thus it came about that while preparing for and executing our thousand-bomber raids, which began in May, 1942, and achieved little result of permanent value during the first three years of war, our Navy and Army, with their air support heavily outnumbered by the enemy, were suffering a tragic succession of defeats. So far as the Army is concerned, we were defeated in Norway, in Belgium and France, in North Africa, in Greece, in Crete, and at Singapore.

"You surely could have endeavoured to give us local or temporary air superiority in one or two of these vital areas? But you chose, it seems, a use of our air forces widely at variance with the classical doctrine, for you say (p. 37), 'the 1939-45 War confirmed the truth of the Air Staff doctrines. . . . In particular, it proved that a successful strategic bombing campaign could be carried out without the prior defeat of the enemy's air forces. . . .'

"Now you have accused us of thinking only in two dimensions, which is scarcely accurate since we all know that we nearly lost the last war, and the 1914-18 War as well, due to U-boats operating against our merchant shipping. Besides this, the Navy at a very early date initiated and built up the R.N.A.S., a highly efficient air force which was subsequently taken away from it! But might we not accuse you of being out of date because you now think only in three dimensions and have left out of account the fourth dimension—time? Therefore we ask, how long must our fleets and armies wait while your strategic bomber campaign aims to achieve 'victory through air-power' or 'total air superiority'? You had not done it in the first three years of the last war, and during that time our fleets and armies, while desperately short of aircraft and sadly in need of air co-operation and support, were performing tasks that were as vital to you as they were to the rest of us.

³ "Most important of all, the air can destroy and damage the sources of submarine production!" Lord Trenchard in *The Daily Telegraph*, 4th December, 1942.

"Our Army was trying to hold that territory in Europe, including airfields and immense supply depots, which you need both for your defence in depth and for enabling you to strike at the enemy. But we were driven back to Dunkirk by a German army which used immense air forces to support its victorious offensive. In all the campaigns mentioned above, Germany could provide that air co-operation which made their attacks, or counter-attacks, always fatal to us. But no adequate counter blow on our side seemed to be possible. This may have been due to your preoccupation with bombing Germany, of which a military commentator wrote at the time, 'No Cologne, no six Colognes, make up for one Tobruk.'⁴

"Another soldier, Captain S. Vines, R.A., in the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL of May, 1952, after noting that our bomber offensive cost us 22,000 aircraft lost (mostly over enemy territory) and 79,281 air crew dead, sums up thus: 'Comparing effort with results we have to face the fact that the campaign was the costliest failure in the history of British arms.' You rightly attach great importance to winning air superiority by destroying enemy aircraft. But if you had supported our naval and military operations in the manner that the Germans supported theirs, would it not have given you ideal opportunities for destroying their aircraft without having to make long journeys into enemy territory to look for them?

"And if you were not going to provide such support, in accordance with a co-ordinated strategic plan, ought you not to have explained to us how our forces could hope to avert disaster while waiting for your full co-operation? In the end you gave it to us exactly as we should have wished, so that the sailors plus airmen were able to begin winning the Battle of the Atlantic in May, 1943, and Lord Montgomery was able to say, on 27th December, 1943, 'If you examine the conduct of my campaign, you will find that we never fought a land battle until the air battle had been won.'

"But if in a future war our enemy starts a *blitzkrieg* offensive to hurl us out of Europe—which would be a major disaster for ourselves and our Allies—we shall not be able to say, 'Stop, that's not fair, we don't fight on land until we have had time to win the battle of the air.' (cf. *The Air Battle*, p. 32.)

"In general, therefore, while expressing our intense admiration for the heroism of your bomber crews, we feel that we paid too big a price in the last war, and might equally do so in a future war, for adhering to the new doctrine and attempting to win the war with an immense force of long-range bombers. The alternative is to prepare a fully co-ordinated strategic plan for all three Services.

"I must now pass the ball to my naval colleague."

THE SAILOR.—"Gentlemen, I feel that such a plan is urgently needed for the Navy, and the new doctrine does not give it to us. I suggest that the airmen should help us, directly not indirectly, to gain sea superiority, in order that we may help them to gain air superiority by bringing them from overseas equipment, fighter aircraft, food for their men, and immense supplies of liquid fuel.

"It is perhaps not generally known that, even in war-time, we have in this Country never more than a few weeks' supply of food for our 50 million population. Also, the Merchant Navy must bring to our shores cargoes amounting in all to about a million tons a week. Three quarters of a million is, in peace and war, the bare minimum. Such quantities can never be brought in by air:

"In regard to the attractive theory of by-passing the enemy's armed forces, I suggest that Germany lost the war through doing this very thing. Had she concen-

⁴ General H. Rowan Robinson in *The Times*, 27th June, 1942.

trated during 1939-41 on attacking only the escort vessels protecting our convoys, she would have found our merchant shipping during 1942 almost completely at her mercy.

"Again, it is probable that Germany could have won the Battle of Britain and then invaded England, if she had continuously employed against our aerodromes, and aircraft on the ground, all the bombers that she used so lavishly during 1940 for bombing London.

"I suggest, therefore, it is a mistake to suppose that our air strategy was faultless, when we really won, after years of toil, largely because the enemy's strategic errors were greater than our own.

"We realize that, in a future war, you urgently need victory in the air, but we need victory at sea no less, and we suggest that the Country cannot afford to let the Navy suffer a succession of defeats during the first year or two years of war.

"Before the last war you often told us that aircraft could easily destroy warships and that they would make all narrow waters impassable both for war and merchant ships. Obviously this result would largely depend on the amount of air counter-attack that could be sent against the aerial attackers. The matter was one of vital importance to us and we therefore felt justified in hoping that you would do one of two things. Either destroy the aircraft that were attacking our ships, or stage an offensive against enemy warships so that their losses were as great as ours. But you did neither! We lost Crete, we nearly lost Malta, and we suffered frightful losses at sea, because the enemy seemed to have almost complete air superiority over the Mediterranean. In the Atlantic there was a desperate shortage of aircraft during those critical years when 50 or 60 very long-range machines would have made all the difference to the U-boat campaign.

"Even in home waters, the ships bringing our Army from Dunkirk were smashed and battered by dive-bombers (of which we had none) and our destroyer losses were so heavy that, as early as 1940, the defence of our convoys was jeopardized thereby. We tried to move certain convoys up-Channel, and even within sight of our coasts they were so decimated by enemy aircraft that the attempt had to be abandoned. The balance would have been redressed somewhat if our airmen had decimated the enemy's ships. Targets certainly were fewer, but they were available. German merchant ships passed frequently down-Channel, where we damaged them at intervals with mines. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, passing up-Channel, gave a splendid opportunity to show what we could do. The only effective air attack was with naval Swordfish, which, being slow and antiquated, suffered terrible losses and were not able to stop them. The total number of warships (excluding submarines) sunk by aircraft was as follows:—

| | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-------------|----|-----------------|----|
| German | ... | ... | ... | Sunk at sea | 6, | sunk in harbour | 19 |
| British and Allied | ... | ... | ... | " | " | " | 17 |
| In addition we had 87 seriously damaged at sea and 47 in harbour! | | | | | | | |

"If our Navy were to suffer under a similar handicap in a future war, it is difficult to see how it could do its job with success. No doubt you were planning to help us indirectly with your 1,000-bomber raids, but surely the effort was disproportionate and therefore strategically unsound? Compare the enormous amount of money, factory power, and man-power devoted to heavy bombers, with the fact that in

February, 1942, the Admiralty were asking for, and could not get, 36 Liberators and 54 Fortresses for long range and very long range work over the Atlantic. In June, 1942, the Admiralty pressed again for maritime aircraft of all types. In January, 1943, Sir Stafford Cripps, visiting the C.-in-C., Western Approaches, at Liverpool, promised to provide 39 V.L.R. aircraft 'shortly.'

"Evidently the new doctrine could not spare much, even in 1943, to help us with the desperate war against the U-boats. Nor was it able to offer help to the Navy in 1940 at a time when the Admiralty, on 2nd July, expressed the opinion that invasion could be expected during the coming week-end.

"It happened that the C.-in-C., Nore, who was responsible for handling the naval forces concentrated in the eastern Channel to resist invasion, had arranged a meeting at the Admiralty on 3rd July to discuss the problem. He invited the C.-in-C. of Bomber and Fighter Commands to attend, as he thought it essential to co-ordinate the plans for defence. They both sent staff officers to represent them. In the course of discussion, Bomber Command explained that it would be rash to ask our bombers to attack enemy warships, because they knew so little about warship identification that they would be just as likely to bomb our own ships. Fighter Command was asked if they could attack the enemy aircraft that would certainly be attacking our warships. They replied that they would, of course, do what they could, but flexibility demanded that they must have a perfectly free hand, and anyway the job allotted to them was the defence of Britain, not the defence of our ships.

"It would seem that, at this time, the co-ordination of all arms had not got very far in practice, for surely this was an occasion when help urgently needed by the Navy might have been regarded as an appropriate part of the defence of Britain?

"In the end, however, the R.A.F. gave to us, as to the Army, liberal and invaluable assistance. Thus, in 1943, the tide suddenly turned and from June onwards the defeat of the U-boats made steady progress. At a later date, June, 1944, the R.A.F. did for both Services, during the invasion of Normandy, exactly what was wanted. For the Army they supplied close support and tactical co-operation in great strength. For the Navy they used scouting forces to detect and attack U-boats or other warships sailing from the French ports. They also kept powerful forces immediately available for counter-attack against enemy aircraft or warships that might attack our invasion armada and its naval escorts. This was exactly as it should have been and the result was magnificent.

"To conclude, therefore, I suggest that the dauntless courage of our airmen was not equalled by the planning of our grand strategy. We seem now to need a conference of all three Services to work out a co-ordinated strategic plan that is acceptable to all, and to tell us how early in a future war the Army and Navy can be given that full measure of co-operation which proved of such immense value in the final years of the last war."

THE MINISTER.—"Gentlemen, it now falls to me to sum up this discussion and, particularly, to try to bring some finality to a controversy that has gone on for more than 20 years. A difficult task, for we are dealing with a very complex subject.

"First, I cannot agree that our air strategy in the last war was the best possible. But this is quite understandable, for the new doctrine was on trial for the first time and many among the highest of our war directors were hoping for a quick 'victory

through air power,' mainly to be achieved by the heavy bomber. But the attempt failed. It follows that our construction programme, and the pre-war strategic planning based on the new doctrine, were not the best possible.

"To avoid equal or greater dangers in a future war it seems essential that the complete inter-dependence of the three Services should be accepted by all. Also that there should be a meeting on the highest level to discuss and agree on the main principles of a future strategy suitable to the requirements of Britain in any war that seems reasonably possible. One such war might be the United Nations versus Russia, China, and others. Argument and counter-argument can go on for ever, but an attempt to discover basic principles should help to clarify the issue and make agreement easier. I shall therefore state now a certain number of principles which I deduce from the history of the past and the needs of the future. In some cases I shall add—though far too briefly—a few explanatory reasons.

"1. *Object.* All our fighting forces must concentrate their efforts on destroying the armed forces of the enemy.

"*Reason.* Some airmen seem to suppose that we did this in the past because, in two-dimension days, we could not attack anything else. The real reason is, particularly today, that if we do not manage to destroy those armed forces they will rapidly destroy us.

"2. *Security.* As a first requirement it is essential to preserve from destruction the main advanced base of the Western Allies, that is, the British Isles, because, unless adequately defended, we may lose through bomb attacks (or perhaps with guided missiles) five or ten million lives, the aerodromes, and other bases needed by our powerful Allies, and the factory power on which ultimate victory depends.

"3. *Initial Strategy.* It follows that, in the early stages of the war our strategy must be defensive, while of course seizing every opportunity for a tactical offensive or counter-attack. (This is the surest means by which we can build up our resources for a final victorious offensive.)

"*Reason.* We expect to start heavily outnumbered, and there are a variety of places where the enemy might quickly deal us a fatal blow.

"4. *Priorities.* Priority may have to be given to any one of the three Services, for a limited time, according to the nature of the principal offensive that the enemy is directing against us.

"5. *The R.A.F.* Such priority should be given at the start to the R.A.F., but they must realize that, at any moment, they may have to divert air forces to help the Army or Navy to avert some major disaster. For this, particularly in military operations, local air superiority will often suffice.

"*Reason.* The air defence of Britain must be a primary task because the enemy aircraft might, within a few hours, wreck with bombs the most important of our big cities, dockyards, ports, and arsenals. At a later date they might stage an airborne invasion. But it must not be forgotten that a big land offensive might bring disaster to our European Army within a few weeks, while a sustained offensive against our convoys with U-boats and aircraft might bring Britain near to starvation in a few months.

"6. *Air superiority.* Total air superiority is of course desirable, just as we should like to have total superiority on land or sea. But such a result may take years to achieve. In the first year or two of war we can only hope for partial or temporary air superiority in certain defined areas for certain specific purposes. The purpose may be, at the start, to protect us from a deadly assault by enemy aircraft. It may equally be to assist the Army, perhaps to avoid the loss of the Channel coasts of France and Belgium, or to capture an area where the enemy is despatching guided missiles which are destroying London. Or it might be to assist the Navy to defeat an offensive by U-boats, because the people of Britain are threatened with starvation. It is, therefore, evident that our planners and our Chiefs of Staff must be continually thinking about the co-ordination of all arms in a concerted and *flexible* plan to meet all the requirements of defence and offence.

"7. *The Army.* The Army already has its tactical air force, but this might prove quite inadequate to meet a big offensive by a major military Power, supported with aircraft that outnumbered ours by three or four to one. In such a case it would be necessary for the R.A.F. to send further aid to the Army immediately they could spare it.

"Reason. If our European Army is defeated and driven back, the enemy can advance to the Channel coast and prepare (with unlimited slave labour) underground aerodromes and rocket stations from which to destroy London and our southern ports and factories. In that event, the air defence of Britain would break down. It must also be realized that air support on a considerable scale may be needed for some of our garrisons abroad, e.g. Malta or Singapore, and for armies overseas fighting perhaps in Korea or the Middle East.

"8. *The Navy.* Adequate support from the R.A.F. must be given to the Navy when called for, in time to prevent any major disaster at sea.

"Reason. So far as convoys are concerned it is to be hoped that the Navy, supported by a strong Coastal Command, would be able to carry on for some months without having to ask urgently for further help. But the mine today is as deadly as the U-boat, and if enemy aircraft or U-boats can effectively mine the approaches to London and our major ports, the threat of defeat by starvation might present itself in a few weeks. Alternatively, the enemy might decide to send to the North Sea 20 or more U-boats fitted with discharging apparatus for atom bombs. These, if not detected very quickly, might destroy London, Newcastle, Edinburgh, etc., in one or two days.

"There is, therefore, no certainty that the Navy will not be in urgent need of further help within the first two weeks of war.

"9. *Inter-dependence.* Each of the three Services must be ready, in emergency, to give extra help to either of the others at very short notice.

"Reason. Since no one can say where or when the most deadly threat may present itself, our mobile reserves must be moved and handled as though all three Services had been completely integrated.

"It will rarely happen that the Army or Navy can win battles without the close co-operation of the R.A.F. The converse applies equally, but the help given to the R.A.F. by the other two Services, though very extensive, is mostly indirect: e.g. the Army manning H.A. guns and defending aerodromes from enemy armies, the Navy bringing indispensable supplies from across the seas.

" 10. *Versatility.* Since the R.A.F. is required, unavoidably, to fight its own battles for air superiority and also to fight battles in support of, or in co-operation with, the Navy and Army, it is certain that we shall never have as many aircraft or air crews as we should like to have. It therefore follows that such as we have must be ready, in emergency, to turn their hands to any one of the above duties.

" Admittedly this involves great difficulties of design and training, but the years from 1943 to 1945 showed that it can be done. The difficulty must not be exaggerated. Admittedly operations over the sea require special training. But strategic bombing, to destroy enemy aircraft on their aerodromes, is exactly the same whether those aircraft are intending to attack England or our shipping in the Atlantic. Equally, a counter-attack against fighter-bombers strafing our Army in the field is essentially similar to attacking the same aircraft when they are trying to bomb London.

" 11. *Back area bombing.* In all bombing raids over enemy territory it is essential that strategic bombing should not degenerate into back area bombing against the populations of large cities.

" *Reason.* The best reason of all: it does not pay. Offensives against the enemy armed forces must never neglect the time factor. The most rapid dividends are paid by attacking the enemy aircraft that are about to attack our towns, ports, or convoys. These may be attacked in the air with fighters, guns, or guided missiles, or on their own aerodromes if we can get at them without suffering excessive losses. Other forms of back area bombing may sometimes be directed against enemy arsenals or factories, the men who work in them, their oil, coal, and iron supplies, the road and rail system by which these things are brought to the factories, etc. But here there is a time lag which may well run into years before decisive results are obtained. A further drawback to the back area bombing of cities is that, with any virile nation, it tends to infuriate the people and strengthen their will to resist. It certainly had that effect in England and Germany.

" All back area bombing must therefore be strictly strategic, with a view to holding up, disorganizing, or destroying those enemy forces that may be in a position to do us vital damage in the immediate future. The period of time to be considered may have to be reckoned in weeks, days, or even hours. Strategic bombers will of course often have to attack targets that are situated in large towns or cities. Among these strictly legitimate targets would be the political and military high commanders of the fighting Services and their staffs, important supply depots and arsenals, bridges and road and rail junctions of major importance, oil fuel tanks, recruiting and training centres, military camps and barracks, etc.

" But when considering any such attacks over enemy territory three things must be carefully weighed up, viz.: our probable loss in bombers, the time the enemy will take to make good the damage (particularly on targets that can be only temporarily injured such as road and rail junctions), and the time likely to elapse before our strategic bombing yields practical results in the battle areas on land, sea, or in the sky.

" 12. *Unanimity.* It is of primary importance that the three Services should reach complete agreement about the main principles of our strategic doctrine.

" As soon as this is done we must discuss with our potential future Allies (the N.A.T.O. Powers, etc.) an outline of the grand strategy for possible future wars. This, of course, involves the consideration of many difficult problems. The first step would be to ensure that we are not defeated in the first few months, or weeks, of war.

The next step would be to plan a general offensive to achieve final victory, commencing immediately we had collected the resources necessary for success. This matter is urgent because our strategy in a future war is, in some measure, being decided today by our current system of training and by the number and design of the bombers, fighters, and other aircraft that we are now constructing or ordering."

Space forbids writing more about strategy: it is hoped that the 12 principles stated above will suffice for a start. If agreement can be reached about them, modified as necessary after discussion, we shall have laid a solid and useful foundation. Other principles can and no doubt should be added afterwards.

To conclude, the main purpose in writing this article is to suggest that the strategic problems referred to above, and the training and construction programme resulting from them, should be fully discussed by all concerned and finally agreed.

It is of course quite possible that this has now been done, but the public has no means of finding out. In a matter of such importance they would greatly like to know the extent to which the New Doctrine is going to shape our future strategy.

AIR POWER: CONCENTRATION AND CO-OPERATION

By "MUSKETEEER"

IT may seem presumptuous for an old infantry officer to enter the lists on such a subject as the use of air power in war. But the writer would plead interest aroused by two recent articles in the JOURNAL¹ and the experience summed up by Kipling in the lines:—

"The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each tooth-point goes;"

He proposes, first, to comment briefly on these two articles; and secondly, to look back to the years between the wars, when enthusiasts boosted 'war winners' and false prophets flourished. Finally, the intention is to put forward some conclusions which may or may not meet with approval, but will, however, be based on the principles of war which apply to all three Services and not simply to the Army.

THE TWO ARTICLES

Captain Vines believes that wars are still decided on the field of battle and that the bombing of Germany was the most costly failure in the history of British arms. He suggests a new definition of war, namely: "The object of war is to enforce the national policy with the application of the minimum force necessary and as economically as possible." He admits this is not a simple definition, and that the two provisos may well conflict.

He supports his contentions by quoting the aim of the strategic bombing campaign as defined at the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943, which was:—

"The destruction of the German military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

and adds: "It is clear that the intention was to defeat Germany if possible by strategic bombing alone." He points out that the cost to ourselves amounted to 79,281 air crew personnel killed and, in money, to the astronomical figure of £19,000,000,000. After listing the achievements of this offensive, some of which occurred as a result of the change of objectives to support the landing in Normandy, he states the failures to have been as follows:—

"(a) The morale of the German people did not break.

"(b) Total German war production actually rose until the end of 1944. when it was 285 per cent. of 1940.

"(c) The collapse of the German economy came when the advance of the land armies had already decided the fate of the war."

Referring to the future, Captain Vines remarks: "We have seen the failure of the policy aimed at destroying cities," and, "It would appear that the thousand-bomber fleets will never fill the skies with their thunder again." He considers: "It would always be necessary to hold under one's hand a force which could retaliate if the enemy resorted to area attacks. A comparatively small number of jet atomic

¹ *A New Definition of War and its Application to Air Power*, by Captain S. Vines, R.A., May, 1952, and *The Application of Air Power to War*, by Group Captain N. C. Hyde, R.A.F., November, 1952.

bombers would be adequate for this task. We always kept a reserve of war gases available in case Hitler initiated their use; in the same way, we require a reserve of strategic jet bombers."

Captain Vines then summarizes the main tasks of our air forces as:—

"(a) The defence of the United Kingdom.

"(b) The defence of our sea communications with the Royal Navy.

"(c) Support for the Army, including the gaining of superiority over the enemy air force in the field, offensive and transport support."

He amplifies the above as follows: "The first two tasks are designed to ensure our firm base. The third is the offensive task, designed to apply air power where wars are won—on the field of battle."

Group Captain Hyde deals effectively with the first writer's definition of war but his arguments to refute the latter's criticisms of strategic bombing display the old lines of thought. He admits, as he must, that German total war production did increase up to the end of 1944, but adds in mitigation: "Strategic bombing was in its infancy, experience was lacking, many target systems were selected and attacked by strategic bombers, and *much effort was diverted for the support of sea and land operations.*"² Nevertheless, he asserts: "The success of the land battle was assured because strategic bombing had weakened the German effort long before its final collapse." Are we to assume that the partial destruction of the German Army in Russia and their heavy losses in the Tunisian campaign did not contribute to this state of affairs or to make the landing in Normandy a feasible operation? Finally, he quotes Speer's reports to Hitler on the declining output of the oil plants and the dwindling capacity of the railways, but these refer to the period May, 1944, to March, 1945, to which reference will be made later.

As to the future, Group Captain Hyde agrees with the first two conclusions set forth by Captain Vines but considers the third, if accepted, "would in all probability ensure our rapid defeat in a future war." He then asserts: "The statement that a land battle is a necessary preliminary to victory is surely incorrect. Japan surrendered before an Allied soldier had set foot on the mainland of Japan. It is not suggested that this was entirely due to air action."

He makes two definite pronouncements:—

"(a) The long-range bomber, and the long-range bomber alone, can win the air battle. The proof of this is in the last war.

"(b) Long campaigns into Eastern Europe have defeated two of the finest armies the world has seen."

COMMENT

The concluding sentence of Group Captain Hyde's article is: "Discussion helps to bring out the truth, and it is essential that we have a clear idea of the functions and capabilities of different weapons, particularly as any waste or unbalance in our war organization might well prove fatal." All of which is true but, in applying these weapons, the principles of war must be the guide, especially those of *security, concentration, and co-operation*. No Service can be allowed its own theory of war; all forces must be co-ordinated to achieve the maximum combined effort. This may seem platitudinous, but these principles by no means guided the application of air

² Present writer's italics.

power in the last war. It may be noted that Group Captain Hyde appears quite hurt that "much effort was diverted for the support of sea and land operations," deflected, it must be supposed, from the attempt to destroy Germany in accordance with the air forces' theory of war.

The first writer makes some remarks on the standard of accuracy of strategic bombing. He might, too, have referred to the failure of enemy aircraft to subdue Malta which withstood so many attacks, and was eventually relieved by the combined operations of land, sea, and air forces based on North Africa. His figures of cost are hair-raising, even though they do not include the cost of feeding and rehabilitating Germany. Nor does he remark on the manpower used in manufacture and maintenance.

Captain Vines considers that, under modern conditions, the defence against air attack has grown stronger and mentions guided missiles in this role. Group Captain Hyde ignores all this, and holds steadily to the long-range bomber, though, surely, the new missiles may achieve as much or greater efficiency with less expenditure of men and effort. His pronouncement that the bomber alone can win the air battle is somewhat enigmatic to simple soldiers who thought Fighter Command won the Battle of Britain. And won it at a time when Bomber Command had inflicted no material or moral damage on the enemy. This pronouncement seems just as unwise as to assert that the battleship alone can win the war at sea. The second is apparently designed to warn soldiers against adventures in Eastern Europe, presumably to be rendered unnecessary by strategic bombing. The reasons for the defeat of "two of the finest armies the world has ever seen" in that part of the world were discussed recently in the JOURNAL.³

"Japan surrendered before an Allied soldier landed in the country." Yes, but she was defeated by the destruction of her sea power, as we could certainly be by the same means. The downfall of Japan was brought about by the combined use of land, sea, and air forces. The outstanding power of such a combination is one of the features of the last war and undoubtedly confirmed the General Staff's pre-war doctrine: "The navy, army, and air force will act in combination to break down the enemy's resistance and accomplish the national aim."⁴ These operations were, after all, the application of the principles of concentrating the maximum force to attain the object and of co-operation in the actual task.

The achievements of the bombers in 1944-1945, stressed by the second writer, were the result of a change of policy insisted on by General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, but only agreed to after an acute controversy. The result was that strategic bombing was directly related to the pending invasion instead of being employed in a more or less independent war as was previously the case.

Why did we fail to apply the established principles in the early stages of the war? So far as the General Staff is concerned, the doctrine was clearly laid down. Possibly one reason is that there was much propaganda by one Service, and other enthusiasts boosted their own particular fancy 'war winner' during the years between the wars. In any case, dangerous theories resulted, which evidently still persist in some quarters.

³ See *Moscow, 1812 and 1941: A Comparison*, November, 1952.

⁴ See *Field Service Regulations, Vol. III, 1935*, section 1, paragraphs 2 and 4; also section 3, paragraphs 1 and 3 (ii).

RETROSPECT

During the inter-war years the Air Staff, apparently mesmerized by the writings of Douhet, and anxious to consolidate their position as an independent Service, insisted that Bomber Command were to bomb Essen in force! They succeeded in persuading the Government that the heavy bomber would prove a war-winning weapon. But, scorning past experience, they also failed to take into account the characteristics and determination of the probable enemy. Thus, one Service was allowed to exploit its own theory to the detriment of national strategy.

Many whose fate took them to France will recall the sense of anger and frustration felt in mid-May, 1940, when, as the Germans poured across the Meuse, it was heard that Bomber Command were to bomb Essen in force! An army staff officer's diary for 20th May, reads: "The striking power of our bombers at home is being employed deep in Germany in place of concentrating closer in on the river crossings of the Meuse and the Oise and so creating disorganization, particularly at night, in the area behind the German position . . . 1600 hours . . ." "There now comes an Air Ministry message saying they will attack the marshalling yards. This means targets such as Hamm, East of Essen. We need closer help if the armies are to be saved."⁵ As a long term policy with an established front, attack on these objectives might have proved useful. But in May, 1940, such sporadic efforts could have no effect on the desperate tactical situation. Surely an attempt to seal off the vital sectors of the battle front would have been the proper action.

In North Africa in 1942, there was the same lack of *concentration* and *co-operation*. "The Air Force was naturally concerned with the strategic bombing of long-range targets; the Army on the other hand seemed often to lack the capacity to interest the Air Force in its own particular problems, and to have no very definite idea of what it required. Among some members of the Air Force this state of affairs was accounted a virtue, and they rejoiced that the Eighth Army left them to their own devices, without attempting to secure a common strategic and tactical plan."⁶ Co-operation did begin to improve when Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery took over the Eighth Army—three years after the outbreak of war.

At sea the defence of our vital communications was adversely affected by this policy of independent bombing. When mounting losses of merchant ships forced the Government to divert some of our air resources to the Battle of the Atlantic good results were achieved by early 1943. "Nevertheless, there was still a school of thought which persisted in the belief that war in the air is something separate from, and independent of, war on land and at sea, and was demanding that every effort should be concentrated on the bombing of Germany to the exclusion of other matters, and even going so far as to advocate the withdrawal of aircraft from the submarine campaign and from Africa."⁷

The Air Forces were, however, not the only protagonists of a potential war winner. The theorists, who asserted that the tank would be master of the battle,

⁵ See *The Diary of a Staff Officer*, pp. 28/29. We may now complete Mr. Kipling's verse, started above:—

"The butterfly upon the road
Preaches contentment to that toad."

⁶ See *Crisis In The Desert, May-July 1942*, South African War Histories Section, p. 14.

⁷ See *Statesmen and Sea Power*, p. 330.

thought foot soldiers unnecessary as part of armoured formations ; some eventually went so far as to claim that Infantry could be dispensed with, except for minor duties and policing. This was clearly refuted by the 1935 edition of *Field Service Regulations* which stated : " Practically all success in war, which is won by the proper co-operation of all arms, must in the end be confirmed by Infantry."⁸ But the theory that tank formations were capable of winning an action without the assistance of the other arms persisted. It seems that many of our failures when confronted by the Afrika Korps were due to lack of *co-operation* between armour and the other arms and neglect to apply the principle of *concentration*. There had developed what Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck called: " the idea that the Royal Armoured Corps was an army within an army which could operate without reference to the other arms of the Service." Rommel, on the other hand, held the opposite view and energetically practised it. By applying the principles of war to the best of his ability with the means available he clearly demonstrated how wrong were the pre-war pundits and enthusiasts.

REFLECTIONS

In the last war the old lessons that there is no short cut to victory, and that the enemy's will to resist will only be shattered when his armed forces are defeated had to be re-affirmed by bitter experience. The pre-war doctrine, unhappily often ignored in the early stages of the war, was proved to be sound. Yet, judging from the views expressed by Group Captain Hyde, none of this might have occurred.

No war is like its predecessor, but so far as we are concerned, one factor has not changed. We remain a sea power and depend for our existence on ships. It used to be said during the 1914-18 War that Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war for us in one afternoon, and it is true today that we can more quickly and certainly be defeated by loss of sea power than by any other means. In a future conflict our primary aim must therefore be to secure the main base and maintain our sea power. The two are complementary—neither will suffice alone. If this fails no bombers will fly—for long. Without *security*, the *offensive*, by which ultimate victory will be won, cannot be mounted.

Over fifty years ago Colonel G. F. R. Henderson wrote : " The naval strength of the enemy should be the first objective of the forces of the maritime power, both by land and sea." We did not apply this in the last war when for too long, too much effort was directed to bombing Germany instead of to the vital Battle of the Atlantic. This old maxim now requires modification to include those other forces capable of attacking our main base, and world-wide communications. Nevertheless, the principles, *concentration* and *co-operation* remain unaffected and this *security*, upon which everything depends, can only be achieved by the combined efforts of land, sea, and air forces.

So far as land operations are concerned we have the examples of the landing in Normandy and subsequent thorough defeat of the German armed forces, as well as the final offensive in Burma. In the latter case, the available air power was used in close support of Fourteenth Army—without it the campaign could not have been brought to so swift and successful a conclusion. This is possibly what Captain Vines had in mind when stating his third task for air power. It will be remembered that in each case there was a supreme commander in complete control of land, sea, and air forces.

⁸ See Volume II, Section 4.

CONCLUSION

The strategic bomber may well be replaced, partly or entirely by guided missiles, but whatever weapon is used, its objectives or targets must be selected to conform to national strategy, and not governed or diverted by any independent theory of war. The end is greater than the means.

Wars will still be won when the enemy's will to continue the struggle is shattered by the defeat of his armed forces. To that end all land, sea, and air resources must be devoted with singleness of purpose and the utmost energy, only such diversions of force being allowed as is essential to maintain *security*. The crux of the matter is to develop power and the flexibility to concentrate the maximum strength at the right time and place.

Our resources are not unlimited, yet we have always been prone to attempt too much at one time, usually for political reasons. The result has been that we have made detachments, often too late, and too small to achieve their purpose. Even when such adventures have not ended in disaster they have always weakened the main effort, or worse. Let us then remember the Duke of Wellington's dictum, surely born of bitter experience: "The only mode by which we can be successful is by the application of our means to one object."

THE CADET FORCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

By MAJOR-GENERAL J. C. LATTER, C.B.E., M.C., D.L.,
CHAIRMAN, COMBINED CADET FORCE ASSOCIATION

LIKE so much else of value in this Country, its cadet forces are and always have been entirely voluntary in character ; they have developed in a largely haphazard manner ; and they use considerable diversity of method in achieving their aims which, though they have much in common, are not wholly identical. They trace their origin, as does the Territorial Army through its parent the Volunteer Force, to the middle of the XIXth Century when the Country was seriously alarmed at the apparent risk of invasion from the Continent, and Lords Lieutenant of counties were urged to raise forces for local defence which soon attracted a sort of ' preparatory school ' in the shape of cadet units. Their objects have varied in emphasis from time to time, and in detail at all times, but may be said to be now broadly as follows:—

(a) To help boys so to develop their characters as to enable them to become good citizens in the widest sense and to have within themselves the seeds of success in the career of their choice.

(b) To give them a ' flying start ' if they join the armed forces of the Crown either for National Service or for a career.

(c) To provide the forces with potential leaders.

The whole movement has the cordial support of H.M. Government ; and this has been the case for some years, regardless of party, as is shown by the statement in the House of Commons on 2nd July, 1947, by the Minister of Defence, the Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M.P., as he then was, and his circular of 3rd July, 1947, asking all local authorities to give such help as they could to cadet work and stressing the value which the Government attached to it.

The rest of this article is devoted to a description of the history, methods, and aims of each of the elements which make up the cadet forces of this Country, with some final comments. They are taken in the order which seems most convenient and as involving least repetition, though some injury to precedence and chronology will result.

THE SEA CADET CORPS

The embryo appeared in Whitstable, Kent, when a group of seamen, discharged from the Navy after the Crimean War, started a " Naval Lads' Brigade " in which the young men of the district were taught, in their spare time, the elements of seamanship and naval discipline and were encouraged in a love of the sea and an appreciation of what sea-power means to our Country and the Empire. This original " Naval Lads' Brigade " still flourishes as the Whitstable Unit, Sea Cadet Corps. It was the forerunner of others all over the Country.

The next major event in the evolution of the Corps was the foundation of the Navy League in 1896. Disturbed particularly by the dwindling proportion of British seamen in our Merchant Fleet, and by the lack of a reserve of trained seamen for the Royal Navy, it established a Sea Training Home at Liverpool. This was followed, in 1900 and onwards, by the launching of " Training Brigs " by various home branches of the League ; and by 1910 the movement had grown so much that the League formed a Central Association to co-ordinate and direct these various voluntary enterprises.

In 1919, the Navy League obtained Admiralty recognition, with a proviso that units must be inspected annually and certified as efficient by an officer of the staff of the Admiral Commanding Reserves. Each unit was administered by a local committee, who accepted responsibility for providing financial support and the direction of the Corps according to the regulations laid down. The Navy League also helped financially any units in poor circumstances. By 1939, there were approximately 100 units of the Sea Cadet Corps administered by the Navy League, with a strength of 10,000. In 1942, the Admiralty came into partnership in the enterprise, gave considerable assistance in cash and in kind, and, in particular, took over responsibility for the technical sea-training given in the Corps.

The Corps, numbering 20,000 cadets at present, comprises some 375 units, each commanded and officered by volunteers holding Special Branch commissions in the R.N.V.R. These officers are assisted by chief petty officer and civilian instructors and are supported by a civilian chairman and committee. All give their services free, the only payment being to officers and instructors whilst actually undergoing courses in naval ships or establishments. Units are grouped into seven geographical areas, each supervised by a serving naval officer of commander's rank on the staff of Admiral Commanding Reserves. The Corps is administered by the Sea Cadet Council, a body set up jointly by the Admiralty and the Navy League with representatives of the chairmen of the Corps and of certain other interested bodies.

Although the Sea Cadet Corps is recognized as giving 'pre-entry training' and, in fact, is a considerable source of recruitment to the Royal and Merchant Navies, that is not its primary objective. Rather it is to use sea-training and the great traditions of the British sea services as means whereby our sea-minded boys may be helped to develop those qualities that make for what the first Elizabethans called the 'proper man.' Instruction in seamanship, practical boat-work, signalling, physical training, rifle shooting, swimming, boxing, football, and social activities, together with trips to sea in H.M. ships and ships of the Merchant Navy, and interchange visits between parties of Sea Cadets of the home Country and Dominions, all are designed to this end. Nor is the spiritual side neglected. Every effort is made through the honorary chaplains to encourage the objective of Christian citizenship.

THE ARMY CADET FORCE

The first official recognition of a military cadet unit was given in 1863. Since then, many Volunteer, T.F., and T.A. units have had cadet battalions, companies, and equivalent bodies affiliated to them with the right to wear the uniform and badges of the parent unit. From 1910 to 1930, army cadet units were, rather loosely, administered by the T.F. (later T.A.) Associations. In 1930, all official recognition and help were withdrawn: but out of evil came good, for Field-Marshal Lord Allenby and Lieut.-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, a former D.G.T.A., formed the British National Cadet Association, which made itself responsible for the organization and administration of the Cadet Force and fought its battles. Though some measure of recognition and assistance was restored in 1932, the B.N.C.A. retained its functions until the War Office took over the responsibility for administration and training in 1942, when the Force expanded rapidly in answer to the needs of war. The B.N.C.A., however, continued to handle the welfare, religious, sports, and shooting aspects of A.C.F. work and does so to this day under the title of the Army Cadet Force Association which it assumed in 1945. In 1949, the administration of the Force was taken over by Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations.

The objects of the A.C.F. are to develop the character and powers of leadership of boys and to produce good citizens, potential leaders, and instructors for the fighting forces, volunteers for the Regular and Auxiliary forces, and entrants for National Service who are already well grounded in basic training. Although some schools maintain A.C.F. (not Combined Cadet Force) units, the vast majority of the A.C.F. is organized in 'open' units catering for the working lads who must perforce train in the evenings after a day's work or at the week-end. The work is done in T.A. centres during hours when the T.A. is not using them (there is a problem here in many cases with the increasing numbers of National Service men now coming into the T.A.) or in specially provided huts. The military training given includes preparation for Certificate 'A,' Parts I and II, and for Certificate 'T' which is for those with a technical bent, rifle shooting on the miniature and open ranges, week-end camps, and an annual camp to which over 50 per cent. of the Force goes for seven days. The development of character is sought through cadet clubs, games and competitions, libraries, canteens, and links with the churches.

The A.C.F. is under the control of the Director of the T.A., Cadets, and Home Guard at the War Office and is organized by counties, each of which has a county cadet commandant who is unpaid and is either a retired Regular officer or a prominent business or professional man with T.A. experience. He is a member of the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association and is responsible for selecting unit commanders, paying frequent visits to units, and representing the A.C.F. of his county at conferences of youth organizations in his area. Within the county, the A.C.F. is usually (but not always) organized into battalions or regiments which are sub-divided into squadrons, batteries, and companies. All are affiliated to their local T.A. unit to whom they look (rarely in vain) for much help in training and administration: for the A.C.F. has no paid adjutants, quartermasters, and the like. National Service officers and other ranks are, under certain conditions, allowed to discharge their liability for part-time training by acting as instructors in A.C.F. units instead of serving in the T.A.

The finances of units are derived partly from capitation grants from the War Office for cadets over 14 years of age who have completed 100 drills in the year, partly from proficiency grants for cadets who have obtained Certificate 'A' Part I or Part II, or Certificate 'T,' partly from subventions given by local education authorities for clubs, sports, and general welfare work, and always from private funds raised by subscriptions (often from the boys themselves), social functions, etc.

There were, at the end of 1952, over 60,000 cadets between the ages of 14 and 18, the official limits, in the Force, under 5,200 officers. A good proportion of the ex-cadets find themselves in 'O.R.I' (potential officer) squads, when called up for National Service. About 12 per cent. of all volunteers in the Regular Army have A.C.F. training and many go from it to army technical schools and boys' units, to which they were almost always originally attracted by their cadet experiences. A few obtain permanent Regular commissions through the R.M.A., Sandhurst, after service in the ranks.

THE AIR TRAINING CORPS

The Air Training Corps was established in 1941, to provide a pre-service training force for the R.A.F. and for the Air Arm of the Royal Navy. It absorbed the Air Defence Cadet Corps which had been created with a similar purpose in 1938 under the auspices of the Air League of the British Empire.

The present objects of the A.T.C. include, in addition to the provision of training in air subjects, the fostering of the spirit of adventure, the promotion of sports and pastimes in healthy rivalry, and the development of the qualities of mind and body which go to the making of a good leader and a good citizen.

The A.T.C. comprises school squadrons and local (or 'open') squadrons, which are organized with the assistance of school authorities and local committees respectively, and are staffed by officers of the Training Branch of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve and by A.T.C. warrant officer and civilian instructors. Gliding schools exist for the purpose of giving instruction in gliding to cadets of these squadrons and are also staffed by Training Branch officers and civilian instructors.

Policy direction of the A.T.C. rests in the Air Ministry with the Air Member for Personnel, advised by the Director of Auxiliaries, Reserves, and Air Cadets; but command, discipline, training, and administration are the responsibility of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Home Command, acting through his regional groups and A.T.C. wings. These wings, of which there are 51, are mainly organized on a county basis and administer local squadrons only: school squadrons are controlled directly from group headquarters.

The Air Council is advised on cadet matters by two Air Cadet Councils, which meet in London and Edinburgh under the presidency of the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Air normally at four monthly intervals, and their membership is designed to include all aspects of the Corps's activities. Each Council has a committee of A.T.C. chaplains. There are, similarly, two A.T.C. Councils of Welfare which advise on questions affecting the welfare and amenities of A.T.C. units and also administer the sums of money received from private sources for the benefit of the A.T.C.

Cadets must be between 14 and 17½ on entry, and they may remain members until they are called up for National Service or until they reach the age of 20, whichever is the earlier. They may be granted the non-commissioned ranks of corporal, sergeant, and flight-sergeant.

Training is given in three stages: basic, proficiency, and advanced. The basic stage consists of general service training, but the proficiency and advanced stages are taken in two concurrent parts, advanced general training, and specialist training. Successful passing of these three stages entitles a cadet to be classified as Cadet (First Class), Leading Cadet, and Senior Cadet respectively, and to wear appropriate arm badges. Certificates are awarded for the proficiency and advanced stages. The various concessions granted to a cadet on entry to the R.A.F. are dependent on the stage of training he has reached in the A.T.C.

This training is supplemented by courses of instruction arranged at R.A.F. stations specifically for cadets in such subjects as airmanship, navigation, signals, engines, physical training, and ground combat training. Each year cadets may attend Summer camps at R.A.F. stations; and squadrons are affiliated to suitable R.A.F. stations which assist them in training and are often able to arrange passenger flights.

First-class cadets may be given instruction in gliding at one of the 47 gliding schools distributed throughout the Country where they may qualify for the *Fédération Aéronautique Internationale* certificates A, B, and C.

In July, 1950, the Flying Scholarship Scheme was introduced. This is a scheme whereby selected cadets receive flying instruction free of charge at civil flying clubs up to private pilot's licence standard which entails approximately 30 hours' flying. Competition for these scholarships, which are valued at £150 each, is extremely keen,

and by 31st January, 1953, 676 cadets (including members of the Combined Cadet Force) had qualified for their private pilot's licence. A number of cadets are also given 10 hours' dual flying instruction at R.A.F. Reserve flying schools. Furthermore, a scheme has recently been approved whereby selected cadets can be given passenger flights at civil flying clubs.

There are also many opportunities for cadets to make flights abroad either in Transport Command aircraft or in aircraft on special flights.

For some years there has been an annual exchange of air cadets from this Country with those of Canada and America and, in the past year, to a more limited extent, with those of India, Pakistan, and Sweden. On these visits cadets are taken on conducted tours to many places of interest and meet their counterparts in the corresponding local forces.

Squadrons are accommodated and equipped at public expense. The Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations act as agents for the Air Ministry in the acquisition and maintenance of property; but headmasters and local committees also have certain responsibilities for the payment of rents and rates, the heating, lighting, and cleaning of squadron premises, and administrative expenses.

At the time of the formation of the A.T.C. in 1941, the cadet strength was about 20,000. This quickly built up to a peak of about 210,000 in 1942, but after the war it declined to 42,000 and has since remained fairly constant at that figure.

THE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS AND THE COMBINED CADET FORCE

Some of the cadet units which came into being in the 1860s were formed in schools, among them Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Rossall, Felsted, and Hurstpierpoint. They consisted of masters and senior boys and were operational, being in effect volunteer units. Volunteer rifle units were formed in many other schools and, with the passing of the fear of invasion, all became purely training organizations and were known as cadet corps. As part of the Haldane reforms of 1907-8, an Officers Training Corps was formed in two divisions—the Senior in universities, the Junior in schools able to produce a minimum of one officer and 30 cadets each. Over 100 contingents of the Junior Division of the O.T.C. were formed and produced many leaders for the 1914-18 War.

It always came directly under the General Staff at the War Office and therefore survived, with little damage, the political and financial storms of 1930-32. By 1939, its strength was 30,000 cadets in 183 contingents. In that year, its title was changed to "Junior Training Corps," largely because the introduction of commissioning through the ranks only made its old name rather suspect as holding out false hopes of an inevitable commission.

The organization had a limited establishment and new contingents could only be admitted as old ones contracted or fell out. There was therefore always a large number of schools which had cadet units outside the O.T.C. These got little assistance from the Government and none whatever from 1930 to 1932; many were kept alive by their membership of the Public Secondary Schools Cadet Association, of which Field-Marshal Lord Allenby and Lord Milne were in succession Presidents. The number of such school units increased rapidly after the outbreak of war in 1939.

Alongside these Junior Training Corps and Army Cadet Force units, there sprang up Sea Cadet Corps and Air Training Corps units in public and secondary schools during the war. Many schools had a J.T.C. or A.C.F. unit and, as a separate entity, a

Sea Cadet Corps or A.T.C. unit; some had all three. The result was apt to be administratively untidy; two or three separate orderly rooms were needed, training accommodation had to be duplicated, headmasters had to deal with two or three Service Departments and cope with two or three separate sets of requirements and regulations—all of which added to the distractions suffered by school staffs. (Service enthusiasts sometimes forget that the primary job of a schoolmaster, for which he is paid by his governors or local education authority, is to teach; and that the master who is public-spirited enough to help the Combined Cadet Force probably has other out-of-school chores imposed on his good nature.) After considerable discussion between the Service Ministries and the headmasters' bodies, the Combined Cadet Force was set up in 1948, to include such Sea Cadet, J.T.C., A.C.F., and A.T.C. contingents in schools which retained boys to the age of 17 and over as wished to join it. Some elected to stay out; but at the end of 1952 the C.C.F. contained over 1,500 officers and 62,250 cadets in 330 contingents.

Each contingent consists of a basic section dressed in army uniform, through which all cadets must pass and in which they receive a general training in drill, fieldcraft, and weapons, with Certificate 'A,' Part I, as the goal. Every contingent may in addition have a R.N. section, an Army section, or a R.A.F. section, or all three, or any two of them, to which a boy passes after achieving that goal. He then dons the uniform of the Service (and Corps) of his choice and receives its specialized training, including seamanship, gunnery, signals, and naval aviation in R.N. sections; camps, shooting, and leadership experience in Army sections; and glider and flying training in the R.A.F. sections, leading up to the proficiency certificates of various types awarded by the Admiralty and Air Ministry, and Certificate 'A,' Part II, in the case of the Army. Each Service supervises the training of its own sections, with varying degrees of local contact; but the Force as a whole is controlled by the Joint Cadet Executive, housed in the War Office, and consisting of a commander on the staff of the Admiral Commanding Reserves; a lieutenant-colonel of the Directorate of the T.A., Cadets, and Home Guard; and a wing commander on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Command, Royal Air Force. All contingents have the right of direct access to this body. Some (mostly the larger) carry out their own administration; the rest are administered by Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations. Many have joined the newly formed C.C.F. Association, which arranges collective insurance, carries out other agency services, supplies information not readily available from other sources, and is frequently consulted by Service Ministries on matters which are not covered through other channels.

Officers receive pay while in camp and on courses; otherwise they give their services free. There are no paid adjutants and, apart from school staff instructors (mostly retired petty officers and warrant officers) in some large schools who are paid for by them, no other paid help. Financial support takes the form of capitation grants from Whitehall, subventions or free accommodation or other facilities from some local education authorities, and (in some cases) subscriptions from parents.

Over the last few years, a high percentage of ex-cadets of the C.C.F. have obtained R.N.V.R. commissions during their National Service and most cadets entering the R.N. College, Dartmouth, have C.C.F. experience; the Force has produced 70 per cent. of the cadets entering the R.M.A., Sandhurst, and over 60 per cent. of the National Service officers who have passed through the Mons and Eaton Hall Officer Cadet Schools of the Army; the percentage of cadets entering the R.A.F. College, Cranwell, from the Force has shown a steady increase, amounting in 1952 to over half the total

entry ; and many cadets have also been accepted for National Service aircrew training, while many others have gained quick promotion to commissioned or non-commissioned rank in the R.A.F.

SOME COMMENTS

Enough has, it is hoped, been said to show that, with the cordial backing of the Cabinet, the three Service Ministries are fostering a youth movement nearly 200,000 strong, which is of the highest actual and potential value not only to the defence and general life of our Country but also to the boys themselves both during and after their National Service.

It is not to be expected that cadet work will appeal to all boys ; there are other youth organizations, doing magnificent work, which will inevitably be more attractive to some ; and we must be thankful for any and every effort which is made to help boys to develop their characters on sound lines. But it is a proved fact that membership of a cadet unit enables a boy to be of more value to the Country during his National Service than one without pre-service training. It is a proved fact that a boy with pre-service training tends to get promotion in the forces, whether as a National Service man or as a longer term volunteer, more quickly than others, from which it follows that the cadet forces are goldmines of potential leaders. It is also a proved fact that employers give a warmer welcome to a man returning from National Service who has learnt to be a leader and to take responsibility than to one who has just drifted, from which it follows that cadet service can confer great practical benefits on a boy for his civilian career—a fact which could well be stressed more cogently to parents and others than is now the case.

But is enough being done to use all these advantages to the full ? It is suggested that there is still, in many places, scope for a closer link between the auxiliary forces of all three Services and their cadet units. It would be a mistake for those forces to try to do the latter's work for them. But much could be done to help them by means of training and administrative guidance and occasional demonstrations, exchanges of visits, and the like. Mutual knowledge, trust, and liking would grow ; and these should lead in many instances to an eagerness on the part of the boy to continue the good work he has done in his cadet unit and during his National Service by joining the local auxiliary unit (R.N.V.R., T.A., or R.Aux. A.F.) which first roused his interest, or at any rate one like it if his career takes him to another part of the Country.

There is here a great, and as yet not fully tapped, source of potential voluntary leaders for the auxiliary forces. It is for those in authority in the latter to see how, without impinging on the independence or adding to the labour of cadet units, they can create or improve the liaison with organizations which hold such great possibilities. And it is to be hoped that employers and others concerned with industry and commerce will realize what a force for social and general good there is to hand in the pre-service units.

A FUTURE FOR THE COLONIAL FORCES

By LIEUT.-COLONEL C. NIXON, M.B.E., THE EAST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT

MUCH is being done in terms of money and material for the economic and social development of the Colonial Empire but very little mention is made of what is perhaps the most valuable commodity in the Colonies—namely, manpower. There are over 60,000,000 people in the Colonies, and a detailed survey of how best this vast population could be employed would be instructive and valuable. It is self-evident that whatever amount of money is spent in development and whatever civilian uses are made of the pool of manpower available, all efforts will be futile if the Colonies do not make, in war, a contribution to the defence of the Commonwealth commensurate with the resources available. It is proposed in this article to examine the present structure of the Colonial forces and to suggest means by which better preparations can be made in peace for the fullest use in war of these forces.

THE COLONIAL FORCES, PAST AND PRESENT

Military forces of some sort have existed in the Colonies from the earliest days in which they first came under the protection of the British flag. In some Colonies, such as those in the East African Protectorates, local levies were used to pacify the countries and to bring law and order. In others, such as Hong Kong, local forces were raised only after the Colony was established. In the 1914-18 War, native troops played an important part in local operations as, for instance, against the Germans in East Africa. Maltese have for many years provided a number of men for the Royal Navy, as well as contributing to the defence of their homeland with the Royal Malta Artillery and the now defunct King's Own Malta Regiment. The West India Regiment played a part in the 1914-18 War, and local forces in West Africa engaged in campaigns in the Cameroons.

In 1939, local forces existed, in some form, in all Colonies. Raised in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Nyasaland, the King's African Rifles consisted of six battalions of Regular infantry, a battery of light artillery, and a signal section. Northern Rhodesia provided the Northern Rhodesia Regiment of one Regular battalion of infantry. The Royal West African Frontier Force, raised in the West African Colonies, consisted of eight Regular infantry battalions, a small artillery element, and ancillary services. Regular battalions of the Malay Regiment existed and there were Regular local forces in Transjordan and Aden and in the Sudan—not a Colony but a Condominium—there was the Sudan Defence Force. Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore had sizeable volunteer forces, all with a nucleus of Regular British army officers and senior non-commissioned officers. At the other end of the scale, such Colonies as the Falkland Islands, North Borneo, and Fiji had very small volunteer local forces, trained by volunteer officers and lacking modern arms and any kind of Regular army content. Most of these Colonial forces were designed simply as a form of military backing to the civil power, for use in an internal security role, and no pretence was made of their fitness to engage in operations in a major war.

Unfortunately, enemies do not plan their strategy on a sporting basis and half trained local forces, raised to maintain internal security, may find themselves in the fore-front of a major battle line. Within days of the entry of Japan into the war, units of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Defence Force were in action against a first-class military machine, and the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps fought

alongside Regular units of the British and Canadian Armies in the defence of the Colony. Nobody would wish to do less than praise the gallantry and tenacity of the officers and men of these, and other units, but it is stupid to pretend that volunteer units, raised, trained, and paid for on peace-time scales, and designed to deal with the first emergencies of civil unrest, can hope to make a very valuable contribution to the defeat of a first-class enemy in a major war.

It is possible that a future world war might start with an invasion of Fiji, the Falkland Islands, or some other remote part of the Colonial Empire. We in Britain are careful to ensure that a substantial period of training is given to every soldier of our Army before he is sent to fight, and nobody would plan on committing recruits of the Home Guard to battles such as were fought down the Malayan Peninsula in 1942. Yet that is exactly what happened in some parts of the Empire and it does not seem that any great strides have been made to avoid a repetition of such misuses of untrained men. It is significant that in 1939 practically every Colony had to pass special legislation to permit the use of its forces outside its own territory, and this procedure applied where Regular Colonial forces existed, as in the East African Colonies.

However dismal the picture, credit must be given to the very real contribution that was made in the 1939-45 War by Colonial forces. Mention has already been made of the noteworthy efforts of the volunteer forces in Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. The King's African Rifles and the Royal West African Frontier Force acquitted themselves well in the East African campaigns and later in Burma. The Fiji Regiment distinguished itself fighting the Japanese. Cypriots, Seychellois, and Mauritians were active in large numbers, chiefly in administrative units in the Middle East, and the Caribbean Regiment served in Italy. The Royal Malta Artillery played a distinguished part in the fighting which earned the George Cross for the Island, and the Malay Regiment fought well in Malaya and Singapore. In fact, the war effort of the Colonies, in terms of army manpower alone, was formidable and, in addition, one must remember the small but valuable volunteer naval and air units which fought in various campaigns.

In this very brief survey, no mention has been made of the large number of men and women from the Colonies who served in units of the Royal Navy, the British Army, and the Royal Air Force. It is interesting to note that the casualties to Colonial troops totalled over 36,000. But, impressive though the effort was (and obviously, we are here considering only one portion of that effort), we are justified in asking whether the usefulness of the Colonial forces would not have been greater had there been a different system for raising, controlling, and expanding them as need arose.

Today, the picture is little different from that of 1939. True, the Malay Regiment has expanded greatly and wider racial fields of recruitment in the Federation are being sought. The King's African Rifles and the Royal West African Frontier Force, though not much larger than before, are better balanced and contain at least a nucleus of supporting arms and services. An encouraging and significant feature is the recognition of the Colonies' responsibility in peace-time that their forces should make a contribution to Commonwealth defence in the cold war. This has been demonstrated by the despatch of East African and Fiji troops to take part in the present fighting in Malaya. The Royal Hong Kong Defence Force has expanded considerably and contains elements of all the main arms and services. But, by and

large, the old pre-war system is in operation and, while there have been some increases, the Colonies, out of a population of over 60,000,000, maintain forces totalling under 70,000, a large proportion of which are volunteer, part-time units. This, in a peaceful world, would be admirable but, in present conditions, it is alarming. However, what is worse than the paucity of men in uniform is the fact that the present Colonial forces are ill-balanced and are raised and trained for action in the coldest of cold wars, and their expansion for a major war would produce just those same difficulties and delays which occurred in 1939. West Africa raised approximately 180,000 troops as the peak figure between 1939 and 1945. East Africa reached a peak figure of over 200,000. Yet West Africa was able to send overseas, as fighting formations, only two divisions and East Africa only one. And these divisions were not in action till 1943 and 1944 (though, of course, troops from Africa were serving in the Middle East, in administrative and pioneer units, before those dates). The so-called African divisions which fought so well in Abyssinia were, in fact, brigades of rifle battalions with gunners, sappers, and services found largely by white and Cape coloured South African troops. In war, divisions are required and divisions are not formed in a matter of weeks from a number of rifle battalions, however good they may be.

In proposing changes in the system of raising and training Colonial forces in peace, with the object of making them better fitted for war, great increases in spending need not necessarily be suggested. Provided certain basic principles are observed, the structure of the forces can be altered to make them better able to take their places rapidly in Commonwealth defence, without more recruits and on not much more money than at present. Of course, the financial side of the question is complex and it is difficult to think of a common yardstick which could be applied to all Colonies, since no two are exactly alike in form of government, natural wealth, and degree of civil progress. Generally, however, the Colonies pay, out of their own revenues, for the local forces they raise. This includes pay of locally enlisted personnel, of officers and non-commissioned officers seconded from the British Services, and money for arms, equipment, and transport. The financial question is, of course, one of the roots of the difficulty of raising Colonial forces for Commonwealth as opposed to purely Colonial service. The Colonies' first and primary use for their local forces is in the internal security role. No Colony, particularly one with a locally elected majority in its legislature, such as Jamaica, is prepared to pay for units of gunners, sappers, and administrative services which, however essential for war-time expansion, are of no immediate use in dealing with civil disturbance. It is for this reason that Colonial forces were so tardy in putting complete divisions into the field, because the nucleus on which to build divisions just did not exist and it is a long and difficult task to produce first rate gunners, mechanics, and other technicians from the often poorly educated material available.

THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF COLONIAL FORCES

There are a number of principles to be observed when proposing changes in the structure of the Colonial forces. The first has been mentioned and is most important. The Colonial Governments require the local forces primarily as a military backing to the civil authority and the police. A recent example of this has been the employment of units of the King's African Rifles against Mau Mau terrorists in Kenya. Such employment of Colonial forces immediately limits the size and clearly defines the structure of these forces which, with this role alone in view, tend to consist of rifle units, with few of the heavier weapons, no supporting arms and ancillary services, and light scales of equipment and transport. And, since the Colonial Governments

pay the financial piper they can justifiably demand to call the military march. This system of financial control leads to a complication in a world war, when Colonial forces are used under War Office direction in a major plan. Then, the Colonial forces are made the financial responsibility of the British Government—the so called Imperial forces—and many difficulties arise. For example, after the East and West African forces became the British Government's financial responsibility in 1940, there were as many as four different rates of pay for one type of appointment.

The next point is that it would be foolish to pretend that all Colonies could raise and train troops fit to undertake combat duties against a first class enemy in a major war. The quality of Colonial troops varies greatly, and because environment, climate, temperament, and educational progress are such important factors, there can be no harm in saying bluntly that many Colonial forces could make their best contribution to Commonwealth defence by providing pioneers, drivers, docks and railway operating units, and similar ancillary services. The manning of 'teeth' arms must obviously be done by the races most suitable, but every potential front-line soldier, white or coloured, replaced in a base job by a suitable non-fighting man, is another contribution to final victory. One of the difficulties of the war-time expansion of the Colonial forces was the number of British army officers and other ranks tied up as trainers of non-European soldiers, not only in combatant units but in a great number of ancillary and technical units. From this we are led to the conclusion that, in re-planning our Colonial forces, strict attention must be paid to the type of employment in war which men from each Colony are best fitted to undertake.

The geographical situation of each Colony, in relation to areas of potential operation, requires consideration. The threatened invasion of British Honduras by Guatemala a few years ago entailed the urgent despatch of part of a British battalion to the Colony.¹ Nobody would suggest that, because of this threat, a small and remote Colony like British Honduras should attempt to maintain a properly balanced army. But it is a fact that during the crisis the frontiers of the Colony were manned by a few armed police. Again, while large British forces are installed in Cyprus and Malta, it would obviously be unsound to expect those Colonies to maintain balanced fighting forces of their own. But men from both Cyprus and Malta have an important part to play in a major war—as they proved during the last conflict—and it is important that those forces are planned now for rapid expansion, to take on a pre-determined role.

Practically all the Colonial forces require the services of British army officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers, and where a Colony maintains a local naval or air force unit, personnel from the appropriate British Service are seconded for a period in the Colony. It is most important that these seconded officers and men are of the highest quality. Not only should their professional qualifications be beyond question but also the matter of temperament should be examined. Before the last war British army officers wishing to serve with one of the Colonial forces were first interviewed at the Colonial Office. If considered suitable, they were then put on a waiting list, and often it was as much as two years before a candidate was called forward for service in the Colonies. A successful application depended as much as anything on the interviewing authorities' estimation of the candidate's temperamental

¹ In 1948, part of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, already stationed in the Caribbean with its headquarters in Jamaica, was sent in H.M.S. "Devonshire" to British Honduras to counter the threat of invasion by Guatemala.

suitability to serve with Colonial troops. During the war, when the Colonial forces in East and West Africa expanded swiftly and largely, big drafts of British officers and other ranks were sent, willy-nilly, to serve with the native troops. The standard suffered at once, not because the drafted personnel were necessarily of poor quality but because, in many cases, they had no desire to serve with Africans. Consequently, there was a lack of sympathy and mutual understanding, and nobody is quicker than an African to spot the white superior who is out of tune with him. Efficiency suffered in consequence.

Immediately after VJ day, steps were taken to reform the Malay Regiment. The arrangements were made locally and officers from units already in Malaya were transferred across for service with the Malays. This undoubtedly gave the Regiment a bad start, the fault for which lay primarily with the authorities responsible for making the arrangements. The situation was not improved by the fact that it was literally years before the terms and conditions of service of British personnel seconded to the Malay Regiment were settled, and it is only recently that this fine Regiment has been getting in full the type of officers it needs and deserves.

The terms of service for seconded British officers and other ranks should be sufficiently attractive to bring forward the best. The present system of 'inducement' allowances is, in effect, a half measure and the very word 'inducement' conveys an entirely wrong impression. There should be keen competition among young British Service officers to be given an opportunity to serve with Colonial forces, where they can broaden their outlook, be given greater responsibilities, and have experiences and adventures in obscure and, often, little-known parts of the world. On the other hand, care should be taken to ensure that the purely financial benefits of service with the Colonial forces are not so attractive that every time a British Service officer finds himself in money difficulties, his mind turns immediately to secondment as the ready way out.

The last, and possibly the most important principle to be borne in mind, is that whatever is done to alter the structure or form of the Colonial forces, nothing should be done to tamper with their character. The Colonial forces have a long and proud tradition; they have their battle honours, their distinctive uniforms, their strong local pride and territorial associations. These, at all costs, must be maintained. Whatever radical changes are made in the organization and role of Colonial forces, it must always be remembered that they are the Services of the Colonies and nothing must be done to make them subordinate to the British Services. Poor cousins do not make steadfast brothers in arms. A good example of this point will be made if the proposed Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland comes about. It will be interesting to see if proper safeguards are made to ensure that the local forces of these Colonies maintain their identities and local connections.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE COLONIAL FORCES

Having examined the Colonial forces, past and present, and noted some of the major principles concerning them, it is appropriate to suggest some means by which these forces could be improved in both peace and war. First, and most obvious, is the question of planning. At the moment, there appears to be no overall plan to deal with raising and training of the local forces and their proper employment in war. Within the Colonies themselves, the control may be efficient but the wider control, exercised from London, is necessarily loose and somewhat out of touch. The Oversea Defence Committee, formed by officials of the Colonial Office and Service

Departments, and in close touch with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, surveys strategy from the Colonial point of view. But this Committee has not got a full-time Service secretariat and there are no longer military advisers at the Colonial Office. The Committee does, indeed, deal with many of the points discussed in this paper, but it has no executive authority whatsoever and can merely advise. Even the pre-war system, whereby a general officer—the Inspector-General of African Colonial Forces—with a small military staff, worked from Downing Street, is gone. The logical answer is to appoint to the War Office a Director of Colonial Forces, with a small staff including representatives from the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. This officer should be charged with replanning the Colonial forces, with ensuring their close liaison, especially for training, with overseas commands and with dealing in London with the Colonial Office and other Ministries on all matters affecting the Colonial forces. He should also be the Chiefs' of Staff adviser on matters affecting the Colonial forces and strategy which directly affects the Colonies, and in this capacity he should be the link between the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Defence. His staff should include civilian representation, at a senior level, from the Colonial Office.

Command of all Colonial units should be vested in the G.O.C. of the appropriate overseas command, though he should be directed to consult, either locally or through the Directorate, the civil authorities concerned when he proposes to use the local units. Strict orders should be issued concerning the occasion and method by which G.Os.C. may use local forces and they must, obviously, be fully aware of the political repercussions of, for instance, ordering local forces out of their own Colony for service overseas.

As regards finance, the present system should be abolished. Colonies should contribute direct to a central fund, the amounts they are now paying for their own forces. This fund must remain under the control of the Secretary of State for Colonies, who alone has the means of direct and easy contact with the Colonial Governments necessary to satisfy them that the money is being spent wisely. To augment the Service Ministries' votes with funds to pay for the Colonial forces would force those departments into an impossible position, since they rightly hold that money, having once been voted to them, is theirs to spend as they think best; and they might not consider money spent on Colonial forces is fulfilling this condition. If, however, the Colonial Secretary retains control of the funds, they will be spent, as advised by the Director of Colonial Forces, in raising and maintaining local forces in the Colonies in accordance with the amounts paid by each Colony, the whole being planned to fit in with Commonwealth strategy. It may be that it would be more satisfactory to make the Directorate of Colonial Forces a branch of the Colonial Office. Its relationship to the Service Ministries would then be analogous to that of the Service departments to the Ministry of Supply.

In his planning, the Director must survey each Colony. He must bear in mind the principles mentioned above and must ask himself three questions in relation to each Colony. First, what is the internal security threat and what local forces are required to deal with the most likely adverse internal situation. Colonial forces are primarily required as military backing to the civil power and it should be the first point to be considered. Naturally, such considerations as the availability of British forces and neighbouring local forces to assist in dealing with a really serious internal security threat must be weighed up.

Next, some estimate must be made of the local forces' duties in relation to cold war operations, both in the Colony itself and in other Colonies to which the forces could be sent. Examples of this role are, first, the part being taken by the African forces in the fighting in Malaya and, secondly, the responsibilities of the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force in resisting Communist infiltration into Hong Kong.

Finally, a decision must be made on the part each Colony's forces are to play in a major war. Here, perhaps more than in arriving at the other decisions, many imponderables will have bearing. But an estimate, as accurate as possible, must be made. What can be decided, for instance, is the type of employment in a major war for which the men—and, possibly, the women—of any particular Colony are best suited. Where a Colony, or a group of neighbouring Colonies, is capable of manning divisions, then nuclei of all the arms and services necessary for rapid expansion in war must be maintained in peace. Trained reserves must be built up and a pre-planned number of divisions and brigades must be catered for. On the other hand, with a smaller Colony, perhaps already garrisoned by British troops as part of a strategic reserve (such as Cyprus), it may be considered that its best contribution to the Commonwealth war effort would be in providing labour companies, muleteer teams, drivers, or complete units to work in base areas.

From the answers to the questions posed above it will be possible to decide on the form the local forces in each Colony is to take. In considering the problem in each Colony there will, of course, have to be the fullest possible consultation with the Colonial Government concerned and with the Colonial Office. To fit those forms into the limits imposed by the money available from the Colonies may be impossible. Where this is so, it will be for the War Office, if necessary with an increased vote, to make a grant to the Colonial Secretary's funds to pay for the additional men and equipment for units required for more than the internal security role. Naturally, the political implication of reorganizing the Colonial forces will require careful consideration. It will be necessary that, in formulating his plans, the Director of Colonial Forces pays strict attention to the wishes of Colonial Governments and that he is careful in his approach to them. The personality and reputation of the officer chosen to fill the appointment will have considerable bearing on this point.

THE RESULTS OF REORGANIZATION

It is not possible to discuss in this paper the implications of the proposed Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, as no final decisions have yet been made. However, it is reasonably certain that if the Federation is established, it will require its own military forces and these would have to be based on the local units now available—the Royal Rhodesia Regiment, two Nyasaland battalions of The King's African Rifles, and the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, together with a few volunteer units. One cannot foresee the final form the Federation's forces will take, but quite evidently the Union of South Africa would be vitally interested in it. A major difficulty might arise over the Union's reaction towards any move to 'Africanize' the Federal forces, that is, gradually to train Africans in them to hold commissioned ranks. Similarly, the Union's view of the same process in the Gold Coast forces may be unfavourable. These problems are, of course, ones for the politician to solve and they are mentioned here to illustrate how impossible it is to regard Colonial forces simply from the military standpoint, without any political implications.

The development of East Africa as a main overseas training ground for British troops is worth study. If such a proposition were feasible, it would be logical to form

mixed brigades of British and African battalions, on the lines of the pre-partition Indian Army.

The establishment of a Directorate of Colonial Forces at the War Office or at the Colonial Office would bring great benefit in training and liaison. It is essential that every Colonial force, whatever its primary and secondary roles, is trained alongside its equivalent arm or service in the British Army. By maintaining close liaison within overseas commands, by arranging attendance of Colonial officers and other ranks on courses in British army establishments, and by arranging a regular though not greatly increased flow of well-trained British army personnel to the Colonial forces, much could be done to make them better able to function both in peace and in war.

It may be that by 'zoning' the Colonial forces, mutual assistance for training, for the maintenance of internal security in peace, and for building up fighting formations in war would be made easier. Zones would overlap, where possible, with the present military commands, and the Colonies within a zone could, in war, each contribute forces to make up a brigade or division, as was done in East and West Africa. This would entail an extension of the functions and possibly even a fusing of the Local Defence Committees.

The suggestions outlined above have, of necessity, been dealt with briefly. The whole subject of the Colonial forces deserves careful study, detailed planning, and forthright action. Arguments on abstruse constitutional procedure, quibbling over financial arrangements, and like delays will mean the continuance of a wasteful system which might be unable to provide just that extra tip of the scales towards final victory in war.

Any suggestion that the British Government proposes to employ the inhabitants of the Colonies as mercenaries must be firmly denied by good propaganda and publicity. As already stated, our Colonial policy is to guide the Colonial peoples to self-government within the Commonwealth. We can quote the cases of India and Pakistan when considering the military aspect of this policy. The fact that the former Indian Army was an efficient fighting force and played a notable part in fighting outside India in two wars in no way retarded the progress of India and Pakistan to self-government. In fact, because the Indian Army was such an efficient machine the process must have been assisted, because the two new nations had immediately available to them the forces necessary for defence. The same could be true of the Colonies. The Gold Coast, which has gone far along the road to complete independence, has the Gold Coast Regiment available as a nucleus on which to form an army if and when the Colony becomes a dominion.

To critics, both home and abroad, who would raise the cry that a new future for the Colonial forces means the militarization of subject peoples, there are two answers. First, no vast increase in numbers or expenditure is required to turn many of the Colonial forces from their present state of para-military police into efficient units for Commonwealth defence. Secondly, nobody with experience of Colonial troops can deny that the men leave the colours with a greater sense of self-pride, a higher educational standard, and a better realization of civic responsibility than they had when they enlisted. Good soldiers can always make good citizens; poor soldiers, ill-trained and improperly employed, become ready prey to the agitator and the street-corner politician and do not, in war, justify their existence. An examination of the subject shows that there is a real need to reorganize the Colonial forces, with results that would be important both in peace and in war. Failure to take action while there is yet time might have serious consequences.

THE ARMY AND THE PRESS IN WAR

By COLONEL J. V. MCCORMACK, O.B.E., M.C.

IN his first talk to war correspondents after the launching of the North Africa invasion, General Eisenhower laid down the lines which would govern his relationship with the Press, lines from which he never deviated, and lines which certainly paid a very good dividend. As his senior British Public Relations Officer, and this being my first Press conference conducted by an American general, I decided to take notes. Realizing the importance of the principles laid down I asked, that same evening, if he would confirm what I had written. To this he readily assented and agreed that each war correspondent joining the theatre should have a copy.

General Eisenhower's statement ran :—

"I regard war correspondents as quasi staff officers, and I wish to emphasize that, in my opinion, each newsman has a greater responsibility than that of a competitive newsman. I am not prepared to treat you as if you were my enemies or a bunch of commercial gentlemen. If I thought you were, I tell you here and now I would do nothing for you. It is for that reason I do not worry if I see you in the corridors of my headquarters, or passing my window or anywhere else. I trust you. As staff officers your first duty is a military duty, and the one fact that you must always bear in mind is to disclose nothing which would help the enemy. He is always looking for every bit of information to help him make his calculations, and many things appearing un consequential to you may help him. It would be a distinct disservice to let such things get out, particularly when the enemy gets them with so little effort.

"As regards censors, I do not regard them as people set apart to trap you, because I consider that if any correspondent tries to put a quick one over the censor, he should be got rid of. I assure you I will not have the slightest hesitation in getting rid of any correspondent who fails to appreciate that he is a part of the military machine. I am not threatening you ; I trust you. You must yourselves act as censors. When I see a mass of copy covered in blue pencil, it is a clear indication to me that the writer is in a bad way, and it does not tend to increase my confidence in him. I am saying this simply to place on record my attitude. Again, I trust you."

I am sure that all correspondents who served under General Eisenhower would agree that his treatment of them fully accorded to the above. He was always ready to trust them, and on numerous occasions let them into his closest military secrets. Never was his trust abused. In many respects his handling of the Press might serve as a model for the future.

To what extent this attitude contrasted with that adopted by the British authorities may be gauged from a study of the many books published by war correspondents during and since the war. From these it would appear that many times they were treated as if they were both irresponsible and dangerous. There were exceptions, of course. Montgomery's Desert Campaign was in many respects brilliantly covered by the Press, thanks largely to the Commander's flair for publicity.

Again, in the First Army, correspondents found in the Corps Commander and the Divisional Commanders friends who were always out to help them. This co-operation, added to the fact that correspondents were chiefly men of outstanding ability and of great initiative, enabled them to do a reasonably good job under very difficult and trying circumstances.

Looking back over the war years, there are many things in Press handling which stand out as needing peace-time consideration, if the mistakes, which occurred throughout the war years with unceasing regularity right up to the evacuation of Palestine, are not to be repeated. And by "peace-time consideration" I do not mean by the War Office only, but also by the Press.

The Press could assist in laying down now the foundations of a system which would be infinitely more efficient than one foisted on them at the beginning of another war, should such a sad calamity overtake us. The problem falls roughly under four headings—personnel, transport, handling of copy (including censorship) before final transmission, and transmission.

In dealing with personnel, the first need is to select a chief whose primary job would be to prepare an organization designed to control and meet the needs of war correspondents. He should be selected now, not by one of the Services, but by all three, in consultation with the Newspaper Proprietors Association and similar bodies.

Unhelpful rivalry between the three Services would thus be eradicated, and all three would be able to contribute to such essentials as transport and transmission. The person selected need not necessarily be a Service man—he should be someone who has attained some eminence in the handling of news, and above all should have the complete confidence of the Press. In war he should hold a rank not less than Major-General or its equivalent.

His first job, which incidentally need not necessarily be a whole-time one, should be to make contact with potential commanders of the future. The need for personal contact cannot be too strongly emphasized, for on this factor, more than any other, depends success or failure in the future. To this end he should be encouraged to attend a course at the Imperial Defence College and thereafter lecture at least once to each term passing through. In addition he should pay repeated visits to the various staff colleges ventilating the tremendous importance of the Press in modern war.

To create added interest, he might persuade the Press magnates to put up at intervals valuable prizes for essays by Service personnel on such subjects as "The Role of the Press in War," and at the same time persuade the fighting Services to endow special prizes at the military colleges for competition amongst cadets along similar lines. Institutions like the R.U.S.I. might also be encouraged to co-operate. Thus there would be aroused in the minds of many officers a real interest in the importance of the Press both in peace and war, and in addition such studies would prove a valuable asset in the education of the officer.

Regulations for the Control of War Correspondents in the Field might well be rewritten. There is a lot to be said for the correspondent in North Africa who wrote in his diary: "I can see from a quick reading (of these regulations) that we should have got no news home if we had abided by them." None can deny that they need drastic revision, and that such items as the wearing of large armbands and constant conducting could well disappear, to the advantage of all. After all, the soldier is not expected to wear a large armband to indicate his regiment—the shoulder title is considered sufficient. So it should be for the correspondent.

The question "to be" or "not to be," concerning conducting, should also be settled once for all. Under the present regulations a correspondent may not go out to dinner, even if his host be the Commander-in-Chief, unless he is accompanied by an officer or be in possession of a written document authorizing him to go alone. This is childish.

Conducting entails great waste of officer personnel—cavalcades of young officers acting as nurses to men often far more experienced in life, including warfare, than themselves. Add to this the cars and drivers needed to transport them and their luggage about, cooks and orderlies to fend for them, clerks to cope with their military needs, necessary camp equipment, and it will readily be conceded that very strong arguments indeed must be produced to justify the continuance of a system involving such an expenditure of public funds. The American system excludes conducting, thereby giving correspondents a great deal more freedom.

The writer believes that if each C-in-C., Army, and Corps Commander had an extra A.D.C. (Press) on his personal staff, they would provide the best possible liaison with the Press. Such A.D.Cs., in view of their intimate relationship with their chiefs, would be well placed to smooth out difficulties, and in addition would have good standing with subordinate commanders. At any rate let the Press, in consultation with the Services, hammer out such questions *now*, and so save a lot of unnecessary irritation and annoyance in war-time. In all probability they would produce a well-balanced code acceptable to all, and this in turn would ensure loyal compliance.

In this connection I cannot do better than quote from a letter written to me by that very good friend of the Press, Field-Marshal Earl Alexander. Writing on the 23rd February, 1943, just after assuming command of the 18th Army Group, and before the final defeat of the enemy in North Africa, he said: "I am most anxious to get the best possible service for the Press during the coming campaign, and feel that a properly organized and uniform system for the handling of war correspondents must prevail throughout my Army Group. I appreciate that there are some differences between the British and American systems of control, but I am of opinion that it is in the best interests of the Press themselves that one uniform system be adopted. I have written notes on my views which I hope will be helpful—please make whatever use of them you wish. The Press can play a tremendously important part in our war effort, and in co-operation with the fighting Services help to gain us victory. But, like the three fighting Services, their efforts must be organized, disciplined, and controlled. My aim is to present the right news to the public in the right way in the shortest possible time. To do this requires a properly organized system. In the Middle East we have had such a system with the result that the presentation of news during the last four months of our successful campaign has been highly praised both at home and abroad.

"Broadly speaking it is this:—Correspondents are looked after and controlled. They are kept up to date and informed of the general military situation so that they shall have the true military background, and sufficient information to enable them to judge what may be said and what may not. My own opinion is that the press correspondent is just as good a fellow as any military officer or man who knows a great many secrets, and he will never let you down—not on purpose—but he may let you down if he is not in the picture, merely because his duty to his paper forces him to write something, and that something may be most dangerous. Therefore he must be kept in the picture.

"Again it is not fair to let correspondents find their way about—it will only result in 'swanning about' in places where they will gather no useful information, and where they may be an embarrassment to others as well as to themselves. On the contrary, as they are playing, or can play, an exceedingly useful part, I feel it is our duty to provide the Press with the means to get about, the accommodation to stay

in, and the necessary help to get their stuff back by the quickest and most efficient means.

"Before a big offensive I see that the Press are ready and collected at the right place at the right time. In other words, we see that the Press get front row seats in the stalls when the curtain goes up!" After referring to the danger in speculating in future moves, the Field-Marshal concluded: "I am very sensible of the fact that the Press are all out to help us, and in return it is our duty to help them, and I shall do so. But I cannot do so unless they agree to a proper organization which I can control."

As these words were written by one of our most distinguished military war leaders, they might well provide the outlines for any new scheme considered for use in the future.

On the first two of the Field-Marshal's points, transport and accommodation, the former could, in this writer's opinion, be met by allotting an agreed amount of transport, cars and motor-cycles, to be used by the Press as *they* think fit, and the latter by providing a Press camp with a really good commandant, a transport officer with a few fitters, and an ever-open N.A.A.F.I. to supply food and drinks at all hours.

On the problem of handling final copy before final transmission, I quote from two well-known correspondents:—

"Leonard Mosley, Western Desert, to Allied Newspapers, April, 1943. It is now two years since I arrived in the Middle East from Britain, and there is no campaign out here in which I have not been in the field with our troops. But not since I was in Abyssinia with the Negus and his patriot army, and I sent back my dispatch to cable head by camel, has the system of reporting war from forward zones been so slow and unnecessarily difficult as it is here at this moment. When Asmara, capital of Italy's Empire in East Africa, fell, my description of how I entered the city was sent by carrier pigeon to Keren, by lorry to Kassala, by train which had four breakdowns to Khartoum, by telegram to Cairo, where it was laboriously re-typed by an inexperienced clerk, and finally reached London four days after the event. But this is lightning communication compared with some experiences we are having these past days. At this moment, when gallant soldiers of this great army are preparing for final battle for Africa—battles they have heroically rushed two thousand miles to wage—descriptions of how troops are feeling, of what they are doing, and what lies ahead are taking a minimum of three and maximum of 'Heaven knows what' to reach newpage. To get this dispatch to you, I am forced to come out of line and motor 80 miles South to where a dispatch rider is waiting. He then rides another eight miles to an aerodrome where a plane is waiting to take it to Algiers for censoring and cabling. But it does not go direct to Algiers, oh, dear no! It flies first to Tripoli where it is to be transferred to another plane which carries it on to the last part of the journey. As a correspondent with me remarked this morning: 'When I write my story it is news—when it reaches my office it is history.' Mines impede us, roads are bad, units difficult to contact, shells, bombs, and clouds of mosquitoes make writing most difficult. Long delays in transmission of our copy on top of this make life pretty irritating. It seems a great pity."

Again, the late Philip Jordan, Tunisia, November, 1942 (recorded in his since-published diary), writes:—

"Here as a correspondent I am on the horns of a dilemma. I am where I ought to be but my communications are so bad. If I can't get articles home I ought not

to be here. The first job of a correspondent is to ensure his communications. Here is the only place in which to discover the truth, and in which to write the truth. For the man on the spot there is too much sunshine about the official communiqué."

Certainly transmission from forward areas (Jordan was at least 200 miles from his base) presents a difficult problem. Mobile wireless sets, wholly available to the Press, would appear to be the ideal answer. But there arises a very big snag. Messages must be censored before putting on the air, and this in turn demands a censor with each set; but the censors must be briefed if censorship is to be maintained evenly. By what means are censors to be briefed without the briefing being overheard? An alternative method, and one which the writer believes provides the only practical answer, is to use aircraft to carry uncensored copy back, but they must be earmarked for this purpose *only*, and they must be capable of doing the job. Towards the end of the Tunisian campaign three planes were provided for this purpose. They were quite incapable of doing the job, and all three were written off in less than a week, with the loss of two of the pilots.

The other, and simpler, problem of transmission of messages to their final destination from the main message centre at G.H.Q. may well be satisfactorily solved in the manner prescribed in the following cable, dated 21st August, 1943, and addressed to A.F.H.Q. in Italy.

"Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the following:—As soon as practicable after occupation of a country by U.S. forces, alone or in conjunction with Allied forces, it is desirable that a United States commercial company install a radio station and operate a direct circuit with the U.S. to handle press, facsimile, and any other commercial traffic permitted and censored by military authority. It is desirable that such radio stations have facilities for transmitting broadcast programmes to the United States for broadcasting over U.S. networks."

Undoubtedly commercial companies are the most satisfactory answer to this problem.

And what of censorship? This is much too large a subject to be dealt with here. One thing, however, can be said with assurance. A system which does not allow of the correspondent knowing immediately what exactly the censor has deleted from his copy, and the time of its final dispatch to his newspaper office, is never going to give the correspondent that peace of mind so essential to his work. This is particularly true if the correspondent is, as he was in North Africa, hundreds of miles from his base.

It will be seen that the problems are legion. Now is the time to face up to them. Otherwise these same problems will arise, once more impeding the flow of news and straining the relations between the Press and the fighting Services.

DOES THE R.A.F. NEED AN ANTI-SHIPING FORCE?

By SQUADRON LEADER J. G. BISHOP, D.F.C., R.A.F.

WING Commander Foxley-Norris, in the November, 1952, issue of the JOURNAL, asks why the anti-shiping role for aircraft has lapsed into the background of Service thinking. He says "... this cannot apparently be attributed to any ruling at high level that there is no need for such a force," and since we do not possess a force of the type he advocates, he explains the apparent anomaly as the result of comparative priorities. He then suggests there is a fallacy in the reasoning on which our comparative priorities are based; a fallacy which may have serious results. I am not acquainted with the rulings at high level; comparative priorities are the result of necessary economies, but even if we could have many times more than we have, it would still be necessary to remember Lord Tedder's dictum: "We must start from the firm basis that ruthless analysis of this last war will give us, and we must discard equally ruthlessly ideas, traditions, and methods which have not stood the test of economy." Lord Tedder emphasized that he did not mean doing things on the cheap but meant getting the maximum of effect with the minimum of effort. If such an analysis of anti-shiping operations in the last war is made, Wing Commander Foxley-Norris's thesis will be found unsound. He says: "It is to be hoped that the above account of the accomplishments and potentialities of aircraft in the anti-shiping role will leave no one unconvinced of their value." But where is his account; he has not gone to the sources. I for one fail to see the justification for an anti-shiping force of the type he advocates; we must not perpetuate the uneconomical and inefficient just because it contained a greater element of excitement and morale-raising satisfaction than other methods.

ANTI-SHIPING OPERATIONS, 1939-45

Wing Commander Foxley-Norris's article stated that the theory of the supremacy of the ship at sea was proved false, and the belief that Germany had no requirement for, or dependence on, merchant shipping was equally erroneous. By the middle of 1941 there was indeed a heavy and continual flow of coastal traffic round the coast of Europe from Trondheim to Brest; but if we were powerless to stop it, the reason was not the lack of a particular weapon but the lack of weapons in general. Nevertheless, our aircraft and light naval forces were effective enough to cause Raeder to report to Hitler in September, 1941, that enemy attacks were causing regrettable losses, and in November that British air superiority in the western area was making sea transport very difficult. Since the war it has become apparent that the most effective weapon in this battle of the narrow waters was the mine. In the year up to June, 1941, air laid mines had accounted for 103 ships sunk and 16 damaged, and the force employed in the sowing had been very small. But the enemy losses were not our only gain, the operations forced the Germans to build up minesweeping forces which were later to grow to such a size and complexity as to put a severe strain on their resources. Also on many occasions shipping was immobilized for long periods while real and suspected minefields were being dealt with. In November, 1942, Raeder told Hitler: "Our effort to sweep these mines is taxing our forces to the limit." Thus, effort was being diverted from the U-boat war.

From April, 1940, when air mining was first employed, to March, 1943, the Royal Air Force in North-West Europe, in operations against enemy surface shipping, devoted just over one-quarter of the effort expended to aerial mine-laying; yet this

sufficed to sink three and a half times as many ships (two and a third times by tonnage) as the three-quarters of the effort devoted to attacks with bombs, torpedoes, cannons, and rockets. Further, the aircraft losses on mining were only half those on strikes. In the second half of the war when the strike wings were in their heyday, the balance was still greatly in favour of mining. From April, 1943, to the end of the war five strike sorties had to be flown for every two mining sorties per ship sunk; and if Fighter Command anti-shipping sorties are included the ratio falls to more than four to one.

AERIAL MINE-LAYING

The mine has been shown to be a more effective weapon in the anti-shipping role than the aimed missile. It has, however, other attractive qualities. Attacks on shipping by strike aircraft force the enemy to devote a certain amount of effort to two forms of defence. He must provide flak and fighters. This is of course inconvenient, but except that it ties down a number of fighters, which can almost certainly be used in other defensive roles in interim periods, it is not costly on the grand scale. We are often reminded that the Allied strategic bomber offensive virtually immobilized over a million men in Germany manning the air defences of the Reich. Air mining operations may perhaps engage slightly less of the enemy's forces than strike attacks in the form of flak and fighters, though this is debatable in view of the serious nature of mining from the enemy's position; but mining will certainly immobilize vast numbers of men and great quantities of material in other defensive operations. The personnel and material which were required for the building, manning, repairing, and administration of a fleet of *Sperrbrechers*, naval minesweepers, escort vessels, and auxiliary craft such as Germany was forced to maintain in the latter half of the war must have cut deeply into the enemy's offensive potential. It is not untrue to say that no other aspect of warfare forces the enemy to waste resources on purely defensive action on such a great scale in relation to the size of the attack involved. Strike attacks are not only less lethal than mining, but do not put this additional burden on the foe.

Wing Commander Foxley-Norris says, "... the aircraft is not an ideal or economic means of mine-laying" because of the small number of stores carried in comparison with a ship, and because of the difficulties of positioning and patterning. Also, its "sole qualification as a mine-layer lies in its power to penetrate to some otherwise inaccessible place, e.g. in the mining of the Danube." Again he has taken no account of the sources. In all, about 90 per cent. of ships sunk by British mines fell to mines laid by aircraft. The virtue of penetration needs no further stressing. The inability of surface forces to operate in coastal waters covered by enemy air power makes the ship a very unreliable mine-layer in estuaries and other sheltered areas where vessels are at a high traffic density. When Doenitz, who succeeded Raeder, told his master in 1944 that the mine situation was a cause of great anxiety and the ore imports from Sweden were threatened in a very serious way, his tale of woe referred to mines laid by aircraft. Also, it must be remembered that while with strike attacks the alarm only lasts so long as the raiders are in the vicinity, with mining the sailor never feels safe and has at all times to move with caution; and this inevitably means a loss of time.

INTERLUDE

An interesting sidelight on this question is the escape of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* up the Channel. Four squadrons of torpedo bombers and nearly 300 heavy

bombers failed to stop their passage through the Straits. However, the *Scharnhorst* was mined that afternoon while off the Belgian coast, and the *Gneisenau* was mined off Holland during the evening. Later that night, the *Scharnhorst* was damaged by a second mine. Both vessels reached port, but it was six months before the *Scharnhorst* was ready for service, and the *Gneisenau*, still immobilized in dry dock five months later when she was hit by bombs, took no further part in the war. These mines were laid by Bomber Command aircraft. Since the war, it has been ascertained that the *Scharnhorst* was brought to a standstill by the second mine for nearly an hour, and then limped into Wilhelmshaven at 12 knots on one engine with 1,000 tons of water inside her. That was two 1942 vintage mines and two capital ships. Further, even more decisive results might have been obtained if mining had been given a higher priority, as was suggested in the May, 1952, issue of this JOURNAL by Wing Commander Warne,¹ and it is not unreasonable to suppose that mines will be improved in performance.

THE QUESTION OF DEEP WATER

It may be argued that enemy shipping will take to waters which are too deep for mining. It is certain it will not take to waters outside his sphere of air superiority. I assume therefore, as does Wing Commander Foxley-Norris, that we can confine our argument to the coast of North-West Europe, for the only surface craft likely to find the deep seas safe are chance blockade runners. I would divide the waters of North-West Europe in two parts, in-shore and off-shore. The enemy is only likely to use off-shore waters when he has a high order of air superiority; otherwise our naval forces will be attacking him. When he has such air superiority, strike aircraft will be unable to interfere with his shipping. Wing Commander Foxley-Norris describes the normal conditions for strike operations as "heavy flak defences and probably fighters"; in these conditions there will always be fighters. At the end of the war rocket strikes were still described as always hazardous despite the decline of the *Luftwaffe*. At this stage any enemy shipping sailing off-shore will have to be attacked by submarines and moored mines unless they are of a nature absolutely vital to our existence. As the enemy loses air superiority in off-shore waters his shipping will automatically retreat to in-shore waters. There he will become vulnerable to the mine in all areas.

There would, in short, be no useful theatre of action for anti-shiping operations which could not be controlled by mining, or would warrant the building of a special force. Everywhere, from the Pyrenees to the Gulf of Bothnia, mining would, as previously, be the best weapon. If at some late stage in a future war, which is fought with our present weapons, it was essential to make direct attacks on shipping in certain limited areas, it is almost certain that, air superiority then lying where it would, a number of long-range rocket-firing fighters could be diverted to the task. These aircraft should have no more difficulty knocking out ships than aircraft, probably much less. Also there is reasonable cause to presume that naval aviation would have aircraft of a strike nature.

AIRCRAFT

There is still another advantage in using the mine as the anti-shiping weapon. The aircraft required to sow is a flexible weapon itself. Mining can be carried out

¹ *The Escape of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen*, p. 201.

by day or night ; it can be carried out from high or low altitude ; and the mine-layer is basically suitable, therefore, for use in the anti-submarine, long range, general reconnaissance, or bombing roles. Either the Shackleton or the Valiant could be used for this purpose, or any other modern jet bomber. The strike aircraft on the contrary is highly specialized and must be able to fly considerable distances at low level. Apart from the navigational difficulties, to-day this immediately puts it in the tortoise class. Low speed may be acceptable in open ocean reconnaissance and escort, but it is suicide in the face of contemporary fighters in in-shore waters. Therefore, the adoption of the mine as the anti-shiping weapon would not call for another aircraft, but for one which could in times of shortage be provided from Bomber Command, and in times of plenty this aircraft could if necessary be diverted to increase the weight of the bomber offensive.

THE CASE FOR ROCKET STRIKE WINGS

On analysis the rocket has no case. But though Wing Commander Foxley-Norris says, "... since the last war, propaganda in the form of memoirs, biography, novel, or film has concentrated on the aeroplane as a fighter or a bomber," I think it is on such propaganda that his case really is based. One of the favourite pictures in war manuals and encyclopædias is a celebrated photo of about 16 rocket-firing Beaufighters buzzing around one poor naval auxiliary, with broadsides "the equivalent of a cruiser" going off in every direction and the vessel still afloat. We are told, "... air/sea mining is not a popular operation with aircrews ; hazards are considerable but no results observed, and there is none of the excitement and morale-raising satisfaction that can be derived from more direct attacks." In the first place the hazards are relatively slight. Secondly, I would be the first to defend the courage of British aircrews when called upon to run great risks, but I have never met any who enjoyed unnecessary risks when they were aware that there was a more efficient and economical method of doing the job. Mining is both more economical and efficient. Under these circumstances I feel sure that the aircrews will be prepared to wait a few days or weeks to learn the results of their attacks from intelligence or photographic reconnaissance sources. If they are not, they will have to be made so, for we cannot afford extravagant methods.

CONCLUSION

In the anti-shiping role we need a weapon which can disrupt the enemy's sea traffic, is flexible and available for use in other maritime or bomber roles, and which can operate from jet-age altitudes with reasonable losses. Such a weapon in the geographical and political milieu in which we are placed is, on the analysis of the last war, the large, long-range, bomber-type aircraft sowing mines. Such a requirement will not make it necessary for us to establish special wings in peace time. As in the last war bomber aircraft can be diverted for this task. Though some people will doubtless squeal about this transfer of effort, in view of our financial position such a policy is inevitable. It worked last time and will work again. Mining is best not only because it gives the maximum return in ships killed for both sorties flown and aircraft lost, but also because it diverts large numbers of men and vast quantities of material to a purely defensive role from the enemy's offensive potential. Further, it has a great nuisance value. Once strike aircraft have left the scene of their attack life proceeds as normal, but with the mine-layer this is never so, and traffic may swing at anchor for days while the seas are being investigated, possibly as the result of nothing more dangerous than the combination of a reconnaissance aircraft passing and a school of porpoises having a game.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE KOREAN WAR—PART V¹

[The first four parts of the narrative of British Commonwealth naval operations during the Korean War were published in the JOURNALS for May and November, 1951, May, 1952, and February, 1953.—EDITOR.]

THE enemy's reaction to the United Nations' complete control of the seas around Korea is still confined to shore battery fire and very limited coastal minelaying. No opportunity has been given to the Allied forces of getting to grips with any enemy maritime forces. The Allied effort, therefore, continues to consist of routine patrols and bombardments in support of the land forces, and provides few exciting incidents to relieve the monotony for those engaged or indeed for the chronicler to write about.

The only new factor which has appeared in this period (July–December, 1952), is the first contact by British naval aircraft with the Russian MIG-15. The results of such meetings have not so far been unsatisfactory.

The disposition of the Commonwealth naval forces has been as before, with the major effort being made on the West coast; an occasional incursion to the East coast, where the U.S. Navy normally holds sway, providing a change of scene to some of the Commonwealth ships.

Throughout the period under review the land front has continued static, and there have been no signs of major offensive action by either side.

The first major operation of July in which the Commonwealth naval forces were engaged was a heavy air raid on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, carried out on 11th July. Aircraft from H.M.S. *Ocean* represented the Commonwealth navies and flew 39 sorties, delivering 180 60-lb. rocket projectiles and 32,000 lb. of bombs on the enemy. All the aircraft returned unscathed and pilots reported that the targets, which were the big marshalling yards of the city and large concentrations of stores around the area, were well covered. Their reports were confirmed by damage assessment which stated that 60 per cent. of the stores were destroyed.

Early on 15th July, news was received that the island of Changnin-Do, previously in friendly hands, had been captured by the enemy. H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Amethyst* were ordered to the scene and were soon on the spot. The island received an intensive strafing from the guns of these ships, assisted by air strikes from the U.S.S. *Bataan*. Both ships were fired on by enemy shore batteries, but suffered no hits or damage, and after a hot exchange the enemy ceased fire. On the next night, the 8th, Korean forces landed on the island and during the day, supported by covering fire from the two British ships and the *Bataan's* aircraft, they cleared the island of the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties.

On 27th July, H.M.S. *Ocean's* aircraft were attacked by MIG-15s, the first occasion on which naval aircraft from West coast carriers had had this experience. Four Fireflies were attacked by two MIGs, two of the Fireflies being damaged. One landed safely on board, and the other on a friendly airstrip. The crews were uninjured. Shortly afterwards four Sea Furies were attacked by four MIGs. The encounter was brief, and no Sea Furies were damaged.

¹ A sketch-map of Korea faces page 286.

Early in the month, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Admiral The Hon. Sir Guy Russell paid a visit to the operational area, during which he was able to visit a number of the Commonwealth ships taking part in the operations.

The month of August was distinguished by its unpleasant weather. Typhoon 'Karen' caused a three days' absence from their stations of the West coast forces, but did not give as much trouble as her sister 'Marge' last year. During the month H.M. Ships *St. Brides Bay* and *Mounts Bay* and H.M.A.S. *Condamine* each did a turn of duty on the East coast. Between the 4th and 6th August, H.M.S. *St. Brides Bay* took part in a joint operation with the U.S. Ships *Carmick* and *John R. Pierce* which began when the former stopped a train consisting of six box cars loaded with timber and sand. H.M.S. *St. Brides Bay* stood watch over the wreck from the morning of the 5th until the morning of the 6th and harassed it with 4-inch and close range fire to prevent the track being cleared. The *John R. Pierce* relieved the *St. Brides Bay* at this duty and during the afternoon was engaged by a Communist field battery which scored hits causing damage and casualties. The United States destroyers had no doctor on board, and the *St. Brides Bay* was glad to be of help by transferring a surgeon lieutenant and leading sick berth attendant to the *John R. Pierce*. This assistance was much appreciated.

H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* relieved the *St. Brides Bay*, and a few days later came under heavy fire from a shore battery. She was hit five times in rapid succession and unfortunately suffered one fatal and several other casualties. In returning the fire she secured a hit on one gun of the battery. The damage sustained did not prevent her from continuing her patrol.

H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* was the 12th Commonwealth ship to have been hit by enemy shore battery fire in the last nine months. The 11th was H.M.S. *Belfast* when, operating on the West coast early in August, she received one hit, having one Chinese rating killed and three others injured. Damage to the ship was unimportant, and after silencing the battery the *Belfast* resumed her patrol.

Other surface operations on the West coast during August included support for raids by friendly land forces given by H.M.S. *Newcastle*, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Rotoiti* and *Taupo*, H.M.C.S. *Crusader* and H. Neth. M.S. *Piet Hein*. H.M.S. *Concord* repulsed two enemy attacks on the friendly held island of Tak-Som.

During her operations on the West coast in August, H.M.S. *Ocean's Sea Furies* had four encounters with MIG-15s. On 9th August, four Sea Furies were attacked by eight MIGs at 5,000 ft. After a brief but spirited action one MIG was destroyed, exploding as it hit the ground, and repeated hits with 20-mm. cannon were obtained on two others which then broke off the action and, screened by the remaining five, retired to the northward. No damage was sustained by the Sea Furies. On the same day four Sea Furies were attacked by four MIGs at 6,000 feet. One MIG broke away emitting black smoke and flames, and the remaining three broke off the action. One Sea Fury was hit during this engagement, one of its drop tanks being set on fire. Later the pilot managed to jettison his blazing tank, put out the fire by side slipping, and made a safe deck landing. An hour later a third action occurred between two Sea Furies and two MIGs at 4,000 ft. One Sea Fury was hit and had to make a forced landing on a friendly island. The pilot was uninjured. The next day four Sea Furies were attacked by eight MIGs. One MIG broke away smoking and on fire, but could not be claimed as a 'certain' as no one saw it crash. No Sea Furies were damaged. This was the last engagement of the month, and the total score was thus one MIG

seen to crash, two 'probables' and two damaged against two Sea Furies damaged. During her patrol between the 9th and 17th August, H.M.S. *Ocean* achieved an average daily rate of 75 sorties.

H.M.S. *Belfast* left the Korean theatre in September to return to the United Kingdom. One of the veterans of the Korean War, she first saw service there in August, 1950. Since then she has steamed more than 80,000 miles, fired well over 8,000 6-inch shells, and spent 404 days at sea. In the early days on the East coast she was described by the U.S. Naval Command as a 'fast firing' ship, and has been much complimented on the effectiveness of her bombardments.

Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford hoisted his flag in H.M.S. *Newcastle* on 23rd September, and assumed the duties of Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, and Senior British Naval Officer in the Korean theatre in succession to Rear-Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff.

Between 23rd and 29th September H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* carried out a patrol in the Han River to investigate junk traffic and to check the channels which were surveyed with so much effort during the Han River operations in late 1951. After an adventurous passage it was reported that the channel had altered considerably and that "the passage was punctuated with frequent alarms and excursions necessitating 'casting' the ship for the deep water. It would have been impracticable in the strong tides and strong breeze to have lowered a boat and sounded out the channel by hand lead. Eventually it was accepted as quite reasonable to have only eight feet of water under the ship for 20 minutes at a time."

During October, the Commonwealth naval forces operating off Korea were visited by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor. Although the visit was of short duration, the First Sea Lord was able to visit all but one of the Commonwealth ships and to witness their activities. He watched the shelling of enemy batteries from the bridge of H.M.S. *Birmingham* and on another occasion he saw aircraft from H.M.S. *Ocean* taking off for strikes against the enemy and returning from their operations. It was in this month that, during a patrol lasting from the 2nd to the 14th, aircraft of H.M.S. *Ocean* flew an average of 85 sorties a day, destroying, *inter alia*, 47 rail bridges which meant that none could be used anywhere in the area.

November saw the end of H.M.S. *Ocean's* tour in this theatre. Her achievements were indeed remarkable. Apart from the record individual day's sorties for Commonwealth carriers off Korea—123—the following figures give some indication of her contribution to the war effort:—

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------------------------|
| Total sorties for the tour | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 5,945 |
| Average daily rate (throughout tour) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 76.3 |
| Highest daily total | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 123 |
| Highest number of sorties per patrol (nine flying days)... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 767 |
| Total flying days | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 79 |
| <i>Ammunition expended</i> | | | | | | |
| 1,000-lb bombs | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 420 |
| 500-lb bombs | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3,454 |
| R/P | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 16,490 |
| 20-mm. | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1½ million rounds (approx) |

Damage inflicted

| | Destroyed | Damaged |
|---|-----------|---------|
| Bridges, road | 115 | 71 |
| Bridges, rail | 81 | 33 |
| Rail wagons | 61 | 73 |
| Motor transport | 57 | 55 |
| Ox carts | 172 | 318 |
| Water craft | 102 | 262 |
| Gun positions | 69 | 176 |
| Electrical installations | 18 | 37 |
| Enemy killed in action (pilots' observations) | 1,000 | — |
| Aircraft | 1 MIG-15 | 3 |

The *Ocean* was relieved by H.M.S. *Glory* who began her third tour of duty of the Korean War.

As a result of their service during this tour, H.M.S. *Ocean*'s squadrons, Nos. 802 (Sea Fury) and 825 (Firefly), have been awarded the Boyd Trophy for 1952. This trophy is awarded annually for the most outstanding contribution in naval aviation during the year.

Surface activity continued on the well-known pattern. On 16th November, H.M.A.S. *Anzac* was engaged by shore batteries. She was under fire for more than ten minutes and was straddled repeatedly, though luckily undamaged. H.M.C.S. *Crusader* supported her during the action and the enemy guns were later harassed by H.M.S. *Birmingham* and the *Anzac* herself.

Naval operations continued on the same pattern throughout December without diminution of effort, but with no outstanding incidents. Another milestone in carrier history was passed when H.M.S. *Glory* achieved her 10,000th deck landing since she left the United Kingdom in January, 1951. Nearly 6,000 of these landings have been made following operational flights against the enemy in Korea.

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| | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------------------------|
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| 20-mm. | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1½ million rounds (approx) |

Damage inflicted

| | | | | | <i>Destroyed</i> | <i>Damaged</i> |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|----------------|
| Bridges, road... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 115 | 71 |
| Bridges, rail ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 81 | 33 |
| Rail wagons ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 61 | 73 |
| Motor transport | ... | ... | ... | ... | 57 | 55 |
| Ox carts ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 172 | 318 |
| Water craft ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 102 | 262 |
| Gun positions | ... | ... | ... | ... | 69 | 176 |
| Electrical installations | ... | ... | ... | ... | 18 | 37 |
| Enemy killed in action (pilots' observations) | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,000 | — |
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DIARY OF THE WAR IN KOREA¹

16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th January.—No event of importance was reported.

20th January.—Allied tanks attacked a number of enemy positions in the eastern sector. Superfortresses bombed enemy supply centres East of Sariwon. The British cruiser *Newcastle* bombarded enemy positions and command posts South of Chinnampo.

21st January.—U.S. Sabre jets brought down seven MIG-15s and damaged three others. The New China news agency reported that a Superfortress was shot down over North-East China on 12th January. U.S. battle casualties in Korea to 17th January were reported to total 128,971, including 20,362 men killed in action.

22nd and 23rd January.—Allied fighter-bombers twice attacked a railway tunnel and anti-aircraft positions in the Pyongyang area. On 23rd, U.S. Sabre jets shot down four MIGs, probably destroying another, and damaging nine more.

It was announced from Washington on 23rd that General Van Fleet was retiring on 31st March and that he would be succeeded as Commander, Eighth Army, by Lieut.-General Maxwell D. Taylor in February.

24th and 25th January.—A patrol of the 1st Battalion, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, raided the enemy's lines and destroyed an important tunnel fortification. U.S. troops, supported by tanks and aircraft, attacked an enemy position in the western sector, but were compelled to withdraw after four and a half hours fighting. U.S. Sabre jets shot down five MIGs.

26th January.—General Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, left Tokyo for Korea on a tour of inspection.

27th January.—It was reported from Tokyo that sanction had been received from the Commonwealth Governments for the immediate inclusion of about 1,000 South Koreans within the infantry battalions of the British Commonwealth Division.

28th January.—It was reported from Tokyo that direct responsibility for the conduct of the enemy campaign of rebellion within prisoner of war camps under U.N. command in Korea was laid at the doors of the enemy Generals Nam Il and Lee Sang Cho (both delegates to the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom) by the headquarters of the U.N. command in an intelligence survey issued earlier in the day. Prisoners of war on Koje Island beat a U.S. soldier to death and a subsequent disturbance was quelled by tear gas.

29th January.—General Collins, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, returned to Tokyo from Korea. Lieut.-General Maxwell D. Taylor arrived in Tokyo *en route* for Korea.

30th January.—U.S. Sabre jets shot down a Russian-type TU-2 bomber over North-West Korea.

31st January and 1st February.—No event of importance was reported.

2nd February.—Superfortresses bombed enemy front line positions over a very wide stretch of the front. Medium bombers attacked a supply centre South of Chinnampo.

President Eisenhower, in a speech to a joint session of Congress, announced that he was issuing instructions that the U.S. 7th Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. (In June, 1950, the U.S. 7th Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack on Formosa and also to ensure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against Communist China mainland.)

3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th February.—No event of importance was reported.

8th February.—General Mark Clark announced that the authorized strength of the Republic of Korea Army was being increased by a further two divisions.

9th February.—Air Force and Marine bombers continued their attacks on military targets on both coasts, one of the heaviest being on an area near Chinnampo. Super-

¹ A sketch-map of Korea faces page 286.

fortresses bombed a supply centre near Pyongyang. One enemy prisoner of war was killed and 38 were wounded (four of whom died later) when Allied troops were forced to quell another riot on Koje Island.

10th February.—No event of importance was reported.

11th February.—Lieut.-General Maxwell D. Taylor took over command of the U.S. Eighth Army from General Van Fleet. Lieut.-General H. Wells, C.-in-C. designate of Commonwealth Forces in Korea, and Lieut.-General W. Bridgeford, the present C.-in-C., arrived in Seoul on an inspection tour.

12th, 13th, and 14th February.—No event of importance was reported.

15th February.—Lieut.-General H. Wells became C.-in-C., Commonwealth Forces in Korea in succession to Lieut.-General W. Bridgeford.

Allied fighter-bombers attacked hydro-electric works on the Yalu River and reported having damaged two generators on the Suiho reservoir. Escorting Sabre jets shot down at least two MIGs and damaged others.

16th February.—Two hundred Allied fighter-bombers attacked an enemy supply area near Pyongyang. Three MIGs were shot down by escorting Sabre jets.

17th February.—No event of importance was reported.

18th February.—A force of 379 Allied fighter-bombers in two raids dropped more than 375 tons of explosives on a North Korean tank and infantry training school West of Pyongyang. Escorting Sabre jets shot down seven MIG-15s.

19th February.—Another attack was made on the North Korean tank-infantry school West of Pyongyang, this time by nearly 200 Allied fighter-bombers. Protecting Sabre jets destroyed two, possibly three, MIG-15s.

20th February.—Superfortresses bombed an enemy headquarters and a supply centre in North-West Korea, five miles from the mouth of the Yalu River.

21st and 22nd February.—Allied bombers continued their attacks on enemy supply centres in North Korea. General Mark Clark called on the enemy commanders in North Korea for an immediate exchange of seriously sick or wounded prisoners of war, and suggested that liaison officers should meet at Panmunjom to arrange such an exchange.

Marshal Juin, C.-in-C., Allied Land Forces Central Europe, accompanied General Clark on a tour of the front.

23rd February.—No event of importance was reported.

24th February.—It was reported that the British Commonwealth Division would begin integration of Korean troops into infantry battalions during the first week in March. By the end of March it was expected that 1,000 Koreans would have been absorbed by the Division.

25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th February and 1st March.—No event of importance was reported.

2nd March.—Several enemy probing attacks on Allied positions in the central and western sectors were all repulsed. It was reported that 25 MIG-15s were shot down in February, eight others probably destroyed, and 30 damaged. Only two Sabre jets were destroyed in air combat, but five were lost to ground fire and nine to other causes, including mechanical failure.

3rd March.—No event of importance was reported.

4th March.—After heavy fighting, South Korean troops regained a hill position South-East of Kumsong which they had lost to Chinese troops before daybreak.

It was announced in Washington that U.S. casualties in Korea to 28th February were 130,732, of whom 20,653 were killed in action.

5th and 6th March.—No event of importance was reported.

7th March.—Twenty-three North Korean prisoners of war were killed and 42 were injured on Yoncho Island (off the southern tip of Koje Island) when 2,000 prisoners demonstrated violently and threatened the lives of their U.S. and South Korean guards. A number of guards were injured by stones.

8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th March.—No event of importance was reported.

12th March.—It was reported that the 1st British Commonwealth Division had been withdrawn from the battle line for rest and training early in February and was now in reserve close to the front.

13th March.—Fighter-bombers attacked an enemy troop concentration in North Korea. U.S. Sabre jets escorting the fighter-bombers shot down six MIG-15s, probably destroyed another, and damaged one more.

14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th March.—No event of importance was reported.

18th March.—In the central sector, Dutch and South Korean troops repulsed seven enemy probing attacks before dawn. Superfortresses bombed an enemy supply and troop centre near the frontier in North-West Korea and also attacked enemy lines. The first contingent of 300 South Korean soldiers joined the British Commonwealth Division.

19th and 20th March.—No event of importance was reported.

21st and 22nd March.—U.S. Marines repulsed attacks in company strength by Chinese troops in the western sector. Fighter-bombers from U.S. carriers attacked targets in the Chongjin area. U.S. Sabre jets shot down six enemy MIGs and damaged seven others.

23rd March.—South Korean troops raided enemy trenches in the eastern sector and set off napalm bombs. Four Allied positions guarding the approaches to Seoul were attacked by Chinese forces and U.N. troops were forced from one hill feature.

The 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, arrived at Pusan.

24th March.—Fighting continued for the hill positions in the western sector and Chinese troops reached two crests before being driven off, and only for a short distance in one case.

25th March.—In the western sector, counter-attacks by the U.S. 7th Division on the hill position ("Old Baldy"), three-quarters of which remained in Chinese hands after further fighting on 24th, failed to make headway.

26th March.—U.S. troops withdrew from "Old Baldy" hill during the night, and from dawn the whole hill was bombarded by Allied aircraft, artillery, and tanks. Chinese troops made simultaneous attacks on four hills 25 miles West of "Old Baldy" and succeeded in reaching two of the Allied positions. Allied fighters destroyed one MIG, probably destroyed another, and damaged five more.

27th March.—The Chinese remained in possession of "Old Baldy" hill, but were under intense bombardment by Allied artillery and aircraft. U.S. Marines regained one of two outpost positions overrun by the Chinese on 26th. MIGs penetrated as far as 75 miles North of Seoul and Australians claimed the probable destruction of one and damage to another.

28th March.—The U.N. proposals for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war were accepted by the North Korean and Chinese commanders who, in the same message, called for an immediate resumption of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom, which were suspended in October.

29th March.—U.S. Marines recaptured an outpost position in the western sector after losing it during the night to an attack by Chinese. U.S. Sabre jets shot down four MIG-15s and damaged a fifth.

30th March.—Three attempts by the Chinese to retake the outpost position in the western sector which they lost on 29th were repulsed by U.S. Marines.

Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, said that, after the arrangements for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war had been settled, a smooth solution of

the whole question of prisoners of war should be achieved. He agreed to the handing over to a neutral State of those enemy prisoners who refused to return home, so that their repatriation could be justly settled and would not obstruct the realization of an armistice.

31st March.—U.N. and enemy liaison officers met at Panmunjom and the former handed over a letter from General Mark Clark, addressed to the enemy commanders, proposing an early meeting of higher level liaison groups to make the necessary detailed arrangements for the immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded captured persons. The letter also referred to the hope that a conclusion of this exchange would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question, and that, accordingly, General Mark Clark would be prepared to instruct his liaison group as a second order of business to meet with the enemy liaison group to arrange for the resumption of armistice negotiations by their respective delegations.

1st April.—The U.N. and enemy liaison officers met at Panmunjom for 30 minutes, and it was stated that the enemy officers answered questions on the location of prisoner of war camps.

2nd April.—The enemy liaison officers handed a letter to the U.N. representatives from the Chinese and North Korean commanders agreeing to meet on 6th April to discuss the exchange of disabled prisoners of war, and to decide on a date for resuming armistice negotiations. It was also reported that the U.N. disabled prisoners of war would be first accommodated in a reception camp which was being erected near Munsan.

3rd and 4th April.—No event of importance was reported.

5th April.—At a brief meeting at Panmunjom, the U.N. liaison officers delivered a letter from General Mark Clark asking the enemy commanders to submit a detailed plan for settling the entire question of repatriating prisoners of war, so that it could be studied while the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners was effected.

6th April.—At Panmunjom, where the U.N. representatives submitted a nine-point plan including a provision for the delivery of 500 sick and wounded prisoners of war a day, and references to categories of prisoners by the enemy representatives caused some difficulties, some progress was made.

Patrol activity not far from Panmunjom resulted in fighting in which it was estimated that 35 Chinese were killed. Superfortresses bombed supply dumps near Pyongyang, and fighter-bombers destroyed over 100 enemy lorries. One MIG was brought down and two were damaged by U.S. Sabre jets.

7th April.—It was reported that substantial progress was made between the U.N. and enemy representatives at Panmunjom.

Fighting occurred in most sectors, mainly due to enemy probing attacks. U.S. Sabre jets shot down two MIG-15s, probably destroyed another, and damaged seven more.

8th April.—At Panmunjom, the U.N. and enemy representatives presented the totals of sick and wounded prisoners whom they were prepared to hand over as soon as agreement was reached. The U.N. offered to return a total of 5,800 (5,100 North Koreans and 700 Chinese), and the enemy offered a total of 600 (450 South Koreans and 150 other U.N. persons, including British). Rear-Admiral Daniel, the senior U.N. delegate, reserved the right to comment on these figures at a later date. Subsequently, staff officers discussed methods for the proposed exchange.

9th April.—The enemy representatives at Panmunjom indicated that they might be ready to sign an agreement on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war on 10th April.

Pyeongyang radio broadcast an announcement that six interned Britons and an Irish missionary, headed by Captain Vyvyan Holt, Minister in Seoul in 1950, had been released and had been handed over to Russian representatives at Antung in Manchuria for repatriation.

10th April.—Owing to last-minute delays in drafting and translation, the agreement on the exchange of disabled prisoners of war was not signed at Panmunjom. The enemy spokesman, Major-General Lee Sang Cho, said that of the 600 disabled persons his side would return, some 20 would be British Commonwealth, 120 Americans, 450 South Koreans, and the remainder would be Dutchmen, Greeks, Turks, and others.

A letter from General Nam Il, chief North Korean negotiator, addressed to the chief U.N. negotiator, was handed over and was said to contain a plan for the exchange of all prisoners of war, the only obstacle to the realization of an armistice.

11th April.—The formal agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war was signed at Panmunjom by the chiefs of the U.N. and enemy liaison groups.

12th April.—At a staff officers' meeting at Panmunjom, the enemy representatives said that they would start delivering U.N. sick and wounded prisoners to our side on 20th April. It was reported that the enemy would return 100 men a day for six days, while the U.N. command would return 500 men a day for 12 days.

Allied Sabre jets shot down seven, and possibly eight, MIG-15s over North-West Korea. An American pilot who had to bale out was rescued from the Yellow Sea by helicopter.

13th April.—U.N. and enemy staff officers met at Panmunjom to co-ordinate plans for the movement of disabled prisoners of war. An enemy staff officer said that apart from the 20 Britons, 120 Americans, and 450 South Koreans, there would be 15 more including Canadians, Australians, South Africans, Colombians, Dutchmen, Filipinos, Greeks, and Turks.

14th April.—The first convoy of sick and wounded prisoners of war left a camp in North Korea on its way to Panmunjom. Enemy staff officers said that it would be joined *en route* by two more groups of lorries from other camps.

It was reported that the British Commonwealth Division was back in the line after 10 weeks of training in reserve and that a fighting patrol of the 1st Battalion, The King's Regiment (Liverpool), had been in action.

15th April.—U.S. aircraft sighted and photographed North of Pyongyang two convoys of lorries presumed to be carrying disabled U.N. prisoners of war. Some 770 disabled enemy prisoners of war were moved from their island camp to Pusan where another 160 sick and wounded in hospital also awaited repatriation.

Reports stated that the enemy took advantage of the lull in the air war on the convoy routes to rush lorry loads along the same roads.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION¹

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

RUSSIA EASES THE TENSION

ON several occasions since its inception the Soviet Union has varied the international temperature to suit its own, often recondite, purposes. That Mr. Malenkov's régime, immediately after its assumption of power, would seek to turn off the heat, at any rate until it became established, could have been foreseen, because such a move was the plainest common-sense. No successor to Stalin would have been likely to find himself so firmly in the saddle that he could afford to strain still further the almost intolerable world-tensions of the last eight years. Thoroughly policed though Russia is, there are no doubt ways and means whereby a rival faction might secure Western support if a new Government did not lead the way in offers of conciliation.

How far the relaxation of tension is mere expediency can only be guessed, but the safest assumption is that it is entirely an expedient. To suppose otherwise would be to hold that the Marxist-Leninist line has been abandoned, which is in the highest degree unlikely. We may be certain that the main premise about the nature of capitalism expounded by Marx and Lenin still dominates Soviet thought, which means that Moscow will continue to watch for signs of the disintegration of the West through its 'contradictions' and will remain prepared to help in the process as chance and policy may combine to suggest.

EFFECTS ON THE WEST

It is probable, indeed, that even the conciliatory gestures made by Mr. Malenkov are expected by him to do the non-Communist world more harm than good. The West has held together less by good-will between its component parts—although good-will undoubtedly exists—than by the alarming acts and attitudes of the Soviet Union. One such act was the siege of Berlin. Another—and more decisive—was the propulsion of the North Koreans upon the invasion of South Korea. Had it not been for these ominous moves the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might never have enjoyed more than a nominal existence, and the citizens of the United States would almost certainly never have accepted responsibility for the huge rearmament programmes which have supervened upon Marshall Aid.

The hope of the Malenkov Government may be that the easing of tension will take the impulse out of Western co-operation and confront the United States with the problem of its own prodigious surpluses, now absorbed by rearmament in all its many forms, which even include the modernization of the Italian hotel industry. That hope should not be difficult to defeat. Cool heads rather than warm hearts must remain the order of the day. The best use to which the West can put the proffered respite would be the thinking out afresh of its design for living in this strange new modern world, because only by making secure the West's economic basis can the classical Communist dogma be confounded. Great Britain in particular has much to gain from a period of calm, because the alarms of the last few years have disguised the precariousness of her economic position, and prevented her from working out solutions for the basic problems with which she must grapple if she is to enjoy any future worthy of the name.

¹ As deduced from reports up to 20th April.

KOREAN DEADLOCK

To give verisimilitude to the new Soviet peace policy, Mr. Malenkov made three significant moves. One was to quash the preposterous convictions of the Moscow doctors, thereby placating Jewish opinion throughout the world. The second was to discuss with Great Britain methods of avoiding a repetition of the scandal caused by the shooting down of a British plane. The third, potentially the most important, was the offer to exchange badly wounded prisoners of war in Korea, followed by Russian support for a United Nations resolution stressing the desirability of a Korean armistice. It would be foolish to imagine that in taking such steps the Communist leadership has not meticulously considered its own best interests.

In Korea, for instance, the front is so firmly established that neither side can liquidate the position without incurring appalling losses, a state of affairs now as unrewarding to the Chinese as it is to the Western Powers. There was a time when it seemed possible that Mao Tse-tung would be able to use Communist strength in Korea as a lever to prize open the American hold on Formosa, but that is no longer practical politics. Hence the disposition of the Chinese to 'pull out,' after training many scores of thousands of North Koreans with a view to filling the gap. This means no more than that Korea has ceased, at any rate for the time, to be a decisive battlefield. It is not a weakening of the general Communist purpose.

THREAT TO INDO-CHINA

There may be much significance, for instance, in the report that units of the Chinese Communist 4th Field Army have already been withdrawn from Korea and sent to South China, where General Teng Hua, formerly deputy commander in Korea, is said to have been given the supreme command. This news should perhaps be read in conjunction with a disturbing *Pravda* leading article which made clear that Korean peace moves had no relevance to the situation in Indo-China. Here is a striking example of Soviet technique—the lessening of pressure in one theatre accompanied by the increase of pressure in another theatre.

The thinking behind this strategy is so clear-headed as to seem obvious. Now that no decision can be forced in Korea, that front must seem as arid to the Chinese as it has long seemed to the West. Hence the care taken by *Pravda* to point out that peace is certainly not to be regarded as "one and indivisible" as long as Indo-China remains to be won.

While Korea historically has been the key to Japan, Indo-China is undoubtedly the key to the whole of South-East Asia. There is no immediate probability that General Teng Hua will receive orders to cross the frontier, but in the event of a general war those orders would certainly be given, and in the meantime the concentration of forces in South China creates a threat of enormous potency.

It also gives encouragement to Viet-Minh, forty thousand of whose troops have been launched upon the invasion of Laos, thereby adding to the difficulties of the harassed French command. That an operation on such a scale should be possible after eight years of continuous French exertion is the measure of those difficulties. The indications are that the favourable trends secured by the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny have been reversed, and that General Teng Hua will consequently be able to 'sit pretty' in South China for many a long day to come.

THE MIDDLE EAST

THE SUEZ QUESTION

One of the results of Mr. Eden's visit to Washington was the State Department's offer of American good offices in the negotiations on the future of the Suez Canal defences. Egypt, although financially dependent upon the United States for most of her development plans, had no hesitation in rejecting the proposal, which would suggest, to say the least, that Washington did not see fit to bring any pressure to bear on Cairo.

Britain's intentions, in the event of no formula for international defence being found, are still a matter of speculation. When Major Saleh Salem was reported as saying in Khartoum that, after the evacuation of British troops, there would be no objection to British technicians remaining to help in the maintenance of the base, Press commentators in this Country seized upon the news as though it contained the basis of a possible solution. Since then Major Salem has denied the authenticity of the report. The Egyptian Government—if Mahmoud Fawzi, the Foreign Minister, has not also suffered from 'misreporting'—will make no concessions in advance, but insist that the defence of Egypt is the sole concern of Egypt—in other words, that there must be "evacuation without conditions." In that event there would seem to be no need of talks; all that would be required would be the drawing-up by the Egyptian Government of a departure time-table. The problem, let us hope, is not as simple as all that.

LONG-RANGE STRATEGY

Considerations of the short-range defence of Middle Eastern communications are the province of the military rather than of the political mind, but perhaps a word may be said here about long-range defence in the atomic, supersonic age into which we are now passing. A Comet airliner now flies from Johannesburg to London in less than twenty-four hours. What speeds will be reached ten or twenty years hence probably cannot be foretold by even the greatest experts. It is certain, however, that the main defence in the future will have to be broad-based far from the areas of vulnerability.

This must give a special strategical importance to events now taking place in Central Africa. As a result of the referendum in Southern Rhodesia, legislative action in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and approval in principle by both Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom, these African territories will be federated in the near future, forming yet another British nation. The result of political unification can only be an increased rate of economic expansion, leading to large-scale industrial development. It may well be that the new Central African Federation will be to Middle Eastern defence in the new age what Egypt was in the era which we are now rapidly leaving behind.

CENTRAL EUROPE

The stirrings of hope created in millions of hearts by Mr. Malenkov's expression of good-will, and by the very cordial responses to it from President Eisenhower and Mr. Churchill, welcome though they are, should not be allowed to obscure the hard fact that the differences between East and West remain as formidable as ever. Incurable optimists of the British Press are already winging their way back to the old theme of "One World," the deadliest delusion of our times and perhaps the idea which has landed us in most of our post-war difficulties. Before these professional optimists chirrup in print, they should explain precisely how they propose to deal with so seemingly intractable a problem as the German future.

One report asserts that the Soviet Control Commission in Eastern Germany has been ordered to prepare the way for a new set of Russian proposals, the three chief points of which are to be :—(1) Free all-German elections under international supervision ; (2) The free Government of a reunited Germany to recognize the existing Polish-German frontier ; (3) A reunited Germany to be free from all existing obligations towards either East or West. To the superficial observer, this doubtless appears an eminently reasonable basis for agreement, whereas it begs every question. If the Soviet Union is now prepared to concede—except for the Polish boundary stipulation—full sovereignty to a reunited Germany, even though in the result it would be almost certain to lose its hold on Eastern German territory, then the leopard has indeed changed its spots and the bear its propensity to hug. That anything of the kind should be contemplated is frankly incredible.

WESTERN OBJECTIONS

Nor could the West accept the proposals without jeopardizing its entire defensive scheme in Europe. Whatever the final pattern of German relations may be, the annulment of Western Germany's present obligations to the West would re-create in Central Europe the gigantic power-vacuum which Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn have been at such pains to fill. Some may argue that a reunited Germany would be free to enter into a new contractual relationship, but were any move in that direction to be made, the chances are overwhelmingly that Russia within twenty-four hours would re-occupy her abandoned zone and again mount guard on the banks of the Elbe.

Dr. Adenauer, in a somewhat similar context, made the pertinent observation that if there were to be an evacuation of all foreign troops from Germany, the American troops would have a very long way to go home, whereas the Russians would be under no necessity to withdraw further than western Poland. The menace of the 300 Communist divisions would remain. Problems of such gravity—and the future of Germany is perhaps the gravest problem that mankind has been called upon to solve—certainly cannot be banished by blithe talk of "One World."

N.A.T.O. DIFFICULTIES

Even during the period of maximum tension, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization failed to fulfil their explicit undertakings about national contributions to the common pool. The present United States President, when Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, his successor, General Ridgway, and Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, have all called attention to the seriousness of these unfulfilled commitments. Marshal Juin, Commander-in-Chief of land forces, now issues a no less stern warning that had all objectives been reached they would still be "well below the necessary requirements," whereas those objectives were far from having been reached. The effect, he declares, is that there has been incurred the grave risk of "a battle inevitably lost, invasion of the homeland, and the adoption of a so-called peripheral strategy."

If there is now to be a period of lesser tension, which Soviet policy seems to indicate, the gap between promise and fulfilment is almost certain to be widened, thus greatly increasing the risk of which Marshal Juin spoke. The moral would seem to be inescapable. Those nations which have a more highly developed sense of their obligations must ensure that their own defence plans are not unduly exposed to the dangers which arise when Allied commitments are not met. Ultimately, although the earth be covered with a network of alliances, the defence of a nation remains that nation's specific responsibility.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

THE CASE FOR PLANNED MASS MIGRATION FROM BRITAIN TO THE DOMINIONS

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—The case presented by Squadron Leader Swift in his article on the planned mass migration from Britain to the Dominions, published in your November, 1952, JOURNAL,¹ is full of logic and common sense. There lies the key to the future, and continued greatness of the British race. Yet the human factor, or vested interests, or political trepidation, or all combined are preventing the development of the plan. The problem is, therefore, how to overcome the inertia resulting from these factors, and to get Britain's surplus population on the move before it is too late. A parallel problem seems to be how to prevent an influx of displaced persons from counter-balancing the migration.

Squadron Leader Swift presents the case from Britain's point of view. It is equally important for the sister nations of the Commonwealth. They have vast real or potential wealth, the development of which is prevented by lack of manpower or of money. That wealth tempts aggressor nations, whether they are or are not behind the Iron Curtain. In the present world situation there is much penetration of Commonwealth countries by foreign capital and industrial interests, and the more firmly they become established the less welcome will there be for British enterprise. Should hot war come, the isolation of these countries, and their weakness in manpower and war industries would make them easy prey for a powerful aggressor. Alternatively, they might be saved by absorption into the American system, whereby their Commonwealth links would be severed.

On two points I question the views expressed by Squadron Leader Swift. He states that a proportion of the national and international debt would have to be transferred with the emigrants. The younger nations of the Commonwealth need great sums of money to establish their immigrants and the industries on which they will work. Therefore they require not debts but loans, and the proposal to transfer the former would frustrate the plan. A factor to be considered in this connection is the stimulation of Britain's export trade as a result of the migration, so that much of the money loaned would return to pay for the exports.

In another paragraph, Squadron Leader Swift suggests that South Africa may not want British men and women. This is not my experience, nor that of many thousands who have settled in the Union since the war. Provided that the immigrant is one who 'gets on with the job,' he or she is as welcome here as in Canada, or Australia, or New Zealand.

T. SCOTT,

Major-General, I.A. (Retired).

20th January, 1953.

GREECE AND CRETE, 1940-41 : REQUEST FOR PHOTOGRAPHS

SIR,—May I ask you to be kind enough to insert this letter in your correspondence column, inviting the assistance of any sailors, soldiers, or airmen in my search for photographs of the 1940-41 battles in Greece and Crete.

I am particularly anxious to obtain photographs illustrating the terrain on the Albanian and Macedonian fronts, the retreat from Larissa to the Thermopylae Line, any

¹ Page 579.

action at the front in Greece or Crete, the destruction at the Piræus, the sea battles, including strikes on enemy aircraft or on our own ships, and the air war. The official material available is very limited and, although books and publications dealing with this period have included several good photographs, I feel there must also be a wide selection of excellent photographs taken by those who were present during these fateful sea, land, and air battles. I hope very much that I shall be able to include a selection of these in a study of the main sea, land, and air operations, which is now almost complete and, for better or for worse, will shortly be in the hands of my publishers.

I will be most grateful for the co-operation of your readers in my quest, and I will naturally acknowledge and in due course return all photographs and negatives received. I would ask that they should be sent to me at the above address [Air Ministry, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall. S.W.1].

J. R. GORDON-FINLAYSON,

Group Captain.

18th March, 1953.

NAPALM

SIR,—I have only recently had leisure to peruse my copy of the JOURNAL for February, and my attention has been caught by a statement on page 84 which may well mislead some readers.

Although I fully appreciate that in quoting Albert Speer's statement that the respirator affords no protection against Tabun and Sarin your contributor was relying on Speer's *ipsissima verba*, I feel very strongly that this should have been accompanied by a footnote pointing out that this was inaccurate as it stands. As is well known in both military and scientific circles the existing types of respirators provide complete protection against all nerve gases in vapour form, although it is true that (as in the case of Blister gases) the skin is vulnerable to the gas in liquid form. It cannot, however, be said that the respirator gives no protection at all.

G. K. STRUGNELL,

Major.

8th April, 1953.

MARCH DISCIPLINE

SIR,—My letter about the genesis of march discipline, which you kindly published in your last number², brought many replies. Two facts are established :—

(1) In 1906, when at Colchester, the 2nd Northamptonshire Regiment, as recorded in its history, introduced "a new formation for route marching. . . . All officers and supernumeraries who previously had marched on the flank were covered off in the column of fours, and the ranks were kept strictly closed up forming a narrow compact body moving on the left side of the road."

(2) At the General Staff Conference at Camberley in January, 1912, it was discussed whether the newly introduced 10 minutes halt per hour should begin at 10 minutes to the hour, or at the hour. This seems to indicate that it was a novelty in 1912.

Several of my correspondents referred me to the Standing Orders of Crawford's Light Division in the Peninsula for the origin of march discipline. These were published in 1814, after his death, by Major Campbell and Captain Shawe (no initials), two of his staff. They are, however, almost entirely concerned with administration; the section "Of the March" deals with stations of officers, silence, marching at ease, halting at sound of bugle, closing up. The last paragraph touches the periodic halt; it runs :— "When the brigade is marching independently of any other, the O.C. the leading regiment will sound the Halt half an hour after marching off, and afterwards once an hour; each

² See JOURNAL for February, 1953, p. 129.

halt to last at least five minutes after the men have piled arms; if a longer halt is thought necessary, the O.C. Brigade will direct it." There are directions about men who fall out, but nothing about width of frontage, safety measures by day and night, or clearing up halting places.

Many standing orders seem to be founded on Crawford's, and mention the five minutes halt. Those of a very celebrated regiment, reprinted in 1911, practically reproduce "Of the March," with the addition that smoking is permitted after the first hour.

On the evidence of the late Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Snow, it would seem that the credit for the introduction of modern march discipline must be awarded to the late Colonel H. O'Donnell, The West Yorkshire Regiment.

J. E. EDMONDS,

Brigadier-General.

15th April, 1953.

COMBINED OPERATIONS, 1939-1945

SIR,—It is surprising that an article under the heading of "Combined Operations, 1939-1945"³ should be written without ever mentioning the names of any of the commanders-in-chief, or of any officer outside Combined Operations Headquarters. A young officer of the future could read this article and form quite a wrong impression of the responsibilities which C.O.H.Q. actually carried. Surely, as it is written, the title should have been "The Evolution and Functions of C.O.H.Q. during World War Two"? For this is what the article is really about, and a very rosy picture is painted—too rosy some may think.

Whatever the title, no account of the history of combined operations or of C.O.H.Q. is complete without the name of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey being mentioned, and of some acknowledgment being made of the immense work in combined operations performed by officers outside that organization who bore the chief responsibility.

When I returned from the Middle East in early 1942, Admiral Ramsey asked me along to his office. He told me that he had been going into plans produced by C.O.H.Q. for an attack on the Pas de Calais, with (I believe I remember correctly) a total of some six divisions for re-entry into Europe, to take place that year. He totally disagreed with this plan. We spent a day going through the charts together, and he expressed the opinion that the neighbourhood of the Cotentin Peninsula offered the best chances of success, but only when the forces available were adequate, which they certainly were not at the moment, in his opinion, for any re-entry into Europe, and could not be for some time. Later, he expressed to me serious doubts as to possibility of success in the C.O.H.Q. plan for the Dieppe raid, and thought losses would be very heavy in the frontal attack decided on unless far more gunfire from seaward was available. This, after all, was the great lesson of Gallipoli. He at least did not regard C.O.H.Q. as the oracle, which Admiral Horan's article seems to suggest.

He also did not approve the organization of C.O.H.Q., saying that it was a mistake for C.O.H.Q. to have its own planning and intelligence staffs which tended to short-circuit the Joint Planning and Joint Intelligence organizations, who must be responsible for advising the Chiefs of Staff Committee. While it will be agreed that C.O.H.Q. under Admiral Mountbatten, with his remarkable energy and enterprise, did invaluable work in developing landing technique, producing craft, training personnel, preparing the United Kingdom as a base for "Overlord," converting ships to headquarters ships, and many other things and, moreover, to their credit did this in the time available, there were at some periods weaknesses which, however excusable, should be recognized in order that they may not be repeated. It seems a pity that this article did not recognize these

See JOURNAL for February, 1953, p. 55.

frankly. With regard to the no doubt too hastily formed C.O.H.Q. Intelligence Staff, I had personal experience of this in 1942 when I was Senior Naval Officer of the forces preparing and rehearsing for the Dieppe raid, which should have come off in the first week in July, but had to be cancelled owing to a week's gale about Zero day. This Intelligence Staff, on which I was expected to rely, simply did not function so far as the Naval Force was concerned, though it improved right at the last minute. This would have been a most serious handicap in an operation of this type, had I not gone direct to the N.I.D.

The remark in the article about Kabret in the Suez Canal area requires correcting. This Combined Operations Centre did not, as stated, follow the same organization adopted by Admiral Mountbatten in C.O.H.Q. Kabret was started as a Combined Training Centre late in 1940 and was reinforced early in 1941 by the naval forces and commandos assembled for an attack on the island of Rhodes, which had to be cancelled owing to our resources being switched to take the Army into Greece. Later in 1941, we obtained the syllabus of instruction from C.O.H.Q., and after expanding this used it for training in order to obtain a common doctrine with forces at home. This was some time before Admiral Mountbatten became C.C.O.

The activities of the Kabret Training Centre were directed generally by a flag officer (later styled Director of Opposed Landings), a brigadier, and a group captain with offices in and forming part of M.E.H.Q. in Cairo. These three officers also formed a committee to advise the commanders-in-chief on combined operations, planning, and working with the established Operation and Intelligence Departments. The whole organization, anyhow up to late 1943, was entirely different from C.O.H.Q. at home; and the weak point here possibly was that D.O.L. had no executive authority. A large number of naval officers and ratings received a very thorough training at Kabret in combined operations, and many army officers went through the course, including practically the whole New Zealand Division, and realistic rehearsals took place on a large scale. The evacuation of the British Army from beaches in Greece, a combined operation in reverse, and the planning for the attack on Rhodes, gave our personnel valuable experience. On my return to the U.K. early in 1942, it was satisfactory to find that Kabret was certainly ahead in landing craft technique, and quite up to the home standard in other matters. Our facilities on the Bitter Lakes were very good, though handicapped by shortage of equipment.

With regard to the statement as to the fitting out of ships for "Torch," there was a flag officer (appointed from C.O.H.Q.) stationed at Largs with the overall responsibility for fitting out and making alterations to all vessels leaving the Clyde engaged in "Torch."

I am unaware what the present organization of Combined Operations is, or what is visualized in case of war, but if lessons are to be learned, and if we are to benefit by experience dearly bought, we must not lull ourselves into the belief that C.O.H.Q. throughout its existence was a model to be taken for the future, as the article would seem to imply.

It should be added that while C.O.H.Q. used to lend out individual planners to commanders-in-chief before an operation, who were very useful as to details of landing craft, landing ships, beach information, etc., these planners never at any time had any responsibilities for mounting and conducting an operation (except raids); that responsibility always had to be borne by the commander-in-chief concerned through his own planning and operational staffs, which thus made rather nonsense of C.O.H.Q. having these staffs duplicated.

H. T. BAILLIE-GROHMAN,

Vice-Admiral (Retired).

*Formerly Flag Officer Attached Middle East and
Director of Opposed Landings, Middle East.*

19th April, 1953.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

N.A.T.O. EXPENSES.—The Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued the following figures on 12th March showing the defence expenditure of the member countries of the N.A.T.O. during the past four years. The figures, which are given in terms of current prices, refer to the N.A.T.O. year (which ends on 30th June) and are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars :—

| | | 1949-50 | 1950-51 | 1951-52 | 1952-53 |
|-------------------|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Belgium | | 155.04 | 196.95 | 346.56 | 483.82 |
| Canada (a) | | 441.20 | 763.30 | 1,643.40 | 2,125.70 |
| Denmark | | 53.00 | 56.04 | 87.75 | 131.33 |
| France | | 1,458.20 | 2,041.00 | 3,219.88 | 4,047.02 |
| Greece | | 124.09 | 172.16 | 203.96 | 206.18 |
| Italy | | 520.29 | 613.33 | 813.06 | 996.51 |
| Luxemburg | | 2.79 | 4.15 | 8.16 | 9.82 |
| Netherlands | | 230.83 | 228.45 | 309.80 | 423.75 |
| Norway... | | 49.59 | 67.07 | 96.22 | 146.13 |
| Portugal | | 45.66 | 48.06 | 50.91 | 75.83 |
| Turkey | | 274.35 | 284.27 | 315.99 | 324.13 |
| United Kingdom | | 2,450.00 | 2,750.00 | 4,095.00 | 4,995.00 |
| United States (b) | | 12,809.00 | 21,947.00 | 43,374.00 | 49,500.00 |

(a) National fiscal year April-March.

(b) This does not include economic aid for defence support assistance (the amount of which in 1952-53 will be approximately \$1,000 million for N.A.T.O. countries). Most of the local currency counterpart of current defence assistance from the U.S.A. is included in the figures for recipient N.A.T.O. countries.

Iceland, the 14th N.A.T.O. member country, has no military budget and is therefore not included in the table.

MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND.—The new N.A.T.O. command "Allied Forces, Mediterranean," of which Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma is the first Commander-in-Chief with headquarters in Malta, became operational on 15th March.

EXERCISE "CPX2."—This exercise, which was attended by some 90 senior commanders and staff officers of the forces of the N.A.T.O., took place at Supreme Headquarters, near Paris, from 9th to 13th March, under the direction of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. The exercise was of the indoor type and took place in an amphitheatre. The purpose of the exercise was stated to be "the study of certain problems that might be encountered in the defence of Europe." Exercise "CPX1" took place from 7th to 11th April, 1952.

ALLIED EXERCISE IN THE KIEL AREA.—British, Danish, and Norwegian troops joined in a defensive exercise in the Schleswig-Kiel-Neumünster area from 15th to 21st March. About 8,000 troops took part.

GREAT BRITAIN

CORONATION PROCESSIONS

Her Majesty The Queen has approved the appointment of Field-Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke to command all troops on parade in London on Coronation Day. The Deputy Commander of the parade will be Major-General J. A. Gascoigne, G.O.C., London District, and Major-General Commanding Household Brigade. The Processions will be marshalled by some 60 army officers assisted by officers of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force under the Chief Marshal, Colonel W. A. G. Burns, Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding the Coldstream Guards.

The total number of officers and men taking part in the Coronation Parade, either in the Procession or lining the streets, will be 29,200. Of these, 26,700 will be drawn from the United Kingdom (3,600 Royal Navy, 16,100 Army, and 7,000 Royal Air Force), 2,000 will be drawn from overseas countries of the Commonwealth, and 500 from the Colonies. The total number of troops marching in the Procession to the Abbey will be 1,250. In the Procession from the Abbey there will be 9,400, of whom 4,400 will be drawn from the British Army. These figures exclude bands. Of a total of 15,800 officers and men lining the streets, the British Army will provide 8,800. In addition to the processional and street lining troops some 6,700 reserve and administrative troops will be employed on Coronation duties in London, and 1,000 officers and men of the Corps of Royal Military Police will be on duty to assist the Metropolitan Police.

Her Majesty's Procession to the Abbey will be preceded by smaller processions. Escorts of the Household Cavalry will escort the processions of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother, and of members of the Royal Family.

At past Coronations the Sovereign has been escorted to the Abbey by a mounted procession representative of all the Cavalry Regiments of the British Army. The mechanization of the Army since 1937 has made it impossible to continue this tradition, and the Procession to the Abbey will, instead, be confined to Household troops who will be fulfilling the role of a personal escort to Her Majesty on the way to her Coronation. The major units in this Procession will be Sovereign's Escorts of the Household Cavalry, the King's Troop, R.H.A., and 1,000 officers and men of the Brigade of Guards. The mounted band of the Royal Horse Guards (The Blues) and the bands of the Grenadier Guards, Irish Guards, and Welsh Guards will march in the Procession. This will also include mounted escorts from the overseas countries of the Commonwealth and the Colonies, Field-Marsals, the Army Council, General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of Home Commands, and officers who are members of Her Majesty's personal entourage.

This Procession will form up in The Mall shortly before Her Majesty leaves Buckingham Palace for the Abbey. It will go via The Mall, Trafalgar Square, Northumberland Avenue, The Embankment, Bridge Street, and the North and West sides of Parliament Square to Westminster Abbey, where Her Majesty's coach is due to arrive at 11 a.m., 34 minutes after leaving Buckingham Palace.

On the return journey from Westminster Abbey to Buckingham Palace, the Procession, which will not be materially changed, will be preceded by a procession representative of the fighting Services of all Her Majesty's Realms. This Procession will be, in the main, dismounted and, including the bands which will march in six groups each of four bands, will consist of approximately 10,000 officers and men.

At the head of the Procession behind a group of army bands will march Commonwealth and Colonial Contingents. Behind these will march another group of bands followed by the Royal Air Force block. Behind the Royal Air Force block will come the British Army block in which every arm and branch of the Service will be represented. The Royal Navy as the senior Service will march behind the Army.

The Home Guard will lead the Army block. They will be followed by representative detachments from the University Training Corps and officer cadets from the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the Officer Cadet Schools. These will be followed by detachments from the Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps and the Women's Royal Army Corps (including Territorial Army), who will be followed by two groups of officers and men representative of the specialist Corps and Services of the Regular and Territorial Armies and Army Emergency Reserve. Next will come a group of officers and other ranks drawn from each infantry battalion of the Territorial Army. The Regular Infantry will follow, each of the 75 regiments being represented by three officers and seven other ranks. They will march in ranks of 10 with their Regimental Colours borne in the centre of each rank. The Brigade of Gurkhas, which is now an integral part of the British Army, will be represented in this group. Following the infantry group will

be contingents (Regular and Territorial) of the Royal Corps of Signals, the Corps of Royal Engineers, and the Royal Artillery. These detachments will be followed by representative detachments from all the regiments of the Royal Armoured Corps. The last group will consist of dismounted detachments of officers and men of The Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards.

On the route of the Procession to the Abbey, The Mall from Buckingham Palace to Horse Guards, Approach Road, will be lined by the Brigade of Guards and officer cadets from the R.M.A., Sandhurst, will line a portion of Parliament Square. On the route of the Procession from the Abbey the British Army will line Pall Mall, St. James's Street, Piccadilly, Hyde Park Corner, East Carriage Drive, Marble Arch, and part of Oxford Street. Altogether 8,800 troops of the Regular, the Army Emergency Reserve, and Territorial Army will be engaged in street lining. The Queen's Colour of each Territorial Army infantry battalion will be with their street lining detachments.

Troops of the Household Brigade and the King's Troop, R.H.A., will wear full dress uniform. All other troops of the British Army on parade, including the dismounted members of the Household Cavalry marching in the Procession from the Abbey, but excluding the Home Guard who will be wearing battledress, will wear the Army's new No. 1 dress.

There will be 27 bands in the Processions, and in addition there will be 20 bands stationed at points along the route. Of these the British Army will have 19 bands in the Processions and 12 along the route, the remainder being provided by the other Services. The processional bands will include massed Pipe bands drawn from Scottish and Irish Regiments, the Brigade of Gurkhas, and the Pakistan Army.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1953-54

The Government's Defence Estimates for 1953-54, providing for a total expenditure of £1,636,760,000, or £174,560,000 more than the original Defence Estimates for 1952-53 and £123,260,000 more than the total of the original and supplementary estimates for that year, were published as a White Paper on 18th February. The 1953-54 total included provisions for the expenditure of £140,000,000 from sterling 'counterpart' funds in respect of U.S. defence support aid, the comparable figure of sterling 'counterpart' releases in 1952-53 having been £85,000,000. About one-third of the increase in the defence budget was attributed to higher costs. In spite of the curtailment of production plans, the expenditure on defence production in 1953-54 was expected to be about £650,000,000, or slightly more than in 1952-53, with a further £100,000,000 to be spent on research.

Detailed estimates of gross defence expenditure in 1953-54, with the probable actual expenditure in the year ended 31st March, 1953 (not allowing for 'counterpart' fund receipts), were as follows :—

| | 1953-54 | 1952-53 |
|-------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | £ | £ |
| Admiralty | 364,500,000 | 360,300,000 |
| War Office | 581,000,000 | 556,500,000 |
| Air Ministry | 548,000,000 | 467,600,000 |
| Ministry of Supply ... | 123,750,000 | 111,800,000 |
| Ministry of Defence ... | 19,510,000 | 17,300,000 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| | £1,636,760,000 | £1,513,500,000 |

The White Paper also announced important Government decisions about the future of National Service and the liability of reservists, as follows :—

- (1) The present National Service scheme, due to lapse at the end of 1953, would be extended for a further five years.
- (2) The present period of two years' whole-time National Service would be continued.

(3) National Service men called up between 1st January, 1949, and 31st December, 1953, after having completed two years' whole-time service and 3½ years' part-time service in the Reserve, would remain registered for a further period of five years. During that time they would be liable to recall in a military emergency.

(4) The liability of Class "Z" and "G" reservists would be limited to recall in a military emergency, and would cease when they reached the age of 45.

Other important details given in the White Paper are summarized below :—

Manpower.—The estimated numbers of men and women in the Forces at 1st April, 1953, and 1st April, 1954, compared with the actual number at 1st April, 1952, were shown as follows :—

| | 1st April, 1953 | 1st April, 1954 | 1st April, 1952 |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Regulars | 541,700 | 552,500 | 521,800 |
| National Service men ... | 313,600 | 287,700 | 317,700 |
| Women | 24,500 | 26,200 | 23,200 |
| | <hr/> 879,800 | <hr/> 866,400 | <hr/> 862,700 |

The White Paper stated that, as a result of the entry into the Reserves of National Service men on completion of their full-time service, the size of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces had increased from 293,000 at the beginning of 1952 to about 427,000 by 1st January, 1953.

The Production Programme.—Emphasizing that the proposed expenditure of £650,000,000 on production was £200,000,000 less than it would have been if the three-year rearmament programme had been carried through in full, the White Paper explained that the reduction would be brought about by spreading deliveries of equipment over a longer period. The Government did not anticipate that the changes would cause labour redundancies on any considerable scale, and expected that the labour force in the aircraft industry, which had increased during 1952 from 177,000 to 206,000, would have to be still further increased as production of super-priority aircraft expanded. The total labour force expected to be engaged on production and on research and development during 1953 was given as about 850,000.

The White Paper stated that defence production was "unlikely to be substantially delayed by shortages of raw materials," since the improvement in supplies of many raw materials had enabled more rapid progress to be made with the acquisition of strategic materials than had been expected a year earlier.

U.S. Military Supplies.—Deliveries of military equipment by the U.S.A. under the Mutual Security Act were stated to have increased in volume during the past year, and were expected to increase still further in 1953-54. The largest item in 1952-53 had been spare parts, other items including bomber and anti-submarine aircraft, rocket launchers and rockets, electronic and engineering equipment, and specialist vehicles.

In conclusion, the White Paper explained that some of the manufacturing capacity released by modifications in the defence programme would be employed on the manufacture of war material for export, and that up to 1st February, 1953, U.S. 'offshore' orders placed in Britain for equipment and supplies for the U.S. forces and for transfer to other N.A.T.O. countries amounted to \$167,000,000, including \$89,000,000 for Centurion tanks.

DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The War Office announced on 5th February that during the joint British, American, French, and Canadian conference in Washington in the Summer of 1951, called at the suggestion of Canada, the adoption of a standard rifle along with production and further development of other small arms and ammunition was discussed. It was evident that

until the difference of opinion over the choice of a suitable round had been cleared up between the countries, no decision could be made on the adoption of a new rifle.

During the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in January, 1952, the adoption of a new rifle was again discussed but without any change in decisions previously taken.

For this reason it was agreed that the United Kingdom and the United States should retain their existing weapons, but that the development of new ammunition should continue at high research priority with a view to producing a round upon which standardization would be possible.

The Press reported recently that the standardization of small arms within the N.A.T.O. was under consideration. This study is in accordance with the decisions previously reached by the Standing Group. In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium are closely associated in this work. These three countries are co-operating together to produce, as soon as possible, a new round which will meet the requirements of the N.A.T.O. forces. An important feature of this work is that although the United Kingdom, Canada, and Belgium on the one hand, and the United States on the other, are developing rounds of different calibres, the overall length of the complete cartridge will be the same.

At the same time, new weapons are being considered so that a modern rifle will be ready immediately the new ammunition has been adopted. Because the overall length of the rounds under development is the same, whatever ammunition is adopted, the rifles considered by each of the four countries may be easily adapted for firing the new standard round.

CIVIL DEFENCE

NEW TRAINING BOOKLET.—A "Central War Room," in which information affecting all departments with civil defence responsibilities will be collected and collated, is to be established by the Government.

A new Civil Defence training booklet, issued on 24th February, entitled "Headquarters Section," states that advice and information will be distributed from the war room and directions given on such matters as inter-regional reinforcements.

In the event of war, a regional commissioner will be appointed for each of the 11 Civil Defence regions in England and Wales, whose task will be to co-ordinate Civil Defence measures throughout the region.

Regional headquarters will be linked to group and corps authority controls and the central Government. To it will be accredited representatives of all the departments concerned with Civil Defence, including an officer of the Ministry of Health dealing with casualty services, and representatives of the police and fire services and of military commands. In each county and county borough, control centres will be established which will report to regional headquarters.

The London region will consist of four sub-regions, each under a deputy regional commissioner. They will be sub-divided into groups (two of which will have sub-groups) under group controllers. The constituent authorities in these groups and sub-groups will comprise the City, Metropolitan borough, and county boroughs, and certain county districts of Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Essex, Kent, and Surrey.

The booklet is pamphlet No. 4 in the Manual of Basic Training, volume 1, and is published by the Stationery Office at 1s. 6d.

STRENGTHS, CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS, SPECIAL CONSTABULARY, AND NATIONAL HOSPITAL SERVICE RESERVE.—The Home Office announced on 22nd January that since recruiting opened on 15th November, 1949, 238,010¹ men and women had joined the Civil Defence Corps in England and Wales. The total included 119,415 women. The figures

¹ This figure was reported to have increased to 253,940 by the end of February.

for the Special Constabulary were 26,987 men and 915 women since 1949, and more than 10,000 recruits joined the National Hospital Service Reserve in 1952.

SOLDIERS, SAILORS, AND AIRMEN'S FAMILIES ASSOCIATION

Lieut.-General Sir Reginald F. S. Denning, K.B.E., C.B., has accepted an invitation to become chairman of the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen's Families Association, in succession to General Sir Mosley Mayne, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., who retired in December.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

CORONATION CONTINGENT.—Canada's Coronation Contingent will consist of 736 officers and men. Of these, 400 will be drawn from the active forces in Canada, England, France, and Germany. From reserve forces 336 will represent units of the Navy, Army, and Air Force and will line the streets round Canada House.

VISIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY.—Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery visited Canada from 15th to 24th April. During his stay he saw military establishments at Ottawa, Kingston, Hamilton, Quebec City, and Montreal, and addressed officers of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Army Staff College.

AUSTRALIA

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF RECRUITING

Major-General R. Kendall, C.B.E., has been appointed Director-General of Recruiting in succession to Lieut.-General Sir Horace Robertson, K.B.E., D.S.O., who has succeeded Lieut.-General H. Wells, C.B.E., D.S.O., as G.O.C., Southern Command.

FOREIGN

EASTERN EUROPE

STRENGTH OF BULGARIAN, HUNGARIAN, AND RUMANIAN FORCES

The British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nutting, in a written reply on 14th February, gave the following estimates of the strength of the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, as compared with the limits imposed under the peace treaties with those countries :—

| | | <i>Peace Treaty</i> | <i>Estimate</i> | <i>Present</i> |
|----------|-----|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | | <i>Limits</i> | <i>25th July, 1951</i> | <i>Estimate</i> |
| Bulgaria | ... | 65,000 | 150,000 | 175,000 |
| Hungary | ... | 70,000 | 100,000 | 175,000 |
| Rumania | ... | 188,000 | 240,000 | 250,000 |

In addition, security troops and armed police, not permitted by the treaties, were estimated to total at least 150,000 in the three countries.

FRANCE

MINISTERIAL VISIT TO LONDON

The French Prime Minister, M. René Mayer, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, and the Minister for Economic Affairs, M. Buron, paid a two-day visit to London on 12th and 13th February during which they had conversations with Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, Field-Marshal Earl Alexander, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, on political, economic, and defence problems of common concern.

M. Mayer, when taking office in January, had told the French National Assembly that he desired as close an association as possible between Britain and the European

Defence Community, and had subsequently announced his intention of visiting London with M. Bidault at the earliest possible opportunity to discuss the matter with the British Government.

WESTERN GERMANY

INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF FRONTIER PROTECTION CORPS

The *Bundestag* adopted on 5th February a resolution moved by the Free Democratic and German parties requesting the Government to increase the Federal Frontier Protection Corps from 10,000 to 20,000 men. Dr. Mende, who moved the resolution as a matter of urgency, demanded an immediate vote without the matter being referred to any committee, declaring that it was essential to prevent any further loss of time in view of the impossibility of protecting the long frontier effectively with the present strength of the Corps, and having regard to the strength and armament of the East German para-military forces.

GREECE, TURKEY, AND YUGOSLAVIA

TRIPARTITE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION

A treaty of friendship and co-operation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was initiated in Athens on 25th February, and was formally signed in Ankara on 28th February by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, respectively M. Stephanopoulos and Professor Köprülü, and by M. Koca Popovitch, the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The treaty provided for close co-operation in the political, defence, economic, and cultural spheres.

ITALY

CAIRO VISIT BY ITALIAN DEFENCE MINISTER

The Italian Defence Minister, Signor Randolfo Pacciardi, accompanied by senior Italian officers, paid an official visit to Egypt from 2nd to 8th February at the invitation of General Neguib, with whom he had several discussions. Signor Pacciardi also had discussions with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, and other officials, visited Egyptian defence installations, and made contacts with members of the Italian colony.

On his return to Rome, Signor Pacciardi said that his discussions with General Neguib had been frank, friendly, and useful; expressed the opinion that the Egyptian armed forces would constitute an important element in the defence of the Middle East, and announced that Egypt would send missions to Italy to intensify the commercial, cultural, agricultural, and industrial relations between the two countries.

Before Signor Pacciardi's departure for Egypt, the Italian Foreign Ministry had announced that General Neguib had extended an invitation to Signor de Gasperi, the Prime Minister, who had had to decline because of pressure of Governmental duties. It was emphasized that Signor Pacciardi's mission would be in no way connected with the supply of arms to Egypt, that one of its purposes would be to re-establish contacts with the Italian colony in that country, and that Signor Pacciardi would also study the possibility of expanding Italo-Egyptian economic and trade relations.

KOREA

For a diary of the war in Korea, see page 282.

RUSSIA

DEATH OF MARSHAL STALIN

Marshal Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., and the dominant personality in Russian political life since the death of Lenin, died at the Kremlin in Moscow on 5th March. He was 73 years of age.

It was announced on 6th March that Marshal Voroshilov had been appointed President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet in place of M. Shvernik ; that M. Georgi Maximilianovich Malenkov had been appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) in succession to Marshal Stalin ; and that Marshal Bulganin had been appointed Army Minister with Marshals Vassilievsky and Zhukov as his deputies. M. Molotov was nominated as Foreign Secretary in place of M. Vyshinsky who was appointed permanent Soviet representative at the United Nations.

UNITED STATES

BUDGET, 1953-54.—On 9th January, President Truman submitted to Congress the United States Budget for the fiscal year 1954, i.e. 1st July, 1953, to 30th June, 1954, in which expenditure was estimated at \$78,587,000,000 and receipts at \$68,665,000,000 (on the basis of present taxation), leaving a net deficit of \$9,922,000,000. Of the total expenditure \$46,296,000,000 was for the armed Services and \$7,861,000,000 for international security and foreign relations, comparative figures being \$39,727,000,000 (actual) and \$5,268,000,000 (actual) for 1952, and \$44,380,000,000 (estimate) and \$6,035,000,000 (estimate) for 1953. The "recommended new obligational authority" for 1954, i.e. authority to enter into commitments for which payment will be made in subsequent years, was estimated at \$41,535,000,000 for the armed Services and \$8,011,000,000 for international security and foreign relations.

ATOMIC EXERCISE.—It was reported from New York on 19th April that some 2,000 U.S. Marines, including airborne detachments, took part on 18th April in an atomic exercise at the Nevada proving ground, after the explosion just before dawn of one of the most powerful nuclear devices ever used in these tests. It was again detonated on a 300-foot tower and the flash was faintly seen in Montana, 850 miles away.

The task of the Marines, who were entrenched about two and a half miles away, was to establish a beachhead in conditions of atomic warfare. Special units, carried in 40 helicopters, were landed in front of the advancing troops, and 12 volunteer officers were posted in six-foot trenches at an unstated distance from the explosion.

YUGOSLAVIA

BUDGET AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1953

Both Houses of the Yugoslav National Assembly unanimously adopted on 26th December the National Economic Plan and Federal Budget for 1953, which had been presented by the Government on the previous day.

The Federal Budget provided for a total expenditure of 229,100,000,000 dinars and a revenue of 178,425,000,000 dinars compared with expenditure estimates of 259,500,000,000 dinars and revenue estimates of 202,706,000,000 dinars in the 1952 Budget. Expenditure included 180,000,000,000 dinars for defence as against 200,000,000,000 dinars in 1952. It was proposed to cover the deficit partly out of reserves, partly by loan, and partly by foreign aid.

General Gosnjak, the Deputy Defence Minister, explaining the Defence Budget, said that three factors had made the reduction possible : (1) in order to ease the burden of national defence and to permit the completion in 1953 of certain key industrial projects, it had been decided to reduce the total number of troops under arms by cutting the three-year term of military service existing in some units to two years ; (2) the internal security forces would be disbanded and the frontier units hitherto included in this organization would pass to a new frontier command ; and (3) stockpiling of stores and equipment undertaken in 1952 would not be needed on the same scale in 1953 and, with the completion of several modern factories, new investment in the armament industry would be smaller.

NAVY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN MARY

On the death of H.M. Queen Mary, which occurred on 24th March, the following message of condolence was sent to H.M. The Queen :—

"The Board of Admiralty, The Royal Navy, and the Royal Marines with humble duty beg to tender to Your Majesty and the Royal Family their profound sympathy in the sad loss which Your Majesty and the Royal Family have sustained."

PERSONAL AIDE-DE-CAMP.—On 10th March, in pursuance of Her Majesty's pleasure, the following appointment was announced :—

Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., LL.D., D.C.L., D.Sc., to be Personal Aide-de-Camp to H.M. The Queen.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—The following officers have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 8th January, in place of the officers stated :—

Captain G. H. Oswald, in place of Captain St. J. Cronyn, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., placed on the Retired List.

Captain E. H. Shattock, O.B.E., in place of Captain J. H. Allison, D.S.O., A.D.C., placed on the Retired List.

Captain J. W. Grant, D.S.O., in place of Captain C. D. Howard-Johnston, D.S.O., D.S.C., A.D.C., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain C. T. Jellicoe, D.S.O., D.S.C., in place of Captain H. G. Cooke, A.D.C., placed on the Retired List.

Captain (Commodore) M. L. Power, C.B.E., D.S.O., in place of Captain B. I. Robertshaw, C.B.E., A.D.C., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain G. C. Colville, O.B.E., in place of Captain H. W. Biggs, D.S.O., A.D.C., promoted to Flag Rank.

Captain E. H. B. Baker, D.S.O., in place of Captain (Commodore) F. A. Ballance, D.S.O., A.D.C., promoted to Flag Rank.

ROYAL YACHT.—The Queen performed the naming ceremony of the hospital ship, to be used as a Royal Yacht during peacetime, on the afternoon of 16th April in the Clydeside yard of John Brown and Co., Ltd. Her Majesty named the ship *Britannia*.

PLYMOUTH COMMAND COLOUR.—Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother visited Plymouth on 18th March, and on behalf of the Queen presented to Plymouth Naval Command a Naval Colour bearing the cipher of Queen Elizabeth II.

H.R.H. THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH

The Duke of Edinburgh visited the base of the Royal Navy's Rhine Flotilla at Krefeld on 21st March. He went on board several of the craft. The squadron was formed in the Autumn of 1949 for the purpose of co-operating with the Army on the Rhine in the British Zone of Germany. It has a strength of some 200 officers and men, including Royal Marines, while some 55 officers and men of the Royal Belgian Navy work with the unit.

BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

FIRST LORD.—During a visit to France in January the First Lord, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, M.P., met General Matthew B. Ridgway at Supreme Headquarters; and at the British Embassy M. Pleven, French Minister of Defence, and M. Gavini, Secretary for the French Navy. During the month the First Lord also visited the Home Air Command at Lee-on-Solent, and Bristol and Avonmouth Docks.

On 23rd March, the First Lord and First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, inspected at Westminster Pier the new Deltic Diesel engines installed in the fast patrol boat 5212, a former German E-boat.

FIRST SEA LORD.—The First Sea Lord flew to Gibraltar on 28th February to attend the exercises by the combined Home and Mediterranean Fleets during their Spring cruises. He stayed in H.M.S. *Vanguard*, flagship of Admiral Sir George Creasy, and visited several other ships. On 8th March he left by air for Paris to attend a S.A.C.E.U.R. conference.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

THE NORE.—The Admiralty announced on 21st April that Admiral Sir Geoffrey Oliver, K.C.B., D.S.O., is to succeed Admiral the Hon. Sir Cyril Douglas-Pennant, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.S.C., as Commander-in-Chief, the Nore (May, 1953). Admiral Douglas-Pennant is relinquishing his appointment because of ill-health.

SECOND SEA LORD.—The Admiralty announced on 23rd April that Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., is to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel, in succession to Admiral Sir Alexander Madden, K.C.B., C.B.E., the appointment to take effect later in the year. The appointment of Vice-Admiral F. R. Parham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., as Second Sea Lord is cancelled on the grounds of ill-health.

HOME FLEET FLOTILLAS.—On 27th January, the appointment was announced of Rear-Admiral J. P. L. Reid, C.B., to the *Victory*, additional, for duty on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, for Coronation Naval Review; and to be Flag Officer (Flotillas), Home Fleet, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. G. A. Robson, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C. (August, 1953). On 1st April, the appointment of Rear-Admiral Reid to relieve Rear-Admiral Robson was cancelled. Rear-Admiral Reid is required for another appointment. Rear-Admiral J. W. Cuthbert, C.B., C.B.E., was appointed Flag Officer (Flotillas), Home Fleet, to succeed Rear-Admiral Robson at the end of July.

D.C.N.P. (M.P.).—Rear-Admiral M. W. St. L. Searle, C.B.E., appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Manpower Planning), in succession to Rear-Admiral R. S. Warne, C.B., C.B.E. (May, 1953).

FLYING TRAINING.—Rear-Admiral G. Willoughby appointed Flag Officer Flying Training, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. T. Couchman, D.S.O., O.B.E. (June, 1953).

MISSION IN GREECE.—Rear-Admiral W. H. Selby, D.S.C., appointed Head of the British Naval Mission in Greece, in succession to Rear-Admiral P. S. Smith, C.B., D.S.O. (June, 1953).

GROUND TRAINING.—Rear-Admiral A. D. Torlesse, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Flag Officer Ground Training, in succession to Rear-Admiral C. R. L. Parry, C.B., D.S.O. (May, 1953).

RESERVE FLEET.—Rear-Admiral I. M. R. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Flag Officer Commanding, Reserve Fleet, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Henry W. U. McCall, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (June, 1953).

HOME FLEET TRAINING.—Rear-Admiral W. L. G. Adams, O.B.E., appointed Flag Officer, Home Fleet Training Squadron, in succession to Vice-Admiral J. F. Stevens, C.B., C.B.E. (August, 1953).

DEPUTY CONTROLLER.—Rear-Admiral L. F. Durnford-Slater appointed Deputy Controller, in succession to Rear-Admiral J. W. Cuthbert, C.B., C.B.E. (June, 1953).

F.O.2, MEDITERRANEAN.—The following was announced to date 15th March :—Rear-Admiral W. W. Davis, C.B., D.S.O., Flag Officer (Air) Mediterranean and Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Mediterranean Station, to be Acting Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet while holding present appointment.

MEDITERRANEAN (N.A.T.O.).—Rear-Admiral P. G. L. Cazalet, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., appointed Allied Chief of Staff to Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the new N.A.T.O. Mediterranean Command.

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Admiral Sir Cecil H. J. Harcourt, G.B.E., K.C.B., placed on the Retired List (27th January, 1953).

Acting Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., LL.D., D.C.L., D.Sc., promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet (27th January, 1953).

Vice-Admiral Sir Richard V. Symonds-Tayler, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C. (Retired), promoted to Admiral on the Retired List (27th January, 1953).

Rear-Admiral A. Day, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet (27th January, 1953).

Rear-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, C.B., D.S.O., promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet (2nd February, 1953).

Rear-Admiral D. M. Lees, C.B., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (14th February, 1953).

Rear-Admiral P. V. McLaughlin, C.B., D.S.O., placed on the Retired List (23rd February, 1953).

Admiral Sir Herbert A. Packer, K.C.B., C.B.E., placed on the Retired List (18th March, 1953).

Vice-Admiral Sir Maurice J. Mansergh, K.C.B., C.B.E., promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet (18th March, 1953).

Vice-Admiral P. W. B. Brooking, C.B., D.S.O. (Retired), promoted to Admiral on the Retired List (18th March, 1953).

Rear-Admiral I. M. R. Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet (18th March, 1953).

Rear-Admiral (E) F. T. Mason, C.B., promoted Vice-Admiral (E) and to be Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet (28th April, 1953).

Captain (E) J. G. C. Given, C.B.E., promoted Rear-Admiral (E) and appointed Rear-Admiral (E) on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the Nore (14th April, 1953).

THE NAVY ESTIMATES

The Navy Estimates, 1953-54, were presented to Parliament on 26th February, with an explanatory statement by the First Lord, Mr. J. P. L. THOMAS. The sum asked for was £329,500,000, and to this will be added a sum of £35,000,000 to be provided by the United States of America as an appropriation in aid of contract expenditure on ships and aircraft. The total Navy Estimates amounting to £364,500,000 were £7,250,000 more than the provision in the original Estimates for the previous year (when there was an American appropriation of £25,000,000) or £4,250,000 more if allowance is made for the supplementary estimate presented to Parliament on 20th January, 1953.

The adjustment made in the naval programme following the decision of H.M. Government to spread rearmament expenditure over a longer period and to hold it to a

lower level is reflected in the Estimates, as also is the effect of higher prices and increases in pay and pensions. Almost half the Estimates—£157,600,000—are to be spent on production and research. Manpower is provided for to the limit of 151,000, but it is expected that there will be a substantial decline in this number as officers and men, recalled or retained beyond their normal time by the emergency legislation of 1950 following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, leave active service during the next 12 months.

In presenting the Navy Estimates to Parliament on 16th March, the First Lord said the emphasis on the new construction programme was concentrated on ships for mine-sweeping and anti-submarine duties, and on the progress and completion of aircraft carriers. A great part of the fleet to-day was of pre-war or of war-time construction, and a steady replacement by new construction was vital if it was to exist as an efficient and balanced fighting force. Of the research and development programme the First Lord said that we expect to spend roughly two-and-a-half times as much next year as we did two years ago on underwater weapons and on the development of electronic valves.

EXERCISES AND CRUISES

HOME FLEET.—Five British aircraft carriers took part in the Home Fleet's Spring cruise during which the Fleet was based at Gibraltar and operated in the Western Mediterranean. The flagship *Vanguard* and other heavy units left home ports on or about 20th January; flotillas assembled at Portland and left on 26th January. After taking part in combined exercises with the Mediterranean Fleet, eight ports in France, Spain, Portugal, Madeira, and Tangier were visited by ships of the Home Fleet between 17th and 25th March.

Exercise "RENDEZVOUS."—The Home and Mediterranean Fleets took part between 16th and 24th March in Exercise "Rendezvous," involving naval and air forces of six Allied nations. Under the overall direction of the new Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, the manoeuvres were conducted in three phases. The opening phase was under the direction of Admiral Sala, French Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. On 19th March this phase ended and control passed to Admiral Girosi, Commander of the Italian Maritime Zone. The third phase was directed by Admiral Cassady, Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet. The events of "Rendezvous" were linked together by the sailing of convoys from ports as far apart as Algiers and the Dardanelles. These convoys provided continuous targets for maritime and shore-based aircraft, submarines of all six nations, and Italian M.T.B.s. A major harbour defence exercise was carried out at Toulon. An amphibious landing rehearsal in phase two prepared the way for the final exercise, a naval amphibious operation involving softening-up by surface and air bombardments of the objective and other strategic military targets, underwater demolition, and minesweeping activities. Exercise "Rendezvous" thus took the form of a series of major naval exercises within an overall operational setting, and was organized by Admiral Carney, U.S.N., Commander-in-Chief, South, before Admiral Lord Mountbatten had taken over his new N.A.T.O. Command.

EXERCISE "RAMPART."—During the week from 2nd to 6th March, the Ministry of Transport carried out an exercise to which the name "Rampart" was given, to test the organization which in war-time would be responsible for determining the destination of ships inward-bound to the United Kingdom. A port officer drawn from each port area of the Country took part in the exercise and was in direct telephonic communication with a 'linked' officer in his area. Many of those taking part in the exercise worked during the last war in the Ships' Diversion Room. Several N.A.T.O. countries and N.A.T.O. commands sent representatives to watch the exercise.

VISIT OF MARSHAL TITO

Marshal Tito, President of Yugoslavia, visited England in March in the Yugoslav naval vessel *Galeb*. He was escorted by ships of the Royal Navy from the vicinity of

Malta. Arriving at the Nore on the 16th the escort of destroyers was relieved by four fast patrol craft of the Royal Navy, which accompanied the *Galeb* up the Thames to Greenwich, where the Marshal embarked in a launch of the Port of London Authority. Accompanied by the four patrol craft he proceeded to Westminster Pier, where he was received by the Duke of Edinburgh, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Eden, and a Royal Naval Guard and Band. On his return on 20th March, the *Galeb* was escorted down river by fast patrol craft, and after reaching the Nore the escort was taken over by destroyers for the passage down Channel and to the Mediterranean.

PERSONNEL

MINEWATCHING UNIFORM.—Distinctive uniforms are being issued to members of the Royal Naval Minewatching Service, which has now reached an enrolled strength of nearly 3,000 men and women. Approved by The Queen last year, the uniform consists of a navy blue battledress with skirts for women volunteers and beret with the R.N.M.W.S. badge, shoulder flashes, and badges of rank. Black shoes with stockings for women and boots for men are also being issued. The badge consists of a silver splash on a blue ground, with two silver waves below, the whole encircled by gold rope and surmounted by a naval crown in gold.

MERCHANT NAVY LIAISON.—Some 35 naval officers of the ranks of lieutenant-commander and lieutenant had up to the end of February taken part in a scheme to maintain and improve liaison between the Royal and Merchant Navies. The officers have been attached as liaison officers for short periods to a variety of merchant ships ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 tons. During attachment they sign on as supernumerary deck officers for a nominal sum and in all respects become members of the ship's company. The scheme, sponsored by the Admiralty, has had the whole-hearted support of the shipping industry and serves a most useful purpose in cementing the close friendship of the war years between the two Services.

LOTT FUND FOR INVENTORS.—The Admiralty has issued a Fleet Order encouraging naval personnel to submit inventions and suggestions aimed at the improvement of the fighting efficiency of the Fleet. In suitable cases awards will be made from the Herbert Lott Naval Trust Fund which has an income of more than £5,000 a year. One of the purposes of the fund is to make awards to officers and men who contribute in signal degree to the improvement of the fighting appliances of the Naval or Marine Forces of Her Majesty.

MATERIEL

CARRIER LAUNCHED.—The aircraft carrier *Hermes* was launched by Vickers-Armstrongs on 16th February, the naming ceremony being performed by Mrs. Winston Churchill. The *Hermes* is the last of four ships of her class to be launched; the *Centaur* and *Albion* are expected to be completed this year and the *Bulwark* by early next year.

MINESWEEPERS.—The coastal minesweeper *Alcaston* was launched by Messrs. Thornycroft at Woolston on 5th January; and the *Bronington* by Messrs. Cook, Welton, and Gemmell at Grovehill, Beverley, on 19th March. The inshore minesweeper *Brigham* was launched by the Berthon Boat Co., of Lymington, on 17th January.

PATROL CRAFT.—The first operational warship powered by gas turbine engines, the patrol boat *Bold Pioneer*, was accepted by the Navy in January and has been undergoing trials from the Coastal Forces base at Gosport. The patrol boat *Gay Charger* was launched at the Teignmouth yard of Messrs. Morgan Giles on 12th February; and the *Gay Fencer* at the Clynder yard of Messrs. McGruer and Co. on 18th February. The *Gay Bombardier*, first of this class, was accepted by the Royal Navy from the builders, Messrs. Vosper Limited, Portsmouth, in the first week of April, following acceptance trials.

PLASTIC BOATS.—The Admiralty have been investigating the possibilities of the technique for building small boats of plastic material for several years, and have been keeping in close touch with developments in the U.S.A. About two years ago the

Admiralty purchased two fibreglass plastic dinghies. These have been subjected to trials, the results of which are fairly promising. Consequently it was decided to proceed with further investigations and to use the technique for boats of more complicated construction. Investigation into the technique is further encouraged by the hope that plastic boats may be free of ship worm in tropical waters and that trouble due to rot may be avoided.

NAVAL AVIATION

BOYD TROPHY.—The Boyd Trophy, presented annually for the most outstanding feat of aviation in the Royal Navy, has been awarded for 1952 jointly to Nos. 802 and 825 Squadrons for their operational achievements in the Korean war zone. It will be held by H.M.S. *Ocean*, light fleet carrier, from which their aircraft flew against Communist targets from May to October, 1952. The Trophy was formally presented at the R.N. air station, Lee-on-Solent, on 11th March by Rear-Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, formerly in command of the Commonwealth Forces in Korea.

AIR STATIONS AND HELICOPTERS.—In the Memorandum accompanying the Navy Estimates the First Lord stated that the modernization of our naval air stations has made considerable progress. Work on runway reconstruction and extension has been completed at two air stations while a third, formerly in reserve, was commissioned and is being developed to accept a major flying task. Two others are expected to reopen in 1953 on completion of work on their runways. The improvement of radio aids at naval air stations to provide for the operation of new types of aircraft continues and will be much helped by the receipt of equipment from the United States. All of the aircraft carriers in the active fleet have now been equipped with helicopters for search and rescue duties.

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

FLYING TIMES.—Flying times for the air squadrons of the R.N. Volunteer Reserve totalled 10,920 hours during the year ended 31st October, 1952, as compared with 9,056 hours during the previous year, an increase of 20.5 per cent.

TRAINING VOYAGE TO U.S.A.—Twenty-five officers and 175 ratings were embarked for sea training in the aircraft maintenance carrier *Perseus* during her passage from Portsmouth to the United States and back in March. The *Perseus* proceeded to take on certain equipment being provided under the Military Aid Programme, and accommodation was made available for the Reserves by the Commanding Officer, Captain P. C. S. T. Carey, R.N.

ROYAL MARINES

COLOURS AT GIBRALTAR.—The 57-year-old Colours of the Plymouth Division, Royal Marines, which were presented to the Plymouth Division, Royal Marine Light Infantry, in 1896 by Admiral of the Fleet the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, were laid up in the King's Chapel at Gibraltar at the end of February. The decision to lay up the Colours there was made because of the unbroken association of the Royal Marines with the Rock of Gibraltar, beginning with its capture in 1704. A scheme was started in 1948 to make the 400-year-old King's Chapel a shrine of units and regiments which took part in the capture of Gibraltar and the siege of 1779-1782. Already several army regiments have laid up Colours or made gifts to the Chapel, and it is particularly appropriate that the Colours of the Plymouth Division should be placed there, as Gibraltar is the only battle honour actually appearing on them.

VISIT OF U.S.M.C. BANDSMEN.—During his visit to this Country last year General L. C. Shephard, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, was so impressed by the bands of the Royal Marines that four bandsmen of the U.S. Marines have visited Portsmouth to study the parade and ceremonial technique of the R.M. Bands with the possible view to adopting their drumstick drill. The four bandsmen spent two weeks with the Portsmouth Group, Royal Marines, under the Director of Music, Major Vivian Dunn, M.V.O., A.R.A.M., R.M., and during their stay had an opportunity of leading Royal Marine bands at drill on the parade ground.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

AUSTRALIA

TWO CARRIERS

On 11th March, for the first time, two aircraft carriers of the Australian Fleet were present in Sydney Harbour. H.M.A.S. *Sydney* was at Garden Island getting ready to take the Coronation contingent to England. The second carrier, H.M.S. *Vengeance*, arrived on the last stage of her voyage from Britain to spend four years with the Australian Fleet, on loan from the Royal Navy, while a sister ship to the *Sydney* is being built.

CANADA

OBSERVER TRAINING.—The Admiralty announced on 1st April that a group of officers of the Royal Navy are now training as observers at H.M.C.S. *Shearwater*, a naval air station near Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. They are attending an observer school which was established by the Royal Canadian Navy last October.

A.C.N.S. (AIR).—Naval Appointments on 18th March showed that Captain W. L. M. Brown had been appointed as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Air) and as a member of the Canadian Naval Board, and had been granted the rank of Commodore, Second Class.

INDIA

NEW AIRCRAFT

The first of ten Sealand amphibian aircraft built for the Indian Navy by Short Brothers and Harland and Wolff in Northern Ireland was formally handed over at Rochester airport on 13th January by Rear-Admiral M. S. Slattery, Chairman of the manufacturing company, to Mr. P. V. R. Rao, Minister, High Commission of India.

PAKISTAN

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Vice-Admiral J. W. Jefford, who relinquished the post of Commander-in-Chief, Royal Pakistan Navy, on 31st January, was entertained at luncheon by the Pakistan Prime Minister on the previous day and presented with a silver salver as "a token of appreciation of the services rendered by him for the defence of this country."

SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. Sauer, Minister of Transport, on behalf of Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defence, who was indisposed, on 23rd February accepted for the South African Navy the former British destroyer *Whelp*, which he renamed *Simon Vanderstel*. This, with the *Jan Van Riebeeck*, purchased earlier from Britain, brings South Africa's destroyer strength to two.

FOREIGN

EGYPT

MINESWEEPER SUNK

The worst disaster in the history of the Egyptian Navy occurred on 8th March, when 53 members of the crew of the minesweeper *Sollum* lost their lives when the ship sank during a gale about 12 miles from Alexandria. Sixty-two were rescued by the Polish cargo ship *Czech*.

FRANCE

CRUISER SOLD

It was reported from Toulon on 30th March that the cruiser *Duguay-Trouin*, of 7,249 tons and armed with eight 6.1-in. guns, completed in 1926, had been sold to a shipbreaking firm for 109 million francs, about £109,000.

GREECE**KING PAUL**

On 16th February, it was announced that in pursuance of Her Majesty's pleasure, H.M. King Paul of the Hellenes had been appointed an Honorary Admiral in Her Majesty's Fleet, to date 16th February, 1953. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had the honour of entertaining King Paul at Admiralty House on 25th February to mark the occasion. When the King arrived on board H.M.S. *Glasgow* in Phaleron Bay on 24th March, his flag as a British Admiral was flown for the first time in such a ship.

NORWAY**FISHING FLEET FOR DEFENCE**

It was announced from Oslo on 15th February that the committee drafting a law to establish the place of the Home Guard in Norway's defences intends to make use of the nation's large modern fishing fleet for patrolling, harbour control, intelligence, transport, and in operations against an enemy's rear. Norway possesses approximately 17,000 seaworthy fishing vessels and Rear-Admiral Danielsen has said that he is convinced that a sea Home Guard with a flexible organization would be of great value to the defence.

RUSSIA**STRENGTH**

In introducing the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on 16th March, the First Lord, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, told the House frankly the strength of the Russian Navy to-day. He said: "It is, of course, true that during the last war Russia suffered heavy naval losses and that, except in the Pacific, warship building came to an end, but as soon as the Germans were driven out and the shipbuilding yards repaired, the Soviet naval construction programme was resumed. Progress was slow at first, but the increase in speed of this programme has been very remarkable of late. At present, it includes many destroyers and submarines, while more cruisers are now being built annually than by all the N.A.T.O. forces combined. To-day, the Soviet Navy has about 20 very powerful cruisers, over 100 destroyers, and more than 350 submarines of all classes. All ships are kept manned, with the result that Russia has to-day the second largest navy in commission in the world."

UNITED STATES

BRITISH MINESWEEPERS.—A contract for the purchase of a number of minesweepers by the United States from the Admiralty was signed on 13th March. The purchase forms part of the United States offshore procurement programme, and the minesweepers will be allocated to North Atlantic Treaty countries as future requirements dictate. Mr. Bannerman, head of a United States Navy contracting team visiting Britain, signed the document at the Admiralty. The value of the order is understood to be of about 11 million dollars (£3,956,834). The Admiralty will place contracts for the minesweepers in British yards.

SUBMARINE TEST.—Twenty-three men of the United States submarine *Haddock*, after spending two months in their vessel submerged in a test of human reactions, were released from their task on 19th March. The submarine was moored throughout the test to a wharf at Groton, Connecticut. Food was brought to the men daily and the condition of each man tested daily. The major purpose of the test was to determine how to control carbon dioxide in the submarine.

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN MARY

The following message from the Secretary of State for War was sent to H.M. The Queen on 25th March:—

"Mr. Antony Head, with his humble duty, begs leave to offer, on behalf of the Army Council and the Army, an expression of their respectful and deep sympathy in the great loss which Your Majesty and the members of the Royal Family have sustained by the passing of Her Majesty Queen Mary.

"Her keen and ceaseless interest in the Army, especially the Nursing Services, over very many years is remembered with pride and gratitude."

The Queen's Company, Grenadier Guards, was presented with a new Queen's Company Colour, the Royal Standard of the Regiment, by Her Majesty at Windsor Castle on 14th April.

Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother visited the Headquarters of The City of London Yeomanry (Rough Riders), of which Regiment Her Majesty is Honorary Colonel, at the Drill Hall, Handel Street, on 25th February.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Army Service Corps, opened the new Territorial Army Centre at Sydenham Road, Croydon, on 31st January. Earlier in the day, His Royal Highness unveiled a Commemorative Tablet to the 4th Battalion, The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey), in Croydon Town Hall.

On 24th February, the Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, visited the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, at Colchester.

The Duke of Gloucester inspected K Company, Scots Guards, at Caterham on 12th March.

The Princess Royal, Controller Commandant, was present at the W.R.A.C. Regimental Day at the Depot, Guildford, on 25th April.

The Duchess of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, accepted the Freedom of the Royal Burgh of Dumfries on behalf of The King's Own Scottish Borderers at a parade of the Regiment at Dumfries on 7th March.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointments:—

TO BE PERSONAL AIDES-DE-CAMP TO HER MAJESTY.—General H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester, Earl of Ulster, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.; Honorary Major-General the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Athlone, K.G., P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D.

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (ADDITIONAL) TO HER MAJESTY.—Colonel I. F. M. Spence, O.B.E., M.C., T.D., late R.A.C., T.A. (3rd April, 1953), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) H. V. Combe, D.S.O., M.C., T.D., tenure expired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIANS TO HER MAJESTY.—Major-General E. P. N. Creagh M.B., M.R.C.P. (5th March, 1953), vice Major-General T. Menzies, C.B., O.B.E., M.B. retired; Brigadier (temporary Major-General) F. C. Hilton-Sergeant, M.B. (29th April, 1953), vice Major-General A. J. Beveridge, C.B., O.B.E., M.C., retired.

TO BE HONORARY SURGEONS TO HER MAJESTY.—Colonel W. R. Ward, T.D., M.B. (16th October, 1952), vice Major General P. H. Mitchiner, C.B., C.B.E., T.D., M.D., M.S.,

F.R.C.S., deceased; Brigadier R. Murphy, C.B.E., M.B. (16th February, 1953), vice Major-General R. D. Cameron, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY CHAPLAINS TO HER MAJESTY.—The Reverend F. W. Hilborne, Deputy Chaplain-General to the Forces, Royal Army Chaplains' Department (27th February, 1953); the Reverend R. W. Fitzpatrick, M.A., Chaplain to the Forces, 1st Class, Royal Army Chaplains' Department (27th February, 1953).

TO BE COLONEL COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Lieut.-General Sir Charles F. Loewen, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (15th January, 1953), vice Lieut.-General Sir Noel M. de la P. Beresford-Peirse, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., deceased.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) J. G. E. Tiarks (14th March, 1953), vice Colonel (Honorary Brigadier) S. G. Howes, D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired; of The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, Lieut.-General Sir Francis W. Festing, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (12th March, 1953), vice Colonel (Honorary Major-General) H. de R. Morgan, D.S.O., tenure expired; of The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's), General Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C. (13th April, 1953), vice Lieut.-General Sir John G. des R. Swayne, K.C.B., C.B.E., resigned. **TO BE HONORARY COLONEL OF A REGIMENT.**—Of The Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars, R.A.C., T.A., Admiral Sir William G. Tennant, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.V.O. (4th December, 1952).

ARMY COUNCIL

The Queen has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal bearing the date 15th January, 1953, to appoint the following to be Her Majesty's Army Council:—

Brigadier the Rt. Hon. A. H. Head, C.B.E., M.C.—*President*.
Colonel J. R. H. Hutchison, D.S.O., T.D., T.A.—*Vice-President*.
General Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.
General Sir John T. Crocker, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.
General Sir Ouvry L. Roberts, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.
Lieut.-General H. Redman, C.B., C.B.E.
Lieut.-General A. D. Ward, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
Sir George W. Turner, K.C.B., K.B.E.

APPOINTMENTS

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General C. D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Vice Quarter-Master-General (27th March, 1953). Substituted for the notification in the November, 1952, JOURNAL.

General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Bart., G.C.B., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Adjutant-General to the Forces (Summer, 1953).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. C. T. Willis, O.B.E., appointed Director-General Ordnance Survey, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1953).

Major-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., appointed Vice Adjutant-General (January, 1954).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier F. C. Hilton-Sergeant, M.B., appointed a Deputy Director of Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (6th January, 1953).

Brigadier R. Murphy, C.B.E., M.B., Q.H.S., appointed a Deputy Director of Medical Services, with the temporary rank of Major-General (5th February, 1953).

Colonel (temporary Brigadier) P. H. de Havilland, C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Northern Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (2nd March, 1953).

Major-General M. S. Chilton, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C.-in-C. Anti-Aircraft Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (17th April, 1953). Substituted for the notification in the February, 1953, JOURNAL.

Lieut.-General Sir Charles F. Loewen, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Western Command (23rd April, 1953).

Major-General G. C. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C.-in-C., Northern Command, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (May, 1953).

Major-General A. D. Campbell, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., M.A., appointed Commander, Aldershot District (January, 1954).

S.H.A.P.E.—Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Assistant Chief of Staff (Organization and Training) (12th April, 1953).

ALLIED FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. N. R. Moore, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, with the temporary rank of Major-General (March, 1953).

Lieut.-General Sir Robert Mansergh, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., appointed Commander-in-Chief, with the temporary rank of General (1st April, 1953).

ALLIED LAND FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE.—Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. R. Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1953).

GERMANY.—Major-General Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 1st Corps, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (4th January, 1953). Substituted for the notification in the November, 1952, JOURNAL.

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—General Sir Cameron G. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed Commander-in-Chief (Summer, 1953).

Brigadier D. H. V. Buckle, C.B.E., A.D.C., appointed Director of Supplies and Transport, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1953).

SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT.—Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., with the temporary rank of Major-General (2nd February, 1953) without remuneration from Army Funds.

PROMOTIONS

General.—Lieut.-General to be temporary General :—Sir Robert Mansergh, K.B.E., C.B., M.C. (1st April, 1953).

Lieut.-Generals.—Major-Generals to be temporary Lieut.-Generals :—Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (4th January, 1953). Substituted for the notification in the February, 1953, JOURNAL ; M. S. Chilton, C.B., C.B.E. (17th April, 1953).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals :—E. P. N. Creagh, M.B., M.R.C.P. (16th February, 1953) ; W. R. D. Hamilton, O.B.E., M.D., Q.H.P. (16th February, 1953) ; R. Murphy, C.B.E., M.B., Q.H.S. (5th March, 1953).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals :—F. C. Hilton-Sergeant, M.B. (6th January, 1953) ; W. R. N. Hinde, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C. (2nd February, 1953) ; R. Murphy, C.B.E., M.B., Q.H.S. (5th February, 1953) ; H. MacG. Paterson (2nd March, 1953) ; P. H. de Havilland, C.B.E. (2nd March, 1953) ; F.M. Hext, O.B.E. (20th April, 1953).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired :—Major-General R. D. Cameron, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., M.B., Q.H.S. (16th February, 1953) ; Major-General T. Menzies, C.B., O.B.E., M.B., Q.H.P. (5th March, 1953).

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1953-54

The Army Estimates for 1953-54 were published on 24th February. Gross expenditure provided for amounted to £636,000,000, reduced by appropriations in aid to the net figure of £581,000,000 shown in the White Paper on Defence. Estimates for the main items of expenditure, with 1952-53 estimates given in parentheses, were as follows:— Army Pay, £126,500,000 (£109,800,000); Motor Transport, £69,400,000 (£97,500,000); Civilian Pay, £60,000,000 (£48,500,000); Ammunition, £50,100,000 (£31,000,000); Food and Rations, £46,800,000 (£41,600,000); Movements, £35,000,000 (£29,300,000); Works, Buildings, etc., £32,400,000 (£30,500,000); Signals and Wireless, £15,500,000 (£7,300,000); Guns and Small Arms, £14,800,000 (£7,000,000); Miscellaneous Warlike Stores, £14,600,000 (£13,200,000); Miscellaneous Services, £3,800,000 (£1,400,000).

A memorandum by the Secretary of State for War accompanying the Estimates stated that much progress had been made during 1952-53 on the rearmament of the Infantry, especially in the field of anti-tank weapons, and that "a complete family" of new weapons had been evolved which were now being manufactured and issued to infantry units. These weapons included: (1) an anti-tank grenade weighing under 21 oz. and projected from the standard service rifle, but with a destructive capacity equal to that of the most powerful anti-tank gun used in the last war; (2) a new recoilless anti-tank gun which was probably the most powerful in use at present by any Infantry in the world. Full production of this gun, which was higher and more easily manœuvrable than the gun it was intended to replace, was already under way. In addition to these new weapons, the American 3.5-in. rocket launcher had also been adopted in infantry platoons and was now in full production in Britain, complete with its ammunition.

With regard to small arms, the memorandum referred to the recent agreement between Britain, Canada, and Belgium on the joint development of a cartridge acceptable to all N.A.T.O. countries, together with a rifle on the general lines of the .280; mentioned that the Patchett machine carbine, intended as a replacement for the Sten gun, was undergoing wide-scale troop trials, and had so far shown excellent results; and stated that body armour of U.S. design and manufacture had been issued on a limited scale to British troops in Korea, and that experience so far gained had been sufficiently encouraging to justify starting production in Britain. A range of instruments to detect the presence of radio-active matter had also been developed so as to enable troops to take defensive action should they encounter atomic weapons, and the production of these instruments would be begun during 1953. The memorandum added that as adequate supplies of Centurion tanks for the active Army were available, it was proposed to issue these tanks to part of the Territorial Army for their training.

The Secretary of State for War, Mr. Antony Head, in presenting the Estimates, dealt mainly with measures to make the best use of manpower and to improve the Army's weapons and equipment. The total of men in the Army, he said, had now reached its peak, and in the future a gradual decrease of manpower would have to be expected. There was every reason to think that Britain had "the best equipped, trained, and prepared Army she had ever had in peace-time," the active Army being equivalent to 11½ divisions and the Reserve Army to 11½ divisions. In the Government's opinion this was the largest Army that could be created with the Country's present manpower.

Mr. Head pointed out that, according to War Office estimates, the Army would by 1955 be 15,000 down on its present strength, which was already insufficient to enable all units to be kept fully posted. He also mentioned the economies made in the use of manpower, stating that in January, 1950, the Army had 373,000 men and the equivalent of nearly 7½ divisions, or almost 51,200 men in a division, whereas by April, 1953, it would have 437,500 men and the equivalent of 11½ divisions, with 38,700 men in each. In 1952, about 10,000 men had been saved without reducing the combat order of battle, and seven new battalions had been formed; in addition, the War Office staff had been cut by 10 per cent., and cuts of 16 and nine per cent. respectively had been made in

divisional and brigade headquarters of the Royal Armoured Corps and the Infantry. Four further investigations with regard to manpower were proceeding.

As regards recruiting to the Regular Army, the number of men who had joined on a three-year engagement had risen from 23,000 in 1951 to 49,000 in 1952—a "most satisfactory" increase. It was estimated, however, that to get the right kind of age-structure about 33 per cent. of Regular recruits should stay in the Army for six years, and that 50 per cent. of these should remain for a further three years, making nine years in all. Of present-day recruits, 40 per cent. had joined on a 22-year engagement; among men already in the Army, however, the number of extensions of service and re-engagements had recently fallen, with the result that only about 10 per cent. of Regulars had over six years' service, compared with the desideratum of about 20 per cent.

Mr. Head explained that one of the main reasons for the decline in re-engagements was the separation of families involved; that there was, however, great difficulty in providing married quarters in many areas abroad because of political uncertainty; and that the Government had decided that the best course would be to increase the local oversea allowance. A special married rate for men serving overseas and separated from their wives would therefore be introduced from 1st March, 1953; the new rates were being worked out for 50 areas and some had already been completed, e.g., in Egypt a captain would get about £100 a year extra tax-free, and a sergeant about £55.

Barrack-room accommodation at home was also causing anxiety. At present two-thirds of the Army in Britain were living in huts, some of them built before 1914, and only about one-third were living in barracks, of which 44 per cent. had been built before 1900 and some before the Crimean war. There was, therefore, a danger that the Army would become "a Service of slum-dwellers" unless something was done soon, but he hoped that it would be possible during 1953 to fix firm plans and dates for building new barracks.

After recalling that at the beginning of 1952 the Army had been 10 per cent. short of its total requirements of officers, Mr. Head stated that during the year the number of officers had increased by 440, and that special arrangements—including the appointment of liaison officers to go round the schools—had been made to stimulate recruiting.

The steps taken to make the Army more attractive to women had also proved successful, and 3,234 W.R.A.C.s had been recruited during 1952, compared with 2,402 in 1951.

The Territorial Army now had a cadre of 6,900 Regulars, besides 135,000 National Service men serving part-time and 67,000 volunteers. With the growing intake of ex-National Service men, it would reach its maximum by 30th June, 1954.

At present there were also 35 equivalent battalions of the Colonial Army at the disposal of the Colonial Governors, and these battalions had co-operated in assisting in various tasks. Plans for 1953-55 provided for the formation of eight equivalent Regular Colonial battalions and six volunteer battalions.

In conclusion, Mr. Head stated that a new heavy-gun tank, "probably the most powerful tank in the world," would be ready for field trials during 1953, and would be supplementary to the Centurion; spoke of orders placed by the Air Ministry on the Army's behalf for a "considerable number" of Blackburn freighter aircraft, each capable of carrying 40 men with their equipment and jeeps; and announced that General Sir John Harding, the C.I.G.S., would hold a conference in August to study the effect of atomic weapons on tactical doctrine.

The Estimates were approved by the House of Commons on 9th March without a division.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF SCIENCE

The War Office have announced that Her Majesty The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve that the distinction "Royal" be conferred on The Military College

of Science, and that in future it should be designated the "Royal Military College of Science."

ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for March show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,960 men and 421 boys compared with 2,839 and 173 in January, and 3,112 and 318 in February. The figures for re-enlistments were one from Short Service (January, 10; February, two) and 572 from National Service (January, 464; February, 480).

RESERVISTS REQUIRED FOR ATTACHMENT TO THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

The War Office have announced that warrant officers and non-commissioned officers in the Royal Army Reserve are being invited to volunteer for attachment to the Territorial Army. The minimum period is for one year, and volunteers will retain their substantive rank. The scheme is limited to non-commissioned officers of the rank of corporal and above, and it will bring to the T.A. much-needed instructors and reinforce its ranks of experienced non-commissioned officers.

In addition to their reserve pay, volunteers, if carrying out a period of training of eight hours or more in any one day, will receive pay and allowances at Regular Army rates under the normal T.A. rules. For periods of training of less than eight hours, but of two hours or more, they will receive instructors pay. They will not be eligible for T.A. bounties.

Attachment to the T.A. does not involve enlistment, but volunteers will be expected to perform the in-camp and out-of-camp T.A. training, and they will be armed, clothed, and equipped by the T.A. unit. By virtue of attending T.A. training, they will, of course, be excused their liability for training as reservists. Applications for attachment to the T.A. should be made to the Officers i/c Records of the volunteer.

DIVISIONAL TRAINING FOR THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

The 42nd (East Lancashire), the 50th (Tyne and Tees), and the 51st (Highland) Divisions of the Territorial Army have been chosen by the War Office to carry out full-scale divisional training on Salisbury Plain this Summer.

Exact dates are still under discussion at the time of writing, but provisionally the 51st (Highland) Division will train during the latter part of June, the 50th (Tyne and Tees) Division in mid-July, and the 42nd (East Lancashire) in the middle of August.

All arms and services will take part, including divisional Royal Armoured Corps regiments, and the Royal Air Force will co-operate. Fifteen days' intensive collective training will be carried out, culminating in a full-scale divisional exercise lasting two or three days.

WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS

STAFF COLLEGE.—The following W.R.A.C. officers have been selected to attend the W.R.A.C. Staff College, Frimley Park, Camberley, for Course No. 5, which assembles on 16th July:—Captains M. J. Allen, J. K. Allison, M. Bloxham, M. E. Davison, R. M. Engel, A. Hodgson, E. G. Joynt, D. B. D. Lance, B. Paget-Clarke, Major J. E. Parker, and Captains E. Scott and J. Wilson.

HOME AREA SERVICE.—The War Office have announced that an entirely new type of service engagement for women has been introduced in the W.R.A.C. in Scotland. It provides an opportunity for recruits to serve in their home areas, and they will not be posted for service overseas except in the event of an emergency.

The engagement is open to women under 41 years of age and the terms of service are for an initial period of three years with the Colours without any reserve liability. The level of pay and allowances is only slightly below the normal W.R.A.C. rates. Women enlisted under this new scheme will serve in units specially raised for local employment.

At present only one local service unit is being formed and this is in Edinburgh, and applicants for service with this unit may only apply to enlist at the W.R.A.C. Recruiting Centre, Edinburgh. Vacancies exist in the trades of General Duty Clerk and Pay Clerk. After training, these tradeswomen will replace men in the area of recruitment.

DOUBLING W.R.A.C., T.A., STRENGTH.—A drive to double the strength of the W.R.A.C., Territorial Army, started in February.

The strength of the W.R.A.C., T.A., was then about 10,000, and in this campaign, organized by County Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations, women all over the Country are being invited to take on essential work.

The campaign has been preceded by a general re-organization of W.R.A.C., T.A., units, which is intended to give volunteers an even wider variety of jobs.

MISCELLANEOUS

TOURS OF THE C.I.G.S.—General Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, left England by air on 17th February for a tour of inspection in Kenya, visiting General Sir Brian Robertson in Egypt *en route*. He returned on 26th February.

He also paid a routine visit to West Africa Command at the end of March returning on 30th March, having spent a night at Bathurst and at Gibraltar on the way.

THE SOVEREIGN'S PARADE AT SANDHURST.—The Sovereign's Parade took place at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, on 5th February with full peace-time ceremonial. Over 800 cadets took part, including 251 who had completed their course. The Salute was taken by General Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who afterwards addressed the cadets.

TRIESTE GARRISON.—The 1st Battalion, The Suffolk Regiment, has replaced the 1st Battalion, The Northamptonshire Regiment. The 1st Battalion, The North Staffordshire Regiment, which is due to come home prior to departure for Korea, is being relieved by the 2nd Battalion, The Lancashire Fusiliers.

DRUMMER'S COLOUR TROOPED.—The Drummer's Colour carried by The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers to commemorate the Battle of Wilhelmstahl in 1762, when the Fifth Fusiliers routed a considerable force of French Grenadiers, was trooped by the 1st Battalion at Barnard Castle on 23rd April at a St. George's Day parade.

THE GREEN HOWARDS PARADE IN MIDDLESBROUGH.—The Green Howards exercised their privilege of marching through Middlesbrough with bayonets fixed, Colours flying, and bands playing on 24th January, during the town's centenary week celebrations. All battalions of the Regiment were represented in the parade.

QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S ROYAL ARMY NURSING CORPS.—The Corps Day, postponed from 27th March because of the death of Her Majesty Queen Mary, Colonel-in-Chief, was celebrated at the Corps Depot at Hindhead on 13th April. Forty officers and 200 other ranks paraded before Dame Louisa Wilkinson, Colonel Commandant, Q.A.R.A.N.C.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

CORONATION DAY DUTIES.—General H. D. G. Crerar, C.H., C.B., D.S.O., will attend in his capacity as Aide-de-Camp General to Her Majesty The Queen, and four officers of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in full dress uniform will form part of the Sovereign's escort.

The band of Le Royal 22e Regiment of Quebec City, the official band of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade in Germany until August, will be in London to play on Coronation Day.

NEW COMMANDER, 25TH CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.—Brigadier J. V. Allard, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., has become Commander, 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade in Korea,

in succession to Brigadier M. P. Bogert, D.S.O., O.B.E., C.D., who had commanded the Brigade for one year.

NEW TRAINING AREA.—The Canadian Army's projected divisional training camp in New Brunswick has been named Camp Gagetown.

1ST AIR OBSERVATION POST FLIGHT.—The flying field at Camp Petawawa has become the station of the Canadian Army's new 1st Air Observation Post Flight which, with the assistance of the R.C.A.F., will carry out air observation for the Royal Canadian Artillery.

AUSTRALIA

CORONATION CONTINGENT.—The Australian Army Contingent for the Coronation will be commanded by Brigadier D. A. Whitehead, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D.

The Contingent will include a detachment of the Australian Light Horse. The detachment will consist of two escorts. The first, of four officers, will be the Australian section of the Sovereign's escort of mounted officers from the British Commonwealth. The second, of one officer and three other ranks, will provide the mounted escort for the Prime Minister's carriage in the procession.

NEW ZEALAND

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following award, in recognition of gallant and distinguished service in Korea during the period 1st January to 30th June, 1952, was published in *The London Gazette* of 20th January, 1953 :—

C.B.—Brigadier R. S. Park, C.B.E.

SOUTH AFRICA

AIDE-DE-CAMP (ADDITIONAL) TO H.M. THE QUEEN.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the appointment of Brigadier H. B. Klopper, D.S.O., as Aide-de-Camp (Additional) to Her Majesty (23rd February, 1953), vice Brigadier W. H. Hingston C.B.E.

NEW APPOINTMENT.—Brigadier S. J. Joubert, D.S.O., has been appointed to serve on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces.

RANK OF "PRIVATE" CEASES.—Mr. Erasmus, Defence Minister, issued orders on 4th February that the term "rifleman" ("skutter" in Afrikaans) will be used to describe the lowest rank in all infantry units. The term "private" will not be used. The last change in the terms used for army ranks was in 1951, when "commandant" was substituted for "lieutenant-colonel."

KENYA

REINFORCEMENTS FROM BRITAIN

Headquarters, 39th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion The Devonshire Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, The Buffs (The Royal East Kent Regiment) were ordered to move to Kenya at the end of March to assist the Kenya Government in suppressing Mau Mau activities. The 1st Battalion, The Lancashire Fusiliers, were sent to Kenya from the Suez Canal Zone in October, 1952.

NIGERIA

NIGERIANS AT SANDHURST

It was reported from Lagos on 20th March that the Chief Secretary, replying to members in the House of Representatives who had urged the establishment of a military academy in Nigeria, said that the Government had decided it was better to press for an increased number of places at Sandhurst, to which it was hoped in future to send at least seven Nigerians every year.

FOREIGN**GERMANY****BAN ON RECRUITMENT OF GERMAN CITIZENS FOR FOREIGN ARMIES**

On 4th February, the West German *Bundestag* unanimously adopted an amendment to the Penal Code prohibiting the recruitment of Germans for foreign armies, and imposing penalties of not less than three months imprisonment for anyone recruiting, helping to recruit, or trying to recruit Germans for foreign military service. The same penalties were laid down for Germans engaged in such activities in a foreign country.

GREECE**GREEK OFFICERS VISIT NORTHERN ITALY**

General Tsigulis and seven other Greek officers arrived in Udine on 30th March. On the same date, they went to Treviso where they were received by the Commander, 5th Italian Territorial District, and inspected units of the Bersaglieri Corps. On 31st March, they were taken to the Italo-Yugoslav border to visit Gorizia. This was the first visit of Greek officers to Italy's N.A.T.O. forces, which are deployed along the Alpine frontier with Austria and Yugoslavia.

RUSSIA**NEW CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF**

Invitations for the Army Day reception on 22nd February disclosed that Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky had been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. He has taken the place of General S. M. Shtemenko who became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1948. Marshal Sokolovsky played a prominent part in the defence of Moscow and Stalingrad during the 1939-45 War, liberated Smolensk, and commanded the first Russian troops to enter Berlin. After the war he was Military Governor and C-in-C. of the Russian Zone of Germany, and was subsequently appointed First Deputy Minister for the Armed Forces in the Soviet Cabinet.

SWEDEN**PURCHASE OF BRITISH CENTURION TANKS**

The Swedish Defence Minister, Hr. Nilsson, announced on 30th January that Sweden intended to buy 80 Centurion tanks from Britain at a cost of about £7,000,000.

AIR NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN MARY

The following message of condolence was sent by the Secretary of State for Air, Lord De L'Isle and Dudley, V.C., to H.M. The Queen:—

"The Secretary of State for Air with his humble duty begs leave to offer to Your Majesty and to the Royal Family on behalf of the Air Council and the Royal Air Force his sincere and respectful sympathy on the passing of Her Majesty Queen Mary."

PRESENTATION OF A QUEEN'S COLOUR TO THE ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT.—The Queen presented a Queen's Colour to the Royal Air Force Regiment at a Ceremonial Parade in Buckingham Palace on 17th March. The Parade was formed of a representative detachment of 125 officers and airmen under the command of Wing Commander A. B. Riall, O.B.E.

DUKE OF EDINBURGH'S VISITS TO R.A.F. UNITS IN GERMANY.—On 17th March, H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh flew to Bückeburg in a Viking of the Queen's Flight. On 19th March, the Duke flew by helicopter from Costedt to Wunstorf where he watched a R.A.F. flying display. He next visited Celle, where he saw another flying display. On 20th March, His Royal Highness visited the Reconnaissance Wing at Gütersloh where he inspected photographs and watched the R.A.F. Regiment taking part in a battle course. The Duke's helicopter flights were the first to be made by a member of the Royal Family in this type of aircraft.

AIR AIDE-DE-CAMP.—Air Chief Marshal Sir John W. Baker, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C., has been appointed Air Aide-de-Camp to The Queen (29th November, 1952).

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—The Rev. A. S. Giles, O.B.E., Q.H.C., appointed Chaplain-in-Chief, Royal Air Force (15th May, 1953).

Professor O. G. Sutton, C.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.S., J.P., appointed Director of Meteorological Office (Autumn, 1953).

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Air Commodore W. A. Opie, C.B.E., appointed Assistant Controller of Supplies (Air) with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (16th January, 1953).

BOMBER COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal J. R. Whitley, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group (27th April, 1953).

FIGHTER COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal Sir Dermot A. Boyle, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, with the acting rank of Air Marshal (7th April, 1953).

MAINTENANCE COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal B. E. Essex, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (1st April, 1953).

SECOND TACTICAL AIR FORCE, GERMANY.—Air Commodore W. G. Cheshire, C.B.E., appointed Air Officer in charge of Administration (23rd April, 1953).

PROMOTIONS

Air Marshals to be Air Chief Marshals.—Sir John Whitworth Jones, K.C.B., C.B.E.; Sir Robert M. Foster, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C. (28th January, 1953).

Air Vice-Marshals (acting Air Marshals) to be Air Marshals.—H. T. Lydford, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C.; A. C. Sanderson, K.B.E., C.B., D.F.C.; L. F. Pendred, C.B., M.B.E., D.F.C. (1st January, 1953).

Air Commodore to be Air Vice-Marshal.—G. A. Ballantyne, C.B.E., D.F.C., F.D.S.R.C.S., F.D.S.R.C.S.(Edin.), Q.H.D.S. (1st September, 1952).

Air Commodore to be acting Air Vice-Marshal.—C. L. M. Brown, O.B.E., M.A., A.D.C. (1st February, 1953).

RETIREMENTS

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John C. Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., is placed on half-pay (29th January, 1953).

Air Marshal Sir Thomas A. Warne-Browne, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C., is placed on the retired list (17th January, 1953).

Air Vice-Marshal A. C. H. Sharp, C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., is placed on the retired list at his own request (1st February, 1953).

AIR ESTIMATES

The net expenditure provided for the Royal Air Force for 1953-54 amounts to £498,000,000, which shows an increase of £60,360,000 on the corresponding figure for the 1952-53 Estimates. It provides for a maximum of 302,000 officers, airmen, and airwomen compared with 315,000 for the previous year.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air, introducing the 1953-54 Air Estimates in the Commons, said that re-equipment of the Royal Air Force with the latest designs of faster-than-sound jet fighters and bombers would be the task of the British aircraft industry over the next few years.

The first squadrons of the Vickers Swift fighter would be formed towards the end of the year and the Hawker Hunter would follow. "They are the finest day fighters in the world," he said. A large order for the delta-winged Gloster Javelin, the all-weather fighter of the future, had been placed. The Vickers Valiant had been ordered off the drawing board by the Labour Government and would be the foundation of the new long-range bomber force. Later would come the new super-bombers—the Avro Vulcan and the Handley-Page Victor, for which a production order had been placed—also off the drawing board. But the proportions of the aircraft in the bomber force could not be regarded as fixed.

To keep the human element up with the progress in the technical field a basic jet trainer would be put into service for limited trials on which pilots would be started—it would be an adaptation of the Provost. The engine would be the Armstrong Siddeley Viper. He thought it would be two years before a final decision could be taken. Also on order was a prototype of a transport version of the Valiant which might prove of "revolutionary importance because of its outstanding performance and economies of operation," said the Minister. Valiant aircraft would also equip the long-range photographic reconnaissance force which would match the new V-class squadrons of bombers. The present short-range P.R. force was equipped with Meteors. It was planned to replace these with a version of the Swift, and the medium-range P.R. aircraft would be the Canberra.

Dealing with more immediate progress in the Royal Air Force, the Under-Secretary made these points:—

Current Types.—The amount to be paid to industry for work on current types which would not now be completed would be relatively small. As production of latest types got under way any disturbance there might be should not last for long. Fortunately, the demand for British aircraft overseas was steadily growing.

Second Tactical Air Force.—This force had increased by over one-third during the year and there would be a further substantial increase this year. An effective night

fighter force had been built up with armed Meteor N.F. 11s; Vampires were being replaced by Sabres for day interception and by Venoms for ground attack.

Canberra Force.—This was now taking shape, and by this time next year it was hoped would be three times as great as it was now. A new mark of Canberra, with improved range, and the first photographic reconnaissance Canberras, were now coming into service.

Fighter Command.—Two squadrons of Sabres would be formed in the coming year. The Folland light interceptor project had not been ordered, but "its development would be watched with great interest."

Coastal Command.—Now mainly equipped with Shackletons and Neptunes. The Neptunes carried several important new anti-submarine weapons and a new mark Shackleton was coming in with more equipment aboard. There was also a target-seeking torpedo and a new sonobuoy.

Transport Command.—Twenty Blackburn freighters, to be known as Beverleys, had been ordered. They were light-loading and the only British type which can drop the Army's heavy equipment.

Dealing with the electronics side of the Royal Air Force, he said the complexity of aircraft and developments in guided bombs had imposed a heavy load on the industry. The re-equipment of the Radar defence system was going on and equipment was being installed as fast as manufacturers could produce it; there was still a shortage of some items.

To sum up the immediate prospects, the Minister said that though the cancellation of old types meant that expansion would be slower than envisaged in earlier plans it would still be greater in 1953 than in 1952.

He also said that the operation of Canberras in Exercise "Ardent," when the testing of the air defence system involved more aircraft than had ever taken part in an exercise over the United Kingdom, had had an immediate effect upon the realism of air exercises. Coastal Command played a large part in Exercise "Mainbrace," the major exercise of the N.A.T.O. Powers in maritime defence, and in Europe the Second Tactical Air Force took part in Exercise "Holdfast."

The four Canberras which flew to South and Central America, visiting eleven foreign countries and four British Colonies overseas, provided an outstanding goodwill and training mission and gave impressive demonstrations. Sunderlands of Coastal Command established the British North Greenland Expedition at their base camp, and Hastings of Transport Command helped in the establishment of the Expedition's ice-cap station. Both jobs gave R.A.F. air crews valuable operating experience.

OPERATIONS

PHOTOGRAPHING THE FLOODED AREAS.—During the first week in February, Mosquito and Lancaster aircraft of Bomber Command flew 40,000 miles photographing the flooded areas of Eastern England. More than 70 sorties were flown and 16,000 negatives were made. Processing staffs worked day and night to produce more than 100,000 prints for Government Departments.

SANDBAG AIRLIFT.—Between 13th and 17th February, Hastings and Valetta aircraft of Transport Command, assisted by Hastings of Coastal Command, flew 697 tons of sandbags (2,780,000 bags) from Denmark, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland to Britain for flood repair work.

FLIGHTS

TO AUSTRALIA IN A DAY

On 27th/28th January, an English Electric Canberra was flown to Darwin in 22 hours 21.8 seconds, including three stops, at an average speed of 391.2 m.p.h. The

flying time was 19 hours 1 minute. The aircraft was piloted by Flight Lieutenant L. M. Whittington with Flight Lieutenant J. A. Brown as navigator—both from the A. and A.E.E. at Boscombe Down.

EXERCISES

"JUNGLE KING."—The biggest Bomber Command exercise since the war—known as "Jungle King"—took place between 17th and 22nd March. Although hindered at times by fog, it was successfully carried through under the direction of Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd, the A.O.C.-in-C. Canberras, Washingtons, and Lincolns made mock attacks on targets in North-West Germany. The Canberras and Lincolns carried out 'attacks' both by day and by night. Raids with live bombs were also made on the range at Nordheim—one of these attacks being by the largest force of Canberras ever operated. The opposition was provided by squadrons of fighters of the Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, which included R.A.F. units of the Second Tactical Air Force. Some of the fighters (Sabres and Thunderjets) claimed a number of interceptions. 'Enemy' B-26 bombers of the United States Air Force in Germany made 'counter-attacks' on R.A.F. Stations in this Country.

In summing up after the exercise Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd said that tremendous advances had been made in bombing accuracy during the last 18 months. To-day the Command was getting excellent results dropping bombs from 40,000 feet at a speed of 450 knots. He said that it had also been found that jet aircraft were easier to maintain than piston-engined aircraft. They had had practically no failures with the Avons in the Canberras.

AIR DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE.—A three-day exercise was held at the end of March with the object of giving practice to the air defence in the Suez Canal Zone. It was under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur P. M. Sanders.

ORGANIZATION

No. 84 SQUADRON

No. 84 Squadron recently left the Far East Air Force after two-and-a-half-years' continuous service on air operations against the terrorists in Malaya. To mark the occasion of their departure a special farewell parade taken by the Commander-in-Chief, F.E.A.F., was held at the R.A.F. Station, Tengah.

MATERIEL

VICKERS TO BUILD JET TROOP TRANSPORT.—The Ministry of Supply has authorized the building of a prototype 150-seater jet troop transport aircraft to be built by Vickers-Armstrongs. Fuel capacity will allow the transport to operate on North Atlantic routes, and the cruising speed will be about 500 m.p.h.

OLYMPUS-CANBERRA AT OVER 60,000 FEET.—During recent high altitude development flights, an English Electric Canberra, powered with two Olympus turbojets, intended for military use, attained a height of over 60,000 feet.

CIVIL DEFENCE

LIMITED RANGE OF ATOMIC BOMB

A Home Office leaflet now being circulated to industrial and commercial Civil Defence units emphasizes that there are definite limits to the destructive range of atom bombs. It is stated that doubling the power of an atom bomb extends the range of damage by only a quarter, while if there were ever a bomb 100 times more powerful its range would be extended by only four or five times. The leaflet, entitled "Civil Defence and the Atom Bomb," aims to show that there is a defence against the bomb, and says that, while the destructive power is enormous, outside the hardest hit area there would still be tens of thousands of lives which could be saved by shelter and strong Civil Defence services.

MISCELLANEOUS

VISIT OF MARSHAL TITO TO R.A.F. STATION, DUXFORD.—On 18th March, Marshal Tito inspected the R.A.F. Station, Duxford, where he watched a flying display and was shown new types of aircraft.

BATTLE OF BRITAIN WEEK.—Battle of Britain week will be observed this year from 14th to 20th September: 15th September is fixed as Battle of Britain Day.

FIGHTER COMMAND RECORD.—Last year No. 56 Squadron created a Fighter Command record by flying 6,207 hours without accident.

R.A.F. AIRCRAFT ENTERED FOR ENGLAND-NEW ZEALAND RACE.—The Royal Air Force has entered a Valiant four-engined jet bomber and three Canberra photo-reconnaissance twin jet aircraft for the speed section of the England-New Zealand air race to be held in October.

ROYAL OBSERVER CORPS MEDAL.—A new medal known as the Royal Observer Corps Medal, to be awarded in recognition of 12 years' satisfactory service, will be issued this year.

VISIT OF FRENCH AIR FORCE CADETS TO R.A.F. COLLEGE.—Eleven officers and 30 cadets of the French Ecole de l'Air with their Commandant, Colonel de Maricourt, visited the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell in March. They travelled in two French Air Force Dakotas.

DUNNING MEMORIAL CUP.—This cup for the Royal Air Force Squadron achieving the highest standard on the Joint Anti-Submarine School Unit Training Course has been awarded to No. 37 Squadron for the year 1952.

ESHER CHALLENGE TROPHY.—No. 610 (County of Chester) Squadron won the Esher Challenge Trophy for 1952. This cup is awarded annually for the most efficient squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

IMSHI MASON MEMORIAL TROPHY.—This trophy, awarded annually for efficiency in weapon training in the Middle East Royal Air Force Command, was won in 1952 by No. 6 Squadron, stationed in Iraq, for the second year in succession.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

GROUND DEFENCE TRAINING.—Training in ground defence warfare has now been started at the R.C.A.F. Station, Rockcliffe. This training is eventually to be carried out by every serving member of the R.C.A.F.

AVRO DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE R.C.A.F.—A. V. Roe (Canada) will complete an order for 70 CF-100 Mark 3 all-weather fighters by mid-Summer. After this they will produce the Mark 4 which will carry 60 rockets in two wing-tip pods in addition to eight .50 machine guns in a ventral pack.

JET TRAINERS.—The R.C.A.F. has ordered 576 Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star jet trainers which are being produced by Canadair at the rate of about 40 a month.

R.A.F. TRAINING IN CANADA.—During 1952, over 1,000 members of the R.A.F. were trained as pilots or navigators. This was arranged under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

AUSTRALIA

R.A.A.F. REORGANIZATION.—The Air Staff have recommended that the R.A.A.F. should be reorganized into a system of commands instead of the present area system. If the proposal is adopted, the three commands would be Home, Training, and Maintenance.

FIGHTER SQUADRON IN KOREA.—R.A.A.F. jet fighter pilots of No. 77 Squadron started 1953 with a total of 15,000 individual sorties since the war broke out two-and-a-

half years ago. More than 11,000 of these sorties were flown in British-built Gloster Meteor 8 jet fighters which replaced the Mustangs in 1951.

JET FIGHTER EXERCISE IN THE DESERT.—No. 78 (Fighter) Wing, which consists of 12 Vampire jet fighters, recently carried out full-scale air-to-ground rocket and gunnery exercises in Libya.

FOREIGN

FRANCE

NF-115 FOR FRANCE.—The French Air Force is soon to receive the first of its two-seater night fighter Gloster Meteor NF-115. These aircraft will be based at Tours.

FRENCH DELTA FLIES.—First French delta aircraft to fly is the Arsenal 1301, a glider representing a flying mock-up of a fighter being built by the Arsenal de l'Aeronautique. The glider made its first eight-minute flight towed by a Douglas DC-3.

GERMANY

WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE PROPOSALS

Proposals were announced by the Foreign Office recently whereby, under the as yet unratified European Defence Community Treaty, the R.A.F. will be responsible for the training of a West German Air Force, the projected size of which is approximately 80,000 men and 1,300 aircraft. The Foreign Office announcement states: "Suggestions for assistance include the provision of training facilities, advice on training matters, the secondment of British officers to E.D.C. staffs, the provision of tactical demonstrations and joint unit training exercises. Suggestions for the association include the exchange of officers for command and staff service, joint formation training under the overall command of the Supreme Commander, Europe, the interchange of air force squadrons, and the co-ordination of the systems of air defence."

HOLLAND

DUTCH AIR FORCE GRANTED SEPARATE IDENTITY.—In an Order of the Day, read by Lieut.-General Aler at a ceremony on the Dutch military airfield at Soesterberg recently, two Royal decrees were mentioned, the first of which declared the Netherlands Air Force to be henceforth a separate arm. The Defence Minister recalled that after the war a Dutch Air Force had to be developed out of nothing. Speaking in English, he expressed deep gratitude to the British and American friends of Holland for their help with men and material, help which was "still given every day."

DUTCH AIR FORCE STRENGTH.—The Dutch Air Force is now half-way towards reaching its planned strength of 21 squadrons. It now has six day-fighter squadrons (Gloster Meteor 8), four tactical squadrons (Republic F-84 Thunderjets), and one transport squadron (Douglas C-47). Several new squadrons will be formed this year but none will be equipped with the type of aircraft most urgently needed by the Netherlands—all-weather fighters.

RUSSIA

MIG-15 LANDS IN DENMARK.—The first Russian-built MIG-15 jet fighter to land intact outside the iron curtain arrived at Roenne Airport, on the island of Bornholm, on the morning of 5th March. The pilot, a 21-year-old Polish lieutenant, asked for asylum as a political refugee. He made a skilful landing on the grass airstrip, only 1,300 yards long, instead of the 3,000-yard concrete runway usually needed.

MORE MIG-15 DETAILS REVEALED.—Noteworthy features of the MIG-15 type are the full-chord wing fences, the small mass-balance weights at the tips of the tail control surfaces, and the Sabre-type jet outlet. Armament of two 23-mm. guns and one 37-mm. is shown in some diagrams, although this is not believed to be universal. Some revision in outline has been made to the rear fuselage air brakes and canopy, while perforated, split flaps are fitted under the wings. The wing itself is anhedral and has a net area of some

195 square feet (gross area, 255 square feet). With an all-up weight of 14,238 lb. (fitted with underwing tanks), the maximum wing loading is thus no less than 73 lb./square foot. The lower portion of the rudder is fitted with anti-snaking strips on the trailing edge. The tailplane, thought not to be of the 'all-flying' type, has simple elevators on its trailing edge. Overall finish is excellent.

SOVIET TWIN-JET BOMBER PRODUCTION.—The Soviet Model 150 twin-jet medium bomber is reported to be now in full production. Production aircraft are capable of speeds of up to 650 m.p.h. and are fitted with take-off rockets. It is also believed that they are equipped with braking parachutes for emergency use. There have been experiments with the pre-rotation of the Model 150's landing-gear wheels to improve landing characteristics.

RUSSIAN 'SUPERFORTRESS' IMPROVED.—As is well known, the B-29 Superfortress—several of which were acquired by Russia in 1945—was placed in production in Russia in 1947. It is now thought that the original A Sh-90 engines (copies of the Wright R-3350) have been replaced, in the latest types of Tu-4, by M-300s of some 3,000 h.p. each. At the same time, additional tankage and equipment have been added to bring the standard Russian piston-engined bomber into the B-50 class.

SOVIET AIR STRENGTH IN GERMANY.—According to *Flugwelt*, Soviet air strength in the Eastern Zone of Germany is now much the same as it was six months ago; approximately 780 jet fighters, 250 fighter-bombers, 150 jet bombers, and 30 reconnaissance and 50 transport aircraft—a total of 1,260 in all. A Russian Air Force of similar composition is said to be stationed in former German territories East of the Oder and Neisse rivers. It is also stated that Soviet air bases are being constructed around Kottbus, 60 miles South-East of Berlin, whilst existing bases nearer the capital are being denuded of aircraft.

RUSSIAN DELTA REPORTED FROM KOREA.—According to a report from Tokyo, a new Russian night-fighter is causing serious losses to American bomber groups over North Korea. It has been described by Allied air crews as being a jet-powered delta design, radar-equipped, with two heavy cannon, and having more than twice the speed of a Superfortress. Long before the war the Russians were experimenting with a variety of low-aspect-ratio shapes.

UNITED STATES

LAST SUPERFORT DELIVERED.—Boeing has delivered the last of its famous Superfort piston-engine-powered bombers. A total of 4,250 B-29 and B-50 bombers were built by Boeing and its licensees during the last 10 years. The last Superfort delivered was a TB-50H, bombardier-navigator-radar operator trainer.

MORE ROCKETS FOR UPPER ATMOSPHERE RESEARCH.—The United States naval research laboratory has ordered from the Glenn L. Martin Co. four more Viking rockets, thus enabling the current upper-atmosphere research programme to be continued. The rockets will be of the latest (No. 9) type, which are 42 feet long and of slightly larger diameter than previously, so as to accommodate more fuel. The Viking is, of course, a slimmer and improved version of the German V-2, powered by a liquid-oxygen/alcohol rocket built by Reaction Motors Inc. The Viking holds the world's altitude record (135 miles) for single-stage rockets; the absolute altitude record stands at 250 miles, set up by a two-stage V.2/WAC Corporal missile.

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAVIAN JET FLIES.—Yugoslavia produced her first jet-propelled aircraft during December, 1952.

HELICOPTERS.—Under the mutual aid programme, the U.S.A.F. has placed an order with Westland Aircraft Ltd. for the supply of S-51 helicopters to Yugoslavia. The number of helicopters concerned is not revealed, but the contract is stated to be valued at about one million dollars (£357,000). The helicopters will be of the Dragonfly military type, and will be powered by Pratt and Whitney engines supplied from the U.S.A.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

The Campaign in Norway. By T. K. Derry. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. (H.M.S.O.) 35s.

The Campaign in Norway is the first volume to be published in the military series of the United Kingdom History of the Second World War. As such, it must be considered as a standard on which the future volumes are to be based. It can be said, without further ado, that the standard is high enough to satisfy the most ardent searcher after facts and that the complete series, should it all reach this level, will stand as a noble monument to the heroic story of British action in the war.

Of the contents of this volume, most interest will probably be aroused at the evidence it produces of the lack of grip exercised by the higher command at this early stage of the war. It is a story of lost chances, of inadequate planning, of a fumbling approach to a problem that, in spite of poor communications and a woeful lack of background intelligence, was yet clear cut enough to warrant bold handling. Dr. Derry's narrative, written after full access to official records, German and Norwegian archives, and such other first-hand accounts as were available, reveals almost at the outset the probable cause of the tragedy. It can be seen, from reading his pages, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although formed into a committee, each approached the problem as an individual responsible for his own Service. As a result, there was no overall presentation of the picture of the military, using the word in its overall meaning, requirements of the campaign. Thus we are presented with a tragic picture of muddle and irresolution, of orders given and countermanded, of guns loaded without their ammunition, of units disembarked at the wrong ports, of untrained men called upon to conduct a difficult campaign in a terrain that demanded extremes of physical fitness and endurance.

None of the three Services emerges from this campaign with real credit. That is not to say that there was any lack of courage, or that there were not local successes—in many cases large and important ones, such as the Second Battle of Narvik which resulted in the loss of nine destroyers and one submarine—but taken as a whole the formlessness of the campaign, and its lack of decisive leadership, must be attributed largely to the fact that the implications of modern warfare had not been sufficiently studied in this Country. What was missing was audacity and the ability to keep in firm view the tactical and strategical objectives that the campaign demanded.

Dr. Derry has completed his task with admirable lucidity and skill, and his volume is a tremendous piece of work that can call forth nothing but praise. This is modern history as it should be written, clear, precise, and set against its political background with brilliant skill. If this is the standard on which the remaining volumes are to be produced, then indeed we shall have a history of which we can all be proud. The whole series is under the general editorship of Professor J. R. M. Butler, and to him, as well as to Dr. Derry, must go our thanks.

Lachlan Macquarie. His Life, Adventures and Times. By M. H. Ellis. (Angus and Robertson, London.) 50s.

This book tells a wonderful story. Macquarie's life falls into two clearly marked parts, the first telling a common enough tale of a Scots adventurer of uncertain background and education. He joined the Army, served in campaigns in North America, India, and Ceylon, and, by sheer survival and a prudent marriage, returned home rising fifty with a sound fortune. Just as he was settling down to become a laird on his native soil, however, by a casual series of accidents he was offered and accepted the post of Governor of New South Wales. Macquarie took up his duties in 1809, and returned home in 1822. Two years later he died, and on his granite tomb in Mull are inscribed the words "The Father of Australia."

Mr. Ellis has made good use of Macquarie's voluminous journals and letter books. The soldier's daily round, his food, medicine, grocery orders, his visits to theatres and picture-galleries while in London, make the narrative vivid. Macquarie had a serious and methodical approach to life. He chronicled his financial affairs in detail, with all their embarrassments and bothers. His emotion on his first marriage night (he was married twice) is marked by a split infinitive. He was industrious, patient, independent, and commonplace; an able administrator, fond of farming, intent on moving round his convict empire and seeing as much as he could for himself.

There is a fascinating chapter on the settlement as it was in 1809. The Rum Rebellion was just over, and "Bounty" Bligh was assuaging his pride by insisting on innumerable guards of honour and gun salutes. Spirits was a much more important item of exchange than money. Macquarie was above all anxious to make things work, and to do so used the people and situations he found existing to forward his aims. He laid out sites and roads, kept everyone informed of his plans, started a police force, and encouraged racing. He was generous to ex-convicts, fair minded to the poor, and just to the aborigines. When occasion required, he was forceful and ruthless, exterminating bushrangers and dangerous natives. He had many enemies, of whom the author gives lively and slightly malicious portraits, using their own and other family correspondence to enliven the vignettes. There were Ellis and Jeffery Bent, Samuel Marsden, and (in his last years only) M'Arthur, the great monopolist. Exiled soldiers were often difficult men to handle. Drought, disease, and food shortages smote the land. What with dealing with intrigues, trying to reduce the amount of corporal punishment, suppressing corruption, and promoting discovery, Macquarie was far too busy to combat the unceasing stream of exaggerations and plain lies his opponents poured on London. A commissioner arrived, whose stupidity and malice were monumental, and the end of Macquarie's career is a painful story of unfair decisions. It is comforting and proper that his foes should be pilloried, and that justice should be done to "The Old Viceroy."

The book is a long one of over six hundred pages, well documented and illustrated with useful maps and portraits. Printed and bound in Sydney, it does credit to Australian craftsmen. Mr. Ellis has written an enjoyable and important contribution to Commonwealth history.

NAVAL

The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697. By John Ehrman, M.A. (Cambridge University Press.) 63s.

The main theme of this book is naval administration and finance during the reign of William III. Tactical descriptions of battles, what ships were engaged, or the ordinary routine of a ship of war at sea are omitted. Full details of earlier naval administration have already been provided by Oppenheim (1509-1660) and by Tanner (1660-1688). Mr. Ehrman now continues the tale for a further eight years, which brings us up to the end of the first of the several wars at sea against France. Although the period covered is short, much happened during the time in the way of putting the administrative machinery of the Navy upon an increasingly sound basis.

The book is divided into two main parts—"The Background of Naval Administration," and "The War in Progress." Documentation is extremely full. It might almost be said that it has been carried to excess. In Chapter I the author describes how the ship of the line was gradually evolved to meet the requirements of fighting in a line of battle. But when he discourses on sails and rigging it is evident that, although he has perused many books on the subject, he has not fully understood the technical details and tends to put too much faith on the mere fact that his authorities are 250 years old. For instance, his statement on page 20 that "the introduction of the bowline and the brace . . . brought the ship's head to about three points off the wind" (whatever that may mean) is not borne out by the references quoted—they do not mention this point at all. At the close

of the XVIIth Century the nearest a square-rigged ship could sail to the wind was about seven points, which, with better cut sails, was later reduced to six points. The jib, also, did not replace the spritsail, but the spritsail topsail and its mast.

When, however, Mr. Ehrman comes to the details of administration—dockyards, materials and their supply, pay, personnel, victualling, etc.—he is on surer ground, and the reader is given a very complete picture of the intricacies of Admiralty business at that time and how this affected officers and men. It is explained how the control and procedure initiated by Pepys was gradually moulded into a system which is essentially not greatly different from that of the present day. This detailed and fully documented information will be of the greatest use to the serious student of naval affairs, but the lay reader may possibly find that it makes rather heavy reading and that he cannot readily see the wood for the trees.

Part II comprises a comprehensive survey of the progress of the war and the steps taken to fit out the expanding fleet which was required to fight an enemy, not only in home waters but also in the Mediterranean. The political ramifications both before and consequent on our defeat at the Battle of Beachy Head have a chapter to themselves. The strategic importance of the Battle of Barfleur and its immediate aftermath, the fireship attack at La Hougue, is not neglected. It is shown how, for the first time, a major Mediterranean strategy came into being, for France maintained a fleet based at Toulon as well as at Brest, and that it was mainly owing to the insistence of William III, who kept a taut personal hand on naval strategy, that the heavy ships remained out in the Mediterranean all through the Winter of 1694-5, refitting at Cadiz, instead of coming home in the Autumn.

A few errors and misprints have slipped through the final proof reading. For example, "scarp" (p. 13) should be "scarph"; the battle of Lowestoft took place in 1665 (p. 22), and that of Beachy Head was on the 30th (p. 350). The footnote on page 397 about La Hougue is not quite correct. There never was a ship named *La Hogue*, though there has been, and is, a *Hogue*. The battle honour is named "Barfleur," the fireship attack at La Hougue being considered to be a non-stop continuation of the battle of Barfleur. In a few instances personal names are incorrectly spelt, e.g. Thomas Corbet, the joint Secretary of the Admiralty, is shown with two "t's"; Du Bart should be Jean Bart; Collins's Christian name was Greenville, not Grenville; and Hopson's second "n" is omitted. In footnote 6 on page 262 the name of this ship was the *Kingfisher*, not the *Kingfisher Ketch*: "Ketch" should have been printed as "ketch," this being the type of vessel and not part of her name.

The book is nicely produced and the illustrations are excellent. The index meets all requirements. On the whole, Mr. Ehrman is to be congratulated on having produced a valuable work of reference on naval administration at the end of the XVIIth Century.

ARMY

The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. (Collins.) 25s.

Field-Marshal Rommel, with a view to publishing a book after the war, kept most voluminous papers of his activities while on active service. These, which escaped many searches for them when Germany collapsed, form the basis of the present book. Interspersed with them are many letters which Rommel wrote to his wife.

Few documents of the war can be quite as valuable as these, for Rommel's reputation as a leader and his tactical skill as an army commander are unquestioned. He was, perhaps, the outstanding soldier on either side thrown up by the war, quick, brilliant, incisive, and with a tremendous flair for seizing the fleeting moment for a devastating stroke. The long tale of his successes was a guarantee of his military greatness, and in the end he was beaten not by any tactical blindness on his part, but by a chronic shortage of supplies and by a crazy interference from above. El Alamein and Normandy, both of them defeats, cannot detract from his reputation as an outstanding genius in war.

There is more in these papers which he left behind than the mere narrative of his campaigns. They abound in his reflections on the military art, in criticisms of the day to day events in his campaigns, and in a studied and objective view of the conduct of operations. As such they are of extreme value, not only as an authentic and exciting chronicle of some of the most dramatic episodes of the war, but also for the insight they give of a brilliant generalship and a consummate artistry that cannot fail to excite admiration.

The papers, too, reveal a Rommel who lives fully up to the almost mythical picture that his deeds conjured up. As one reads this thoroughly exciting book, Rommel emerges as a figure who must command the greatest respect from friend and foe alike. He was a true soldier, equally gallant in victory and defeat, and perhaps the supreme interpreter of modern warfare.

This is one of the most important books which the war has yet produced. It is of vital interest, not only for its graphic and first-hand account of the operations from the viewpoint of the enemy commander, but also for the extremely valuable lessons which Rommel has to teach. This is, without question, a book that must not on any account be missed.

Red Coat. An Anthology of the British Soldier During the Last Three Hundred Years. By E. W. Sheppard. (Batchworth Press.) 20s.

As the preacher in Ecclesiastes might well have said: "Of making many *anthologies* there is no end." According to the author the purpose of this particular anthology "is to outline this type (the British fighting man) with the help of extracts from memoirs, histories, autobiography, and poetry."

In order to achieve his object Major Sheppard has ranged over three hundred years of time, and in his choice of writers he has also been most catholic. Such variety cannot but make strange bedfellows, as for example: Thackeray and Gilbert Frankau, Dickens and Siegfried Sassoon, Hardy and Ian Hay—to mention only a few. In the poetry section we meet several old friends like "Tommy," "The Shropshire Lad," and "The British Grenadiers." There are a number of illustrations, showing different aspects of military life up to the 1914-18 War, including the well-known Bairnsfather "Mice" cartoon.

Organization and Administration in the Indian Army. By Brigadier Rajendra Singh. (Gale and Polden.) 15s.

This book, intended for the use of the officers of the Indian Army, follows the pattern of General Lindsell's well-known treatise for the British Army, though it includes some additional subjects. The author has succeeded in producing a comprehensive work of great value to regimental and to staff officers which deserves to achieve as wide a circulation as the classic which inspired it.

The first three parts are devoted to organization, command, and control both in principle and detail, including staff and regimental duties. Two chapters are allotted to Engineers and Signals. Engineers, we note, come under the Quartermaster-General in the modern Indian Army, which has also retained the Master-General of the Ordnance as a principal staff officer.

The last war has shown the vital part played by administration under modern conditions, and the truth of the old dictum: "War is first and foremost a matter of movement," has once more been proved. We know, too, that improvisation is often necessary on active service, but that it is unlikely to succeed unless based on a thorough grasp of principles and normal methods. These are clearly described in the following parts. Part IV covers the principles of administration, the functions and organization of the services, administrative appreciations and orders, staff duties, and relations with the services. Parts V and VI are concerned with lines of communications, maintenance, and movement. Part VII deals with various 'A' subjects such as manpower and evacua-

tion of casualties as well as 'Q' matters, including the supply of troops in the field and in peace. The final part gives information and advice on the important subject of interior economy.

The book is written in a clear, colloquial style; reference to any particular subject being facilitated by the arrangement of the text, by a full index, and a number of useful diagrams. This work should be welcomed by those for whom it is primarily intended; they will surely benefit by using it as a guide to the solution of both theoretical and practical problems.

The History of British Army Signals in the Second World War. By Major-General R. F. H. Nalder, C.B., O.B.E. (Published by the Royal Signals Institution.) 17s. 6d.

Prior to his retirement in 1947, the author of this excellent survey of the work of British Army Signals in the late war held the important appointment of Director of Signals and Signal Officer in Chief at G.H.Q. India. His book contains no operational accounts of individual signal units nor does he refer to the gallantry of such units in the carrying out of their tasks, but he writes as an expert, funding the knowledge he has gained for the benefit of those who must follow. His book, which is complementary to the official monograph compiled by Colonel Gravely, should be carefully studied not only by the officers of the Corps to which he belonged but by all staff officers as well.

During the inter-war period most branches of the Army suffered from some form of neglect, and it is possible that Signals bore more than their share of the economies then in force, for in peace-time civilian sources can carry so much of the traffic. There could, however, be no more fatal policy to pursue, for Signals are the essence of command and the author makes clear the disabilities under which they laboured in the earlier years of the war. That they succeeded so quickly in overcoming them must for ever redound to the credit of the Corps.

He deals with the main developments in each of the three principal theatres of war and is especially interesting on the subject of "Direction and Control." Each theatre has its lessons but the one which is common to all is co-operation and he has much to say on this theme, not only as between the various Signals organizations concerned on an inter-Allied scale, but also at the lower levels on an inter-Service and inter-arm basis. In many of the campaigns a very wide collaboration with civilian signal resources was an essential and these cases are explored.

On the more technical side, chapters are devoted to organization and manpower, signal system and traffic, wireless, line communications, security, and equipment. Each is dealt with in a way that the non-professional reader can understand, and the author considers that if no great technical advance occurred the improvement in signal technique was immense, and stresses the need for a very close relationship between a commander, his staff, and his Signals. His book is a mine of information for the other arms and services, and it is apparent that any unit or formation which neglects to maintain a very close liaison with its Signals only gets the communications it deserves.

The Royal Hampshire Regiment. Volume Two, 1914-1918. By C. T. Atkinson. (Published privately.)

This volume covers the operations and activities of the thirty-three battalions of the Royal Hampshire Regiment during the 1914-18 War. Events are taken, with minor exceptions and overlaps, in chronological order, which enables the reader to maintain a clear picture of the war as a whole, but makes it slightly difficult to follow the history of any particular battalion. The writer of any regimental history is faced with this problem of striking a balance between the interests of purely regimental readers and a more general public, and this is specially difficult where the movements of so many units have to be included in the story. On the whole the author has succeeded in satisfying both types of reader.

From the general reader's point of view there are many items of great interest, such as the narrative of the 15th Battalion's part in the capture of Flers in September, 1916, the first occasion when tanks were used in battle. Another narrative of absorbing interest is an eye-witness's account of the *River Clyde* operation during the landing on Gallipoli.

These are only two of many breaks in the inevitably rather monotonous sameness of ordinary infantry frontal attacks, which were typical of the trench warfare period on the Western Front. But even these grim and colourless battles are described in a matter-of-fact manner which will bring back very vividly to the minds of any who took part in similar work, the true atmosphere of the great 'pushes' of 1916-18.

The story also deals with Mesopotamia, the Balkans, India, Aden, and Palestine, in all of which units of the Regiment took part in active operations. After the Armistice many of the battalions were employed on police duties and small wars in lesser known theatres such as North Russia, the Caspian region, and Persia.

The author has defeated the problem of expensive maps by providing a lavish number of rough but adequate sketches, which greatly assist in following the narrative of minor battles. The book is well indexed and documented.

History of the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Goorkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles).

Volume III, 1921-1948. By Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Stevens, O.B.E. (Gale and Polden.) 25s.

This is the third volume of the history of a Regiment which has every reason to be proud of what it has achieved during nearly 140 years of service. The narrative begins with a chronicle of events between the wars; records the Regiment's service on the North-West Frontier and the raising of new battalions after the outbreak of the 1939-45 War; then, goes on to relate the story of each battalion separately. The final chapters cover the work of the Regimental Centre, regimental matters, and the unit's last days in the Indian Army, after which the 1st and 2nd Battalions left the old Regimental 'Home' at Dehra Dun to continue in the Queen's service elsewhere.

Seven chapters are devoted to the amazing odyssey of the 1st Battalion—Persian Gulf, Cyprus, Libya, Tunisia, Italy, and Greece—mainly with the immortal 4th Indian Division. Of all the many actions in which the unit fought with great dash, Wadi Akarit was the one in which the tactical ability, discipline, and morale of the Regiment was shown to a marked degree. In adversity, too, as at Cassino, or the tragic loss of the 2nd Battalion at Singapore, the 2nd Gurkha's discipline and *esprit-de-corps* never faltered.

The 3rd Battalion, resurrected in October, 1940, was at first stationed on the frontier but, in June, 1942, joined the 77th Indian Brigade for service in Burma. Their experiences in the first Chindit operation were unfortunate, and the author claims, with good reason, that the training and organization laid down by Wingate was distinctly faulty. However, the wreck of the Battalion eventually reached India; and, after careful retraining and rehabilitation, returned to Burma in March, 1944, and, as the author puts it: "found a fierce satisfaction in this (Arakan) campaign," in which it did very well indeed.

Two new battalions, the 4th and 5th, raised in March, 1941, and March, 1942, respectively, did most of their service on the frontier. The 4th, however, reached Burma in time to take a noteworthy part in the last phase of the war.

The author has succeeded in presenting the fine story of the 2nd Gurkhas clearly and well. This is a work of considerable interest not only to past and present officers of Gurkhas, but to those others who would learn something of the value of training and *esprit-de-corps*. It is a handsomely produced volume, provided with charts, the usual appendices, and some excellent illustrations.

A History of the 4th Prince of Wales's Own Gurkha Rifles. Volume III, 1938-1948. By Colonel J. N. Mackay, D.S.O. (Blackwood.) 42s.

This volume carries the regimental history through to the final transfer of the Regiment from British allegiance to service in the new Indian Army. It includes, therefore, not only detailed accounts of the war services of all component units during 1939-45, but it gives also a revealing picture of some of the military problems which faced units of the old Indian Army during the transitional phase of massacre and confusion which marked the separation of India and Pakistan.

The narratives of wartime operations are unusually vivid, being compiled largely from the verbatim narratives of various commanding officers who took part in these operations. One result of this system of narration is that a great deal of detail has been included, which will certainly be of lasting interest to officers of the 4th Gurkha Rifles, but may require to be skimmed by readers who have not served in that Regiment.

To assess the appeal of this book to prospective readers it seems advisable to divide these into four categories. All who served with the Regiment during the late war will read the book from cover to cover with avid interest, for it is essentially a 'family' history of a particularly readable style. This applies only slightly less strongly to past members of other Gurkha units, for every page is redolent of the spirit of that magnificent fighting race. For the same reason old 'qui hais' of non-Gurkha upbringing, but who have had the honour of serving alongside Gurkha regiments, will find the joy of happy memories in almost every page.

For the less fortunate reader who has never met Gurkhas this book abounds in deeply interesting matter. The last stand of the 2nd Battalion in the Western Desert and the capture of Mandalay Hill by the 4th Battalion are only two out of many equally fine pieces of plain fighting narrative. To the serious student of war the book offers lessons on how first-class Infantry can adapt itself to almost any problem of modern war.

A pleasant feature of the book is the profusion of small marginal sketches depicting characteristics of local life. As is only proper in a book on Gurkhas, sport is given its due share of space throughout, starting with a tiger shoot on the second page! A very human and readable volume adequately provided with sketch-maps and a good index.

ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(* Books for Reference in the Library only)

GENERAL

- BLIND WHITE FISH IN PERSIA. By Anthony Smith. Demy 8vo. 231 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1953.) 16s.
- THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA. By Sir Percival Griffiths. Medium 8vo. 519 pages. (MacDonald, 1952.) 45s.
- THE CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY. By T. K. Derry. Royal 8vo. 289 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1952.) 35s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- CLINICAL PROBLEMS OF WAR. By Allan S. Walker. Medium 8vo. 725 pages. (Australian War Memorial, 1953.) 37s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers.
- THE COMMUNIST TECHNIQUE IN BRITAIN. By Bob Darke. Demy 8vo. 159 pages. (Collins, 1952.) 10s. 6d.
- EXPLORATION FAWCETT. By Colonel P. H. Fawcett. Medium 8vo. 311 pages. (Hutchinson, 1953.) 15s.
- A FORGOTTEN JOURNEY. By Peter Fleming. Crown 8vo. 189 pages. (Hart-Davis, 1952.) 10s. 6d.
- FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, 1863-1942. By George Seaver. Crown 8vo. 391 pages. (John Murray, 1953.) 25s.
- HIMMLER. The evil genius of the Third Reich. By Willi Frischauer. Demy 8vo. 269 pages. (Odhams Press, 1953.) 16s.
- *THE HISTORY OF THE CORONATION. By Laurence E. Tanner. Medium 4to. 96 pages. (Pitkin, 1952.) 17s. 6d.
- ILLUSTRATED SOCIAL HISTORY. Volume IV. The Nineteenth Century. By G. M. Trevelyan. Large post 8vo. 185 pages. (Longmans, 1952.) 25s.
- LACHLAN MACQUARIE. His Life, Adventures, and Times. By M. H. Ellis. Medium 8vo. 614 pages. (Angus and Robertson, 1952.) 50s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE LIFE AND DEATH OF STALIN. By Louis Fischer. Demy 8vo. 255 pages. (Jonathan Cape, 1953.) 16s.
- LIVING DANGEROUSLY. By F. Spencer Chapman, D.S.O. Demy 8vo. 189 pages. (Chatto and Windus, 1953.) 12s. 6d.
- LONDON CALLING THE NORTH POLE. By H. G. Giskes. Demy 8vo. 207 pages. (William Kimber, 1953.) 15s.
- MA-RAI-EE. Malaya under Japanese occupation. By a Malayan Chinese. Demy 8vo. 254 pages. (Harrap, 1953.) 12s. 6d.
- MAU MAU. By L. S. B. Leakey. Crown 8vo. 115 pages. (Methuen, 1953.) 7s. 6d.
- *THE MOUNT EVEREST RECONNAISSANCE EXPEDITION, 1951. By Eric Shipton. Medium 4to. 128 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1953.) 25s.
- REVOLUTION IN CHINA. By C. P. Fitzgerald. Large post 8vo. 289 pages. (The Cresset Press, 1952.) 21s.
- RUMOURS OF WAR. By A. J. P. Taylor. Demy 8vo. 261 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1952.) 15s.
- SALISBURY, 1830-1903. Portrait of a Statesman. By A. L. Kennedy, M.C., M.A. Demy 8vo. 409 pages. (John Murray, 1953.) 25s.
- THE SILENT WORLD. By J. Y. Cousteau. Medium 8vo. 148 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1953.) 18s.

- THE STORY OF EVEREST, 1921-1952. By W. H. Murray. Demy 8vo. 193 pages. (Dent, 1953.) 15s.
- THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY. A revised edition, which includes the 1939-45 War. By Major E. W. Sheppard. Demy 8vo. 142 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1952.) 15s.
- THE SUDAN. By J. R. S. Duncan. Demy 8vo. 281 pages. (Blackwood, 1952.) 12s. 6d.
- THEY HAVE THEIR EXITS. By Airey Neave. Demy 8vo. 191 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1953.) 12s. 6d.
- TITO SPEAKS. By Vladimir Dedijer. Demy 8vo. 456 pages. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953.) 21s.
- WINSTON CHURCHILL. The Era and the Man. By Virginia Cowles. Demy 8vo. 377 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1953.) 18s.
- A YEAR OF SPACE. A Chapter in Autobiography. By Eric Linklater. Demy 8vo. 273 pages. (Macmillan, 1953.) 18s.

NAVAL

- EPICS OF SALVAGE. By David Masters. Demy 8vo. 264 pages. (Cassell, 1953.) 18s.
- THE NAVY IN THE WAR OF WILLIAM III, 1689-1697. By John Ehrman. Medium 8vo. 719 pages. (Cambridge University Press, 1953.) 63s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- NEW ZEALAND'S NAVAL STORY. By T. D. Taylor. Medium 8vo. 337 pages. (A. H. and A. W. Reed, New Zealand, 1953.) 22s. 6d.
- VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC. Battle Report series. Prepared from Official Sources by Captain Walter Karig, U.S.N.R., and others. Medium 8vo. 548 pages. (Rinehart and Co. Inc., 1949.) Presented by Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Fooks, O.B.E.

ARMY

- *THE HISTORY OF BRITISH ARMY SIGNALS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By Major-General R. F. B. Nalder, C.B., O.B.E. Medium 8vo. 377 pages. (Royal Signals Institution, 1953.) 17s. 6d. Presented by The Royal Signals Institution. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- *THE ROYAL HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT—Volume Two, 1914-1918. By C. T. Atkinson. Medium 8vo. 515 pages. (Published privately.) Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- *HISTORY OF THE 2ND KING EDWARD VII'S OWN GOORKHA RIFLES (THE SIRMOR RIFLES). Volume Three, 1921-1948. By Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Stevens, O.B.E. Super Royal 8vo. 322 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1953.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- *A HISTORY OF THE 4TH PRINCE OF WALES'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES. Volume III, 1938-1948. Compiled by Colonel J. N. Mackay, D.S.O. Crown 4to. 620 pages. (Blackwood, 1952.) 42s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- BRITAIN AT ARMS. By Thomas Gilby. Crown 8vo. 361 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1953.) 12s. 6d.
- COMMANDO. By Brigadier John Durnford-Slater, D.S.O. Large Post 8vo. 222 page (William Kimber, 1953.) 15s.
- AN EPISODE IN THE SPANISH WAR, 1739-1744. By the Hon. Arthur C. Murray, C.M.G., D.S.O. Demy 8vo. 91 pages. (Seeley, Service and Co., 1952.) 10s. 6d.
- HAIG MASTER OF THE FIELD. By Major-General Sir John Davidson, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O. Demy 8vo. 158 pages. (Peter Nevill, 1953.) 21s.

- A HILL IN KOREA. By Simon Kent. Crown 8vo. 240 pages. (Hutchinson, 1953.) 10s. 6d.
- ILLYRIAN VENTURE. By Brigadier "Trotsky" Davies. Large Post 8vo. 246 pages. (The Bodley Head, 1952.) 18s.
- THE MILITARY NECESSITY. By Alfred de Vigny. Demy 8vo. 208 pages. (The Cresset Press, 1953.) 12s. 6d.
- ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE INDIAN ARMY. By Brigadier Rajendra Singh. Crown 8vo. 380 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1953.) 15s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE ROMMEL PAPERS. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Demy 8vo. 545 pages. (Collins, 1953.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE SHADOW OF STALINGRAD. By Heinrich von Einsiedel. Crown 8vo. 254 pages. (Allan Wingate, 1953.) 15s.
- WHY WATERLOO? By A. P. Herbert. Crown 8vo. 404 pages. (Methuen, 1952.) 15s.

AIR

- STRATEGIC AIR POWER. The Pattern of Dynamic Security. By Stefan T. Possony. Medium 8vo. 313 pages. (Washington Infantry Journal Press, 1949.) 45s.

NOTE

In addition to the books presented a number are also purchased for the Library.

ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-SECOND ANNIVERSARY MEETING

ON TUESDAY, 3RD MARCH, 1953, at 3 p.m.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES M. ROBB, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.,
presiding

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice convening
the meeting which appeared in *The Times* of Thursday, 19th February, 1953.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1952

The Council have the honour to present their Annual Report for the year
1952.

PATRONAGE OF THE SOVEREIGN

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was graciously pleased to become the
Patron of the Institution.

The Institution has been honoured with the Patronage of the Sovereign
ever since it was founded in the reign of King William IV.

CORONATION ARRANGEMENTS

A special Committee consisting of the Vice-Chairman of the Council, the
Chairman of the Finance Committee, and Commodore R. Harrison, D.S.O.,
R.D., R.N.R., has been deputed by the Council to make arrangements for
members and their friends to view the Coronation Procession on 2nd June,
1953, from the Institution and Banqueting House. Particulars were published
in the Secretary's Notes in the Journal for November, 1952.

COUNCIL

VICE-PRESIDENT

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., A.F.C., was elected for a further term as a Vice-President.

ELECTED MEMBERS

The following elections were made to vacancies on the Council :—

Major-General R. A. Hull, C.B., D.S.O., vice General The Lord Ismay,
P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., M.C.

General Sir Richard N. Gale, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., vice General
Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.

Lieut.-General J. C. Westall, C.B., C.B.E., R.M., vice Major-General
H. T. Tollemache, C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

Vice-Admiral J. A. S. Eccles, C.B., C.B.E., vice Rear-Admiral R. M. J.
Hutton, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Rear-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B.E., D.S.O., vice Rear-Admiral W. W.
Davis, C.B., D.S.O.

Air Vice-Marshal W. M. Yool, C.B., C.B.E., vice Air Commodore
F. Crerar, C.B.E., A.D.C.

Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., vice
Major-General R. A. Hull, C.B., D.S.O.

The following Members of the Council, having completed three years service, retire but offer themselves for re-election, for which they are eligible :—

Royal Navy—

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O.

Royal Naval Reserve—

Commodore R. Harrison, D.S.O., R.D., R.N.R.

Regular Army—

Major-General J. A. Gascoigne, C.B., D.S.O.

Territorial Army—

Major-General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L.

Royal Air Force—

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Lieut.-General Sir Colin B. Callander, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., succeeded General Sir Richard N. Gale, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., as the War Office Representative.

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

The following accepted the Council's invitation to become ex officio Members of the Council on taking up their appointments :—

Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., First Sea Lord.

General Sir John Harding, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

General Sir Frank Simpson, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commandant of the Imperial Defence College.

Major-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley.

Air Vice-Marshal L. Darvall, C.B., M.C., Commandant of the Joint Services Staff College.

Vice-Admiral C. A. L. Mansergh, C.B., D.S.C., President of the Royal Naval Staff College, Greenwich.

Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E., Director, Territorial Army and Cadets.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1952 was 6,251 compared with 6,310 in 1951. During the year 250 members joined the Institution compared with 280 in 1951. The following shows the figures for the past seven years :—

| Year | Joined | | Total | Re- signed | Deceased | | Struck off | Total |
|----------|--------|------|-------|---------------|----------|------|---------------|-------|
| | Annual | Life | | | Annual | Life | | |
| 1952 ... | 197 | 53 | 250 | 206 | 56 | 21 | 26 | 309 |
| 1951 ... | 224 | 56 | 280 | 125 | 49 | 35 | 24 | 233 |
| 1950 ... | 289 | 56 | 345 | 126 | 41 | 50 | 21 | 238 |
| 1949 ... | 397 | 103 | 500 | 185 | 58 | 64 | 57 | 364 |
| 1948 ... | 449 | 128 | 577 | 270 | 44 | 29 | 35 | 378 |
| 1947 ... | 407 | 276 | 683 | 390 | 63 | 31 | 36 | 520 |
| 1946 ... | 433 | 163 | 596 | 135 | 56 | 46 | 24 | 261 |

The details of members joining during the year 1952 are as follows :—

| | |
|--|-------|
| Regular Army | 133 |
| Royal Air Force | 50 |
| Royal Navy | 29 |
| Territorial Army | 12 |
| Indian Forces | 7 |
| Pakistan Forces | 6 |
| Royal Marines | 3 |
| Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve | 3 |
| W.R.A.C. | 2 |
| Dominion Forces | 2 |
| W.R.A.F. | 1 |
| Royal Naval Reserve | 1 |
| Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve | 1 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 250 |
| | <hr/> |

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Revenue Account shows the financial benefit to the Institution arising from the co-operation of members who covenant to pay their subscription.

A Council resolution in October, 1951, approved that all second and subsequent annual covenants may be executed at the rate of £1 5s. 0d. while the standard rate remains at £1 10s. 0d.

At the end of 1952, there were 1,429 annual covenanted subscriptions compared with 1,531 in 1951; and 684 covenanted life subscriptions compared with 768 in 1951.

During 1952, 350 annual covenants, out of a total number of 455, were renewed on expiry, and 116 life covenants completed the seven year period.

FINANCE

The excess of income over expenditure is £103 10s. 5d. compared with a deficit in 1951 of £905 9s. 8d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below :—

| RECEIPTS | | | | 1952 | | | 1951 | | |
|--|--|--|--|-------|----|----|-------|----|----|
| | | | | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
| Annual Subscriptions | | | | 5,898 | 11 | 0 | 5,915 | 10 | 6 |
| Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit) | | | | 1,998 | 11 | 0 | 2,073 | 4 | 0 |
| Museum | | | | 3,830 | 10 | 6 | 3,176 | 13 | 0 |
| Journal Sales | | | | 2,900 | 15 | 6 | 1,934 | 17 | 3 |
| Journal Advertisements | | | | 558 | 10 | 11 | 479 | 2 | 3 |
| Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets | | | | 137 | 18 | 11 | 181 | 9 | 10 |

Life Subscriptions (brought to credit) represent £1 10s. 0d. from each life member whose payment has not yet been so expended. The balance, in each case, is held in the Life Subscription Fund. The sum of £1,484 14s. 0d. has been transferred to this Fund on account of tax rebate on covenanted life subscriptions.

Museum. Admissions to the Museum are the highest on record, although they have, of course, received the full benefit of the increased prices instituted in May, 1951.

Journal Sales. The price of the Journal was increased in January, 1952. This factor plus a rise in the number of copies sold results in a record figure.

Journal Advertisements. The previous highest figure was £557 in 1946.

Catalogues and Pamphlets. The fall here is no doubt due to the increased admission charges.

| | EXPENDITURE | | | | | |
|---|-------------|----|----|-------|----|----|
| | 1952 | | | 1951 | | |
| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
| Salaries, Wages, and National Insurance | 9,499 | 13 | 2 | 8,651 | 15 | 2 |
| Journal Printing | 4,440 | 8 | 2 | 4,203 | 17 | 10 |
| Library—Purchase of Books | 326 | 10 | 7 | 368 | 18 | 5 |
| Binding | 96 | 3 | 0 | 44 | 15 | 6 |
| Fuel | 242 | 15 | 6 | 206 | 3 | 2 |
| Lighting and Electric Fires | 483 | 11 | 7 | 451 | 5 | 8 |
| General Repairs and Maintenance | 169 | 2 | 6 | 2,213 | 11 | 1 |
| Other Printing and Stationery | 357 | 5 | 2 | 324 | 7 | 8 |
| Museum Expenses | 158 | 6 | 4 | 332 | 1 | 11 |

Salaries and Wages. These items are now shown under one heading. The increase is due to additional remuneration authorized for the Clerical and Attendant Staffs during the year.

Journal Printing. The increase is for a full year of the higher charges made by the Printers in 1951.

General Repairs and Maintenance. The amount for 1951 includes the major part of costs for redecorating the Banqueting Hall.

GENERAL

The balance sheet this year is produced in a form that more clearly indicates the actual financial position of the Institution. In previous years the Museum exhibits, books, maps, and charts have been included as assets; but, since the values of these must be arbitrary and lacking in market assessment, the Council, after professional advice, decided to omit them. The items remain, of course, insured against fire for an estimated sum, but from an ethical point of view it is inconceivable that they would ever be offered for public sale.

JOURNAL

The popularity of the Journal has continued. Apart from cash sales to non-members which were maintained, 216 new non-member subscribers outnumbered those who failed to renew their subscriptions by 52, despite the increase in cost. New subscribers included 6 from Canada, 29 from India, 47 from Pakistan, 9 from the U.S.A., and 24 from Italy.

The receipts for Journal sales in the Finance Section reflect the higher price charged for the Journal. In addition to this, the number of copies sold to non-members shows a considerable increase over the figure for 1951.

The number of valuable lectures given at the Institution during the year and the considerable number of articles received from officers and others have enabled a high standard to be maintained. Moreover, the balance of the contents of the Journal has tended to improve as a result of an increase of contributions from each service.

The late commencement of the lecture season made it impracticable to include any lectures in the November number. To do so would have meant delay in issue and possible overlap with Christmas period posts. It was felt, therefore, that members would prefer to receive their November Journals as early as possible, especially on this occasion when it contained leaflets regarding Coronation arrangements.

The increase in the number of books received with a request for a review indicates a rising appreciation of the "Reviews of Books" section of the Journal, as a result of which the Library also benefits.

The invaluable help given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the lecture programme, in facilitating approval for articles written by serving officers, and in giving advice in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

LIBRARY

The number of books issued on loan during the year was 6,041. A comparison with the previous year's figure of 5,645 reflects the growing popularity of the Library. Accessions amounted to 389 against 437 in 1951.

Several interesting gifts of books have been made to the Library by members and others interested in the Institution, and these are gratefully acknowledged.

In addition to the normal research work by members, many accredited visitors have been provided with information.

The efficient working of the Library has not been helped by certain members who have disregarded the rules by keeping books for periods far exceeding the time laid down. There have been even more regrettable cases of failing to return books at all. The few members to whom this applies are asked to think of the obvious inconveniences caused to other members, as well as the unnecessary administrative expense.

MUSEUM

During the year ended 31st December, 1952, 33,771 adults and 17,651 children paid for admission to the Museum, compared with 34,354 adults and 13,779 in 1951. Free admission was given to 5,589 members of the Services and to 2,239 guests of members, school parties, cadets and scouts, and foreign officers attached to H.M. Forces. The total figures for the year showed an increase of 3,571.

His Excellency the United States Ambassador visited the Museum on 17th November and was received by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council and Admiral Sir Henry Moore. The Mayor of Westminster was also invited, but was prevented from accepting. Among other visitors during the year were His Excellency the High Commissioner of Malaya, the C.-in-C. Indian Army, a Burmese Military Mission, the Minister of Works and his

Parliamentary Secretary, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for War, and the Under Secretary of State for War.

A start has been made to provide drawings to illustrate the evolution of certain items of uniform and these are displayed in their appropriate cases. Although primarily intended for the student, they arouse considerable interest among ordinary visitors.

The revision and checking of each item on display or in store has made satisfactory progress, but it will be a considerable time before the work is completed and a new catalogue produced.

Close liaison with the Imperial War Museum has been maintained and a general policy of co-operation established.

On 8th January, a broadcast by the B.B.C. for the Home and Overseas Services was made from the Banqueting Hall. It provided the Institution and Museum with some excellent publicity, and a consequent rise in paid admissions to the Museum. Material assistance was also given to the B.B.C. in the broadcast from the Wellington Museum, Apsley House, in July.

The bulk of the regimental silver of The Royal Dublin Fusiliers was transferred to Army museums and messes under the direction of a committee of former members of the Regiment, and this gesture was greatly appreciated by the recipients.

The Institution acknowledges the gift or loan of many valuable and interesting exhibits received during the year from generous donors. Details of these have been published in the Secretary's Notes in the Journal.

Several members of the Institution, who are experts in their own field of research, have continued to give their services and among these special mention must be made of Captain H. T. A. Bosanquet, R.N., and Captain W. A. Tinlin. The Museum lost a valuable friend when the death occurred of Mr. J. W. Latham, the eminent authority on swords. Mr. Latham was not only the leading adviser in the manufacture of the "Stalingrad Sword" but he also carried out much of the delicate craftsmanship with his own hands.

Practical help to Service and other Museums by the gift or loan of exhibits was continued throughout the year, and the following have benefited :—

The Life Guards; 4th Queen's Own Hussars; Royal Regiment of Artillery; Corps of Royal Engineers; 25th Field Engineer Regiment, R.E.; Foot Guards Depot; The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers; The Royal Sussex Regiment; The Royal Hampshire Regiment; The Middlesex Regiment; The King's Royal Rifle Corps; The Rifle Brigade; London Irish Rifles; Royal Army Chaplains' Department; Royal Army Service Corps; Royal Army Medical Corps; Royal Army Ordnance Corps; Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers; Royal Army Pay Corps; Royal Army Educational Corps; Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; School of Infantry; Inns of Court Regiment; University of London U.T.C., T.A.; Officer Cadet School, Eaton Hall; Madras Regimental Centre; Army Cadet Force Association; London Irish Cadet Association; Army Rifle Association; National Maritime Museum; Imperial War Museum; United Service Museum, Edinburgh; Victoria and Albert Museum; Science Museum; London Museum; Ethnological Museum; British Horological Institute; Colchester and Essex Museum; St. Mary's L.C.C. School; North Lambeth Scout Group; and the Victoria and Leopold 1st Exhibition, Belgium.

CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1952

| | £ | s. | d. | | £ | s. | d. |
|---|-----|----|-----|---|-----|----|-----------|
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :- | | | | DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1951 | | | 3 10 0 |
| Balance at Bankers | 46 | 5 | 7 | BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1952 :- | | | |
| Investment at Market Price | 244 | 6 | 0 | Balance at Bankers | 54 | 13 | 7 |
| Dividends Received, Gross | 280 | 11 | 7 | Investment at Market Price :- | | | |
| | | 8 | 8 0 | £280 3% Savings Bonds 1950-70 | 240 | 16 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | 285 9 7 |
| | | | | | | | £288 19 7 |

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1952, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, LONDON, E.C.2.
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
20th January, 1953.BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1952

| | £ | s. | d. | | £ | s. | d. |
|---|-------|----|-----|--|-------|----|--------------|
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :- | | | | PRIZE ESSAY | | | 31 10 0 |
| Balance at Bankers | 190 | 8 | 10 | DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENTS since 31st December, 1951 | | | 12 11 10 |
| Investments at Market Prices | 1,670 | 18 | 8 | BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1952 :- | | | |
| Dividends Received, Gross | 1,861 | 7 | 6 | Balance at Bankers | 223 | 2 | 2 |
| | | 64 | 3 4 | Investments at Market Prices :- | | | |
| | | | | £1,922 10s. 3d. British Transport 3% Guaranteed Stock 1978-88 | 1,480 | 6 | 10 |
| | | | | £100 0s. 0d. 3½% War Stock | 78 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | £100 0s. 0d. 3% Defence Bonds | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | 1,881 9 0 |
| | | | | | | | £1,925 10 10 |

We have audited the above Statement of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1952, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, LONDON, E.C.2.
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
20th January, 1953.BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

BRACKENBURY MEMORIAL FUND

31ST DECEMBER, 1952

| | £ | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. |
|--|-----|----|----|------|----|----|
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :- | | | | | | |
| Balance at Bankers | 14 | 16 | 7 | | | |
| Investment at Market Price | 341 | 1 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | 355 | 17 | 7 |
| Dividends Received, Gross | | | | 14 | 14 | 8 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| EXPENDITURE ON BOOKS, Etc. | | | | | | |
| ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION Administration Fee-1952 | | | | | | |
| DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1951 | | | | | | |
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1952 :- | | | | | | |
| Balance at Bankers | | | | 23 | 14 | 7 |
| Investment at Market Price :- | | | | | | |
| £421 1s. 0d. 3½% War Stock | | | | 328 | 8 | 5 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | 352 | 3 | 0 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | £370 | 12 | 3 |

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1952, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
20th January, 1953.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL FUND

31ST DECEMBER, 1952

| | s. | d. | £ | s. | d. | |
|--|-----|----|---|------|----|---|
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1951 :— | | | | | | |
| Balance at Bankers | 21 | 9 | 3 | | | |
| Investment at Market Price | 122 | 3 | 0 | | | |
| | | | | 143 | 12 | 3 |
| Dividends Received, Gross | | | | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1951 | | | | | | |
| BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1952 :— | | | | | | |
| Balance at Bankers | | | | 25 | 13 | 3 |
| Investment at Market Price :— | | | | | | |
| £140 3% Savings Bonds 1960-70 | | | | 120 | 8 | 0 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | 146 | 1 | 3 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | £147 | 16 | 3 |

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilmot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1952, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
20th January, 1953.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN: Our Chairman, General Sir Ouvry Roberts, desires me to express his apologies for his inability to be here this afternoon. If you did not know already, you will have seen in yesterday's *Times* that he is now in Germany where he has a big programme of important duties to fulfil.

As you will see from the Agenda, the first resolution stands in my name, but before putting it to the meeting I propose to follow the custom of referring as briefly as possible to the principal events of the year.

Following the lamented death of King George VI, a message of condolence in the name of the Institution was sent to Her Majesty and Members of the Royal Family. In due course we were again honoured by the Patronage of the Sovereign, thus continuing in unbroken succession the Royal mark of appreciation since the Institution was founded. The last Royal Lady to give her Patronage was Queen Victoria, to whom we owe the gracious gift of the use of the Banqueting House.

During the year under review a proposal regarding the permanent use of the Banqueting House for Government entertaining was due to be laid before Parliament by a private member, who had given us fair warning of his intention. Your Council set up a committee consisting of Admiral Sir Henry Moore, Major-General J. A. Gascoigne, and Brigadier Sir George Harvie-Watt to look after our interests. They obtained the active support of the Service Chiefs, the First Lord, the Secretaries of State for War and Air, and last, but by no means least in these circumstances, the Minister of Works.

It so happened that on the day the proposal was to be brought up—18th November to be precise—the ordinary business of the House did not finish until 4 a.m. the following day. Not surprisingly, the member deferred his proposal. However, I am told that he is not abandoning his intention, but with the support we have already established his action should be little more than a gesture.

There have been several abortive attempts in the past to deprive us of the use of the Banqueting House, but none has ever reached Parliament. Perhaps it would be a good thing if this one did. At least it would be a quick answer in the future to anybody conceiving a similar thought.

I am sure you would like me to record our grateful thanks to Admiral Sir Henry Moore and his Committee, and to our other friends in the Service Departments for their action on our behalf.

The use of the Banqueting House will be specially appreciated at the forthcoming Coronation, as it will enable a number of our members to obtain a good view of the Procession down Whitehall. A little nearer the time, your Council will send a Loyal Address in the name of the Institution to Her Majesty The Queen. That, I know, will meet with your cordial and united approval.

There is no need for me to remind you that costs have again increased during the year, and that the Institution has had to bear its part of the burden. But, let me say at once that an increase in members' subscription has not even been considered by your Council. The annual rate remains at thirty shillings—the figure set in 1948. Nobody can deny that we get good value for this comparatively small sum, which is ten shillings less than the price of a year's Journal.

The rates of pay for the junior staff were reviewed during the year. Increases were awarded in all cases and the present rates compare favourably with those in similar organizations. In order to make these increases possible, the administrative part of the staff voluntarily reduced its establishment and took on the extra work.

Those members of the Institution who have not covenanted to pay their subscriptions are earnestly asked to do so. It will not cost them a penny extra, but it will go a long way towards relieving the financial strain. A member who covenants insures himself without cost against having to pay any increase in subscription for seven years ; that alone makes it worth while. We, on our side, will continue to do all we can to keep expenses down and to increase our income ; between us, we can make the annual subscription safe from interference. The Secretary is always ready to explain the simple terms of a deed of covenant.

We now come to the Annual Report for 1952 of which you have a copy. Before referring to it I should like to thank Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington, Brigadier John Longmore, Lieut.-General Sir Colin Callander, and the Members of their Committees for their valuable services during the year. If we turn now to the printed report, I think that it would be convenient to take each section in turn. Pages 1 to 3 you will notice contain a record of facts and as such, I think, they call for no further comment. On the section dealing with Finance, Brigadier Longmore, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, is present and is prepared to answer any questions which members may wish to ask with regard to finance. (*No questions were asked.*)

As there are no questions on Finance we turn next to the sections headed "Journal" and "Library." Lieut.-General Sir Colin Callander, the Chairman of the Journal and Library Committee, is here and is ready to answer any questions. (*No questions were asked.*)

The third and last section is "Museum." Are there any questions about the Museum ? (*No questions were asked.*)

Since there are no questions I shall put the resolution to the meeting :—

"That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted."

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE : I should like to second this resolution and then to raise two matters. The first is with regard to the increase in the number of visitors to the Museum. That is due to the good set-out and to the courtesy of our staff. It also shows that the Banqueting House is a most necessitous part of this Institution.

The second matter concerns the Journal sales which have gone up very considerably. That again is due to our staff, and I should like to thank them for the keenness which they display and for the way they are making this Institution much more easy to run financially. (*Applause.*)

The Resolution was then put to the Meeting and carried.

THE CHAIRMAN : I will now ask Major-General Vyvyan to move the second Resolution.

MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. VYVYAN : I beg to move :—

"That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year."

WING COMMANDER E. BENTLEY BEAUMAN : I should like to second that resolution.

The Resolution was then put to the Meeting and carried.

VACANCIES ON THE COUNCIL

THE CHAIRMAN : The undermentioned officers have been nominated as Candidates for the vacancies on the Council :—

ROYAL NAVY (one vacancy)—

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE (one vacancy)

Commodore R. Harrison, D.S.O., R.D., R.N.R.

REGULAR ARMY (one vacancy)—

Major-General J. A. Gascoigne, C.B., D.S.O.

TERRITORIAL ARMY (one vacancy)—

Major-General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (one vacancy)—

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.

The above mentioned officers were elected.

AMENDMENT TO BYE-LAWS

THE CHAIRMAN : It is proposed by the Council :—

“ Amendment to Bye-Laws. Delete paragraph 1 of Ch. IV which reads :—

‘ A General Meeting, at which the Annual Report and statement of accounts shall be presented for adoption, shall be held on the first Tuesday in March, that day being considered the anniversary of the Institution ’
and substitute :—

‘ A General Meeting, at which the Annual Report and the statement of accounts shall be presented for adoption, shall be held on a date to be decided by the Council at their meeting in December ’ ”

I do not know whether there are any questions about this ? It is really a small amendment to the Bye-Laws. (*No questions were asked.*)

The proposition was carried.

THE TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1952

THE CHAIRMAN : I will ask the Secretary to report the results of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition, 1952.

THE SECRETARY : The subject was “ How far does the rising tide of nationalism in the countries of the Middle and Far East affect previous strategic thought ? ” There were eight entries made up from the Royal Navy and Army including one from the Royal Pakistan Army. The three Referees were from the Imperial Defence College.

On the unanimous recommendation of the Referees it was decided to award the Gold Medal of the Institution and the First Trench Gascoigne Prize of thirty guineas to Major M. E. Bransby-Williams, R.A. He was second in the competition in 1924. In view of the high standard of the essays, and again on the recommendation of the Referees, the Council decided to award prizes to the second and third. The second prize of twenty guineas was awarded to Captain F. B. Ali of the Royal Pakistan Army, and the third prize of ten guineas to Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, late of

The Essex Regiment, who won the competition in 1933, was an equal second with Major Bransby-Williams in 1924, and was second again in 1947.

The Chairman then presented the prizes to Major Bransby-Williams and Brigadier Clarke. Captain Ali was unable to be present.

THE EARDLEY-WILMOT PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1952

THE SECRETARY: This competition is held every five years and the subject is essentially Naval. Up to quite recently—this year in fact—the subject has always been “Changes in naval warfare owing to new and modified weapons,” but, for the future, the Council have decided to select the subject each time the competition is held. On the recommendation of the Referees the winner of the Eardley-Wilmot Medal and cash prize of eighteen guineas is Captain R. Oliver-Bellasis, R.N.

The Chairman presented the prize to Captain Oliver-Bellasis.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am sure that on your behalf you would like me to express our thanks to the officers who undertook the task of acting as Referees in these competitions, and we hereby record our thanks to them.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE RETIRING CHAIRMAN

THE CHAIRMAN: A year ago to-day General Sir Ouvry Roberts was elected as our Chairman. You will remember that he undertook these duties at short notice owing to General Lord Ismay's Cabinet appointment and his successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, becoming High Commissioner of Malaya.

The Institution owes a real debt of gratitude to General Sir Ouvry Roberts for all the work he has done for us in the past year on top of his arduous duties on the Army Council as Quartermaster-General.

I therefore propose:—

“That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the retiring Chairman.”

COMMODORE R. HARRISON: In seconding this vote of thanks I should like to record the very deep debt which the Institution owes to the senior officers of all three Services who give their valuable time in order to preside at our meetings, and to look over the affairs of the Institution week by week. We owe them a very great debt and I really think that their interest makes for the brilliant success which this Institution enjoys.

I have much pleasure in seconding this vote of thanks.

The vote of thanks was carried with acclamation.

THE CHAIRMAN: That concludes the meeting.

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
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